Mudd, 859 S.W.2d at 703; Cigno v. Cigno, 723 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Mo.App. 1987). A trial court may not, however, make a present award of child support which includes monthly payments for a child's automobile expenses before the child reaches driving age. Boudreau v. Benitz, 827 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Mo.App. 1992); Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo.App. 1993). Upon appropriate proof, a trial court may make an increase in child support for future expenses effective at a future date and contingent upon the occurrence of the event.
Simply stated, absent proof of increased expenses of the children, the changes in income of Mother and Father are irrelevant. Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo.App. 1993). Therefore, the only remaining question is whether Mother's evidence of increased expenses was sufficient to prove a substantial continuing change of circumstances to the extent that increased child support was mandated as a matter of law.
On September 8, 1992, the trial court modified the child support award and granted wife's prayer for attorney fees in the amount of $13,000. In Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App.E.D. 1993), (hereinafter Brooks I) husband appealed all aspects of the judgment modifying the decree. However, the issue of attorney fees was not briefed, argued or considered. Wife cross-appealed denial of her request for damages.
Consequently, her failure to file a Form 14 precludes her from challenging the trial court's calculation of child support on this ground.Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993), cited by wife as support on this point, is inapposite. The challenge in Brooks concerned whether the mother had shown a substantial and continuing change in circumstances warranting modification of the decree; the calculation of the child support was not challenged by the father.
" Appellant's Excerpts of Record, tab H, p. 16 (Decision and Order). "An award for child support is for the child's current needs based on the child's appropriate standard of living and not for the purpose of saving portions thereof for future needs." Jane Doe VI v. Richard Roe VI, 6 Haw. App. 629, 736 P.2d 448, 457 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987); see also Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (characterizing "a car for a child who was 15 years old at the time of the trial, and a bar mitzvah for a child who was 10 at the time of trial" as "wish list" items). Thus, the trial court's award of child support exceeded the reasonable needs of the children, even considering that they are children of a wealthy parent.
Id. See also Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993) (father's failure to submit Form 14 did not bar appeal where his "challenge is directed only to mother's failure to satisfy her burden to show a substantial and continuing change of circumstances so as to authorize the modification"). Thus, Father's argument in his reply brief that any failure to file Form 14 at trial "would not have precluded him from challenging the trial court's finding that there was a substantial and continuing change in circumstances to warrant modifying the original child support order[]" is correct.
At the conclusion of Father's case, the trial court denied Mother' motion to dismiss for Father's failure to state a cause of action and for failure of proof of a substantial and continuous change of circumstances.See also Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo.App. 1993) (holding that a modification judgment should be reversed where the expenses listed by the mother were unsubstantiated and speculative); Searcy v. Searcy, 85 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Mo.App. 2002) (holding that a modification judgment should be reversed and remanded where evidence of expenses consisted of speculation). Father relies almost exclusively on Schleisman in the present matter; however, Schleisman does not aid Father.
Father contends that Mother's evidence of the children's expenses amounted to nothing more than a "wish list." Such a "wish list" is insufficient to support a finding of "unjust and inappropriate" and an upward deviation from the Form 14 guidelines, Father says. He cites Brooks v. Brooks, 871 S.W.2d 42 (Mo.App. 1993) (modification judgment reversed largely due to unsubstantiated and speculative expenses claimed by the mother), and Searcy v. Searcy, 85 S.W.3d 95 (Mo.App. 2002) (modification judgment reversed and remanded where evidence of extraordinary expenses consisted of speculation as to possible future expenses). This case is reminiscent of the Searcy case.
Although the respondent's testimony would support the fact that this expense may have been a work-related expense for the summer in question, in order for it to be included in the trial court's Form 14 calculation determining prospective child support payments, it would have to be something more than a one-time expense such that future support was required therefor. Brooks v. Brooks , 871 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo.App. 1993). In this regard, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the expense was to be reoccurring, as such the inclusion of the $25 of work-related child care costs in the trial court's Form 14 was not supported by the evidence and was error.