Summary
In Brooks v. Brooks, No. 03–1217, 2004 WL 240207 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 11, 2004), the court of appeals decided an appeal from a district court's order granting summary judgment to the wife in a paternity fraud case brought by her estranged husband.
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No. 4-059 / 03-1217
Filed February 11, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Michael J. Moon, Judge.
Trent Brooks appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Joanie Grife and Barry Kaplan of Fairall, Fairall, Kaplan Frese, L.L.P., Marshalltown, for appellant.
Erin Broadston of Mowry Law Firm, Marshalltown, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Trent Brooks appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Julie Brooks and Bryan Lolwing. The issue presented in this case is whether Iowa law recognizes or should recognize tort actions filed by a husband against his wife for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress when the actions are based on the wife's misrepresentation of paternity. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Trent and Julie Brooks were married on May 2, 1991. Julie gave birth to a son named Travis in 1988, prior to the marriage. Julie represented to Trent that he was the father of Travis, and he believed that to be true. After the couple was married, Trent signed an affidavit stating that he was Travis's biological father, and Travis's surname was changed to Brooks. Additionally, a paternity proceeding declared Trent to be Travis's biological father. In 1999 Julie gave birth to twins; Macy and Riley. Julie again represented to Travis that he was the father of the twins. Julie did not disclose to Travis that she had an affair prior to the parties' marriage nor did she disclose she had extramarital affairs during the marriage.
Trent filed a petition for dissolution on November 28, 2001. During the pendency of the dissolution proceedings Julie, without Trent's knowledge, conducted paternity testing with Bryan Lolwing and the children. The test revealed that Bryan was the biological father of all three children. Julie did not inform Trent that he was not the children's biological father. Instead, Trent learned this fact from his father. Trent then filed a petition for the disestablishment of paternity.
On October 18, 2002, Trent filed suit against Julie and Bryan alleging fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Julie and Bryan filed a motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2003. Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion. Julie and Bryan filed a motion to enlarge or amend the court's order. The district court agreed to amend its prior ruling and found it is contrary to public policy to allow claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress where it threatens an existing parent-child relationship. Trent appeals.
Standard of Review.
We review a summary judgment ruling for corrections of errors of law. Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Iowa 1998). Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997).
Issue on Appeal.
Trent argues that Iowa should recognize tort actions by husbands against their wives for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on misrepresentation of paternity. The district court concluded that Iowa does not recognize those causes of action because it is contrary to public policy. In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on a decision from the Nebraska Supreme Court. See Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002). The district court cited with approval the following language from Day:
Unlike a case involving a battery or a car accident, the quality of the parent-child relationship will be at the center of the lawsuit. The closer the plaintiff was to the child before he learned that he was not the biological father, the greater the potential for disruption and the more likely that a disruption to the relationship would cause him severe emotional distress. Because the tort necessarily places the quality of the parent-child relationship at its center, the child will become a focal point of litigation. In many cases, the mother will turn to the child to rebut the plaintiff's characterization of the parent-child relationship. As a result, the child will be subject to discovery concerning the nature of his or her relationship with the plaintiff and may even be called to testify at trial. The temptation for one party to manipulate the child's view of the other will be great, and we can conceive of the situation where the child `become[s] a strategic tool for advantageous use of one family member over another.'
. . . .
As we read his petition, Robert's fraud and assumpsit claims are for Robin's misrepresentation that led Robert to make investments of time, emotion, and money in Adam that he would not have made had he known that Adam was not his biological son. In effect, Robert is saying, "He is not my son; I want my money back." Robert's fraud and assumpsit causes of action focus on the burdens of the parent-child relationship, while ignoring the benefits of the relationship. We do not believe that having a close and loving relationship "imposed" on one because of a misrepresentation of biological fatherhood is the type of "harm" that the law should attempt to remedy.
Id. at 480, 82.
This is an issue of first impression in Iowa appellate courts. Although we find the Day decision persuasive, we decline the opportunity to decide whether such causes of action should be recognized in Iowa. We leave it up to the legislature or our supreme court to establish new causes of action even when they appear to have merit. See State v. Rhomberg, 516 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1994) ("A proposed change in the law, if desired, is in the province of the legislature."); Riniker v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); see also Flynn v. American Home Prod., 627 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). In Flynn, the district court concluded that Minnesota does not recognize the tort of "fraud-on-the-FDA" and the matter was submitted to the Minnesota appellate courts. Id. The appellant argued the Minnesota Court of Appeals could and should recognize the new tort cause of action. Id. After reviewing the case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated as follows:
We are mindful that `the task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court. It is not the function of this court to establish new causes of action, even when such actions appear to have merit.'
Id. (citations omitted); see also Samuels Recycling Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("Although our decisions are binding precedent until they are reversed by the supreme court, and although we have some role in the development of the law, the primary role of implementing statewide development of the law belongs to the supreme court.") (citations omitted). Therefore, we need not address the merits of either party's argument.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.