Estoppel by record is closely related to claim preclusion, except that under estoppel by record, it is the record of the earlier proceedings, rather than the judgment itself, that bars the second proceeding. Brooks v. Bank ofWisconsin Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 46, 467 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Ct. App. 1991). Both rules require an identity of parties and an identity of causes of action or claims in the two proceedings.
Accordingly, his allegations in support of that theory fail to state a claim. See Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 49-50, 467 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Ct.App. 1991) (complaint fails to state a claim when under no conditions would relief be appropriate). B. Weigel's Statutory Lien Claim.
Plaintiffs' reliance upon Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39 (Wis. App. 1991) is not well founded. In Brooks, the court allowed beneficiaries of Madeline Stanton's POD CDs to bring a negligence claim against a bank officer.
Id. The term "party" in this context refers only to a person's status as a party to the account; it has no bearing on standing. See Brooks v. Bank of Wiscousin Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 467 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Wis.App.1991) ("We conclude, therefore, that the definition of `party' in sec. 705.01(6), Stats., relates only to the person or persons who are parties to a multiple-party or agency account. It has nothing to do with legal standing to sue a depositor's agent for alleged negligence in maintaining a POD account."). It appears that only one (unpublished) case has construed both cited subsections of § 705.
Obviously, since we have concluded that Crosby proved a prima facie case for constructive fraud, thus establishing his right to relief, it would be absurd to conclude that Crosby had no standing to sue. Cf. Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis. 2d 39, 467 N.W.2d 187 (Wis.App. 1991). Were we to conclude otherwise, we would effectively abrogate the doctrine of constructive fraud.
"Estoppel by record," the doctrine relied upon by the circuit court and court of appeals in this case, is identical to claim preclusion except that it is the record of the earlier proceeding, rather than the judgment itself, which bars the subsequent proceeding. Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 46, 467 N.W.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1991). In order for claim preclusion or estoppel by record to apply, there must be an identity of parties or their privies and an identity of claims in the two cases.
We are not convinced. ¶ 20. Methodist Manor cites Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis. 2d 39, 467 N.W.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1991), to support its argument that Ray is liable for the acts she committed, which caused it harm. In Brooks, beneficiaries of a payable on death certificate of deposit filed suit against the Bank of Wisconsin Dells and one of its officers, who was the depositor's attorney-in-fact, after the officer cashed in the certificate and used the money to pay the depositor's living expenses.
¶ 30. Estoppel by record is a doctrine similar to claim preclusion under which a party is prevented from litigating what was litigated or might have been litigated in another proceeding, but it is the record of the prior proceeding, not the judgment, that is the bar to the second proceeding. Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 161 Wis. 2d 39, 46, 467 N.W.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1991). Estoppel by record does not apply for the first reason that claim preclusion did not: Miller is not asserting that the State is barred from refiling and litigating the charges against him; instead he asserts the State is barred from introducing the evidence Judge Krueger ruled was excluded in the prior action.
The trial court correctly concluded that the statute discharged the Bank from liability for paying the account balances to Gould. Negligence of the bank is an exception to the discharge of claims under § 705.06(2), Stats. SeeBrooks v.Bank of Wis. Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 467 N.W.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1991). Joseph argues that the P.O.D. accounts were "special accounts" with an accompanying fiduciary relationship, rather than a mere creditor-debtor relationship.
James argues that the State is precluded from raising this on appeal on grounds of claim preclusion, issue preclusion and estoppel by record because this information was not brought to the complaint examiner's attention. Such theories, however, apply only when there are two separate legal proceedings or actions, Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis.2d 541, 550-51, 525 N.W.2d 723, 727-28 (1995); Brooks v. Bank of Wis.Dells, 161 Wis.2d 39, 46-47, 467 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Ct.App. 1991), and are inapplicable here. James's assertion that his signature was attached to an interlibrary loan request for press clippings without his consent is no more than a request that we order the department to conduct an investigation into the matter — relief that is unavailable in certiorari proceedings.