Neither the Department of Civil Service nor the Westchester County Executive has made any unlawful expenditure, regardless of whether New York recognizes same-sex marriages. ( Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 NY3d 327; Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70; Matter of O'Brien v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 239; Syracuse Urban Renewal Agency v State of New York, 106 AD2d 23; Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201; Slattery v City of New York, 266 AD2d 24; Beresford Apts. v City of New York, 238 AD2d 218; Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801; Matter of Altamore v Barrios-Paoli, 90 NY2d 378; McMillen v Browne, 14 NY2d 326.) Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York City ( Susan L. Sommer of counsel), and Kramer Levin Naftalis Frankel LLP (Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Joshua Glick, Michael B. Eisenkraft and Jason M. Moff of counsel), for Michael Sabatino and others, respondents in the first and second above-entitled actions.
In reviewing an administrative agency's determination as to whether it. is arbitrary and capricious under CPLR Article 78, the test is whether the determination "is without sound basis in reason and ... without regard to the facts" (Matter of Pell vBoard of Educ. of Union Free. School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroncck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; Matter of Kenton Assoc. v Division of Rous. & Community Renewal, 22b AD2d 349 [1st Dept 1996]). "[T]he construction given statutes ... by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld" (Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 NY3d 327, 334 [2008] quoting Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 [1971]). "[R]egulation reflecting the choice made by the department ... is beyond [the court's] power to disturb unless it is 'so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary'" (Goodwin v Perales, 88 NY2d 383, 396 [1996], quoting Matter of Bernstein v Tola, 43 NY2d 437, 448 [1977]).
Pursuant to statute ( see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 41.38, 41.44), the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) works with and provides state aid to entities like TSLI. TSLI commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge two OMH determinations. It is well settled that when an agency acts within its area of expertise in interpreting statutes it is responsible for administering, its construction of those statutes is to be upheld if its decision is not irrational or unreasonable ( see e.g. Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 NY3d 327, 334). It was not irrational or unreasonable for OMH to determine that, for reimbursement purposes, under the Mental Hygiene Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder ( see Mental Hygiene Law § 41.38; 14 NYCRR 595.12), the expenses TSLI incurred in leasing residential apartments it used as offices must be accounted for as operating costs rather than as housing costs. The Appellate Division's order to the contrary should be reversed.
Hurwitz Fine, P.C., Buffalo ( Michael F. Perley and Audrey A. Seeley of counsel), for appellant. I. A local development corporation (LDC) should enjoy tax-exempt status under Real Property Tax Law § 420-a (1) for lease of its real property to for-profit businesses where the LDC's action is consistent with the LDC's core charitable purpose. ( Matter of Ellis Hosp. v Assessor of City of Schenectady, 288 AD2d 581; Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 NY3d 327; Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah v Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 NY2d 244; Gospel Volunteers v Village of Speculator, 29 NY2d 622; Matter of Adult Home at Erie Sta., Inc. v Assessor Bd. of Assessment Review of City of Middletown, 10 NY3d 205; Matter of Genesee Hosp. v Wagner, 47 AD2d 37, 39 NY2d 863; Matter of County of Erie v Kerr, 49 AD2d 174; Matter of Nassau County Council Boy Scouts of Am. v Board of Assessors of Town of Rockland, 84 AD2d 862, 55 NY2d 607; Matter of Canton Human Servs. Initiatives, Inc. v Town of Canton, 4 Misc 3d 413; Sisters of St. Joseph v City of New York, 49 NY2d 429.) II. Respondents erroneously removed the tax-exempt status of Lackawanna Community Development Corporation's real property at 100 Ridge Road. ( Matter of Regional Economic Community Action Program v Ritter, 270 AD2d 492, 95 NY2d 758.) Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo ( Daniel A. Spitzer, Michael B. Risman and Joshua Feinstein of counsel), for respondents. I. The property does not meet the r
In this instance, DFS has interpreted "correspondence," as the term appears in the Banking Law provision, to include not only written communications such as emails and letters, but also documents attached to, enclosed with, or obtained through its correspondence with regulated entities. As the agency responsible for the administration and implementation of Banking Law § 36, DFS' construction of the statute is entitled to deference, as its interpretation is rational (see Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department. of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 N.Y.3d 327, 334 [2008]; Matter of Partnership 92 LP & Bldg. Mgt. Co., Inc. v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 46 A.D.3d 425, 429 [1st Dept 2007], affd 11 N.Y.3d 859 [2008]). Moreover, DFS's interpretation of "correspondence"
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered September 15, 2017, denying the petition to annul the determination of respondent Department of Environmental Protection, dated October 7, 2003, which denied petitioner's application for an exemption from water and sewer charges, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs. In Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. (11 NY3d 327 [2008]), the Court of Appeals upheld respondent's determination that the petitioner church could qualify for an exemption from water and sewer charges only for the portion of its building used for public worship, plus one caretaker's dwelling. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the case is controlling here. Respondent's determination limiting the water and sewer exemption to the portion of petitioner's premises devoted exclusively to public worship, plus the residence of a caretaker for these premises, is not arbitrary and capricious.
At issue here is only the second element, whether the property is primarily used for religious or charitable purposes. With respect to that element, property uses that are “merely auxiliary or incidental to the main and exempt purpose and use will not defeat the exemption” (Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 N.Y.3d 327, 335, 869 N.Y.S.2d 878, 898 N.E.2d 921 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Ellis Hosp. v. Assessor of City of Schenectady, 288 A.D.2d 581, 582, 732 N.Y.S.2d 659 [2001] ). Petitioner offered testimony from four women affiliated with the property, along with numerous exhibits, whereas respondents offered no witnesses and relied on cross-examination and exhibits.
According to petitioners, DOH improperly construed the statute to mean that employers are precluded from using the value of benefits to offset cash wages. However, because this construction is consistent with the structure of New York City's Living Wage Law ( see NYC Admin. Code § 6–109[b] ), we find it to be rational inasmuch as any reduction of the cash wage rate below the floor provided for in the Living Wage Law would frustrate the legislative goal of achieving wage parity among home care workers throughout the metropolitan New York area ( see Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection of City of New York, 11 N.Y.3d 327, 334, 869 N.Y.S.2d 878, 898 N.E.2d 921 [2008];Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 70, 79, 854 N.Y.S.2d 83, 883 N.E.2d 990 [2008] ). Accordingly, we defer to DOH's interpretation of the statute.
. Here, the Board rationally construed the credit/refund amendment—authorizing credits/refunds for “overpayments made to the fund”—as referring only to overpayments made by “affected insurance carrier[s]” (i.e., windfall carriers) who are directed to pay the Board for any windfall retained in prior years, i.e., in which the surcharges exceeded assessments (L. 2009, ch. 56, § 1, part QQ, § 3; see Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 N.Y.3d 327, 335, 869 N.Y.S.2d 878, 898 N.E.2d 921 [2008] ). Under this interpretation, since payments to the Board by “affected insurance carrier[s]” as mandated by the amendment are ultimately transferred to the state's general fund (L. 2009, ch. 56, § 1, part QQ, § 3[b] ), these are the “overpayments made to the fund” of assessments for which the Board is authorized to issue credits/refunds when excess payments by affected carriers are later detected (L. 2009, ch. 56, part QQ, § 1, now codified in Workers' Compensation Law § 15[8][h][4] ).
Similarly, while the District is no longer permitted by federal law to apportion against hydroelectric power companies, its current apportionment mechanism continues to limit the reach of the statute to those entities that receive the most substantial, readily measurable benefits. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the District's interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference and, because it is rational, that interpretation must be upheld ( see Matter of Brooklyn Assembly Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y., 11 N.Y.3d 327, 334, 869 N.Y.S.2d 878, 898 N.E.2d 921 [2008] ). Contrary to petitioners' argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not invalidate the District's reading of the statute as irrational or otherwise address the merits of that interpretation. Rather, the Court concluded that federal law preempted state law with respect to FERC licensees and precluded the District from apportioning its operational costs on downstream hydropower projects ( see Albany Eng'g Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Commn., 548 F.3d 1071, 1076–1079 [2008], supra;see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson Riv.-Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 95–96 [2012], supra ).