Moreover, Aydee's counsel had, been informed by Nestar's insurer through HCM four months after the accident that it was disclaiming any responsibility as Nestar was not insured, although the letter from HCM dated July 1, 1992, was in response to Alicia's initial notice. In Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 619. A.2d 583 (1993), the Court discussed the purpose of the notice provisions delineated in N.J.S.A. 39:6-65: The time requirements for the notice of claim are designed to encourage "timely inquiry and thus to safeguard the fund against fraud and imposition."
Our courts have noted numerous times that the purpose of the Fund Law "is to provide a measure of relief for persons who sustain losses or injury inflicted by financially irresponsible or unidentified owners or operators of motor vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless." Corrigan v. Gassert, 27 N.J. 227, 233, 142 A.2d 209 (1958) (citing Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J. 1, 138 A.2d 14 (1958)); see also Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd. v. NJ Mfrs. Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 185, 189, 649 A.2d 1243 (1994); Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 145, 619 A.2d 583 (1993); Sumner v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, 288 N.J. Super. 384, 386, 672 A.2d 731 (App.Div. 1996). "The Legislature was attempting to `ameliorate the injustice to the victims resulting from a basic shortcoming of the tort liability system: the futility or impossibility of prosecuting a civil damage claim against a financially irresponsible or even unknown tort feasor.'"
See Presslaff v. Robins, 168 N.J. Super. 543, 546 (App. Div. 1979) (holding that the discovery rule does not apply to claims under the Wrongful Death Act because it contains its own limitations period that runs from the death of the decedent, rather than from an unspecific date of accrual); see also Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 151 (1993) (explaining that New Jersey tends to reject application of the discovery rule "for statutes of limitations that run from a fixed, specified event"). Before 2010, the Survivor Act contained no explicit statute of limitations.
However, the rule has been held to apply only where the cause of action is one subject to a period of limitations measured by accrual rather than by the occurrence of a fixed, specified, or objective event. Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 151, 619 A.2d 583 (1993); Bernoskie, supra, 344 N.J.Super. at 165, 781 A.2d 52; Mancuso v. Mancuso, 209 N.J.Super. 51, 56, 506 A.2d 1253 (App.Div. 1986). For example, causes of action for libel, the design and construction of real property improvements, wrongful death, PIP benefits, and workers' compensation, are all subject to limitations periods measured by the occurrence of fixed events as to which the discovery rule has been held not to apply.
But, if a statute's plain language is far from clear, a court must rely on "other rules of statutory interpretation." Young, 141 N.J. at 25, 660 A.2d 1153. Some other rules of statutory interpretation include: (1) construing statutes with remedial purposes liberally, Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 149, 619 A.2d 583 (1993); (2) construing statutes contrary to the common law narrowly, Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 310, 609 A.2d 415 (1992); and (3) construing exceptions to statutes narrowly, Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 558-559, 362 A.2d 13 (1976). CEPA "should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal."
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations under the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund because the legislature had restricted relaxation of the limitations period to specified exemptions. Brookins v. Murray, 619 A.2d 583 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 1993). See also Schwarz v. Fed. Shipbldg Dry DockCo., 108 A.2d 417, 421 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 1954) (refusing to apply discovery rule to Workers' Compensation Law because "this court cannot read something into a statute that is not there"); Interlox Punch Die Corp. v. Insilco Corp., 415 A.2d 1208 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1980) (holding discovery rule inapplicable to fraud action under New Jersey Uniform Securities Act because statute did not include "accrual" language);Presslaff v. Robins, 403 A.2d 939 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1979) (declaring discovery rule inapplicable to limitation period of Wrongful Death Act because of the absence of statutory language to support its application).
Significantly, New Jersey courts have not extended the discovery rule to a repose statute that commences and ends on specifically timed events. See Brookins v. Murray,131 N.J. 141, 151, 619 A.2d 583 (1993) ("The discovery rule as an equitable doctrine has not been applied to all so-called `statutes of limitations.' The tendency in New Jersey has been to reject the discovery rule for statutes of limitations that run from a fixed, specified event.").
Where the Legislature's intent is remedial, a court should construe a statute liberally. E.g., Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 149, 619 A.2d 583 (1993); Torres v. TrentonTimes Newspaper, 64 N.J. 458, 461, 317 A.2d 361 (1974). Statutes in derogation of the common law, however, are to be construed narrowly.
"Where the Legislature's intent is remedial, a court should construe a statute liberally. E.g., Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 149, 619 A.2d 583 (1993); Torres v. Trenton Times Newspaper, 64 N.J. 458, 461, 317 A.2d 361 (1974)." Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25, 660 A.2d 1153 (1995).
The term "disclaimed" as used in N.J.S.A. 39:6—65(b) has been construed broadly. Brookins v. Murray, 131 N.J. 141, 155 (1993) (citing Wharton v. Knox, 98 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 1967)).