The court in Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 819 F.Supp. 1227, 1244, citing to Cabo, assumed without deciding that the COLA at issue was property for purposes of the takings clause. Similarly, in Bronco Wine Co. v. United States Dept. of Treasury (E.D.Cal. 1996) 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1316, the court stated in dicta that since a COLA is property for purposes of due process analysis, it must also qualify for Fifth Amendment protection. Contrary to the assumption in Bronco Wine Co. v. United States Dept. of Treasury, supra, 997 F.Supp. at page 1316, the due process and takings clause concepts of property are not coterminous.
A TRO preserves the status quo pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction motion in order to avoid irreparable harm in the interim. See Ariz. Recovery Housing Ass n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 2020 WL 8996590, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2020); Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996). The standards governing temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “substantially identical.”
A TRO preserves the status quo pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction motion in order to avoid irreparable harm in the interim. See Ariz. Recovery Housing Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 2020 WL 8996590, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2020); Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996). The standards governing temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “substantially identical.”
. Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (emphasis added). III. Discussion
‘The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction.’ " Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist. , 561 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n, PAA Chapter , 306 F.2d 840, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1962) ); see alsoProcter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co. , 78 F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he purpose of a TRO under Rule 65 is to preserve the status quo so that a reasoned resolution of a dispute may be had."); Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury , 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996) ("The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending a full hearing on a preliminary injunction."). The Court therefore considers whether the status quo would materially change before a preliminary injunction could be heard.
An ex parte TRO is only appropriate where the applicant would face irreparable harm so immediate that it would be improper to wait until after a preliminary injunction hearing to enjoin the non-movant's conduct. See Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D.Cal.1996) (“The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending a full hearing on a preliminary injunction.”); cf. Hacker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 450 F.Supp.2d 705, 710 (E.D.Mich.2006) (“A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy that generally is reserved for emergent situations in which a party may suffer irreparable harm during the time required to give notice to the opposite party or where notice itself may precipitate the harm.”)
The substantive standard for granting a temporary restraining order is the same as the standard for entering a preliminary injunction. Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D.Cal.1996); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F.Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D.Cal.1995). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
The standard for granting a temporary restraining order is the same for entering a preliminary injunction. Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Franklin v. Scribner, Civil No. 07-0438 BTM (LSP), 2007 WL 1491100, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2007). The Ninth Circuit has prescribed the following equitable criteria for determining whether to grant injunctive relief:
A party seeking a TRO must satisfy the same test required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Lockheed Missile Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Second, to the extent that plaintiff's California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. claim is premised on a violation of GATT, it also fails to state a claim because there is no private right of action under GATT. See Intercitrus, Ibertrade Commercial Corp. v. United States Dep't of Agric., CIV.A. 02-1061, 2002 WL 1870467 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2002),citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512(c)(1)(A) (B); Bronco Wine Co. v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (E.D. Cal. 1996).