Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-0718-Y
September 30, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Thomas Bronaugh, Reg. No. 60538-079, is a former federal prisoner who was incarcerated in a Federal Correctional Institute (FCI) in Forrest City, Arkansas, at the time of the filing of this petition.
The Respondent is Marvin D. Morrison, Warden of the PCI, Forrest City, Arkansas.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 24, 2000, Bronaugh received a disciplinary conviction for escaping from a minimum security PCI located in Beaumont, Texas. (Resp. at Ex. B.) The discipline hearing officer sanctioned Bronaugh by disallowance of 27 days good conduct time, disciplinary transfer, and loss of visiting privileges for 180 days. (Id.) Bronaugh challenged his disciplinary conviction via his administrative remedies to no avail. (Pet. at Ex. I.) Bronaugh was transferred to the FCI in Forrest City, Arkansas, where he filed the instant habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Helena Division, on July 19, 2001. Morrison filed a response on November 28, 2001, and, on January 10, 2002, Bronaugh filed his motion in opposition.
Subsequently, Bronaugh was transferred to a Volunteers of America halfway house in Fort Worth, Texas, and assigned an anticipated release date of September 26, 2002. His petition was thereafter transferred by the United State District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Helena Division, to this court by order dated May 17, 2002. The petition and other pleadings and relevant documentation in the case were received by this court on September 19, 2002. Telephonic communication with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Volunteers of America halfway house in Fort Worth, Texas, has confirmed that Bronaugh was in fact released from custody to supervised release on September 26, 2002.
According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Bronaugh's current address is 1001 Willow Drive, Apt. 115, Fort Worth, Texas 76120.
D. ISSUES
In two issues, Bronaugh challenges the prison disciplinary proceeding as violative of his due process rights under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and contends he is innocent of the charged disciplinary offense. (Pet. at 2-9.) He requests that the court vacate his disciplinary conviction, restore his good time credits, and order the Bureau of Prisons to place him back in a minimum security facility. (Id. at 9.)
E. DISCUSSION
1. MOOTNESS
Bronaugh is no longer confined at the local Volunteers of America halfway house, having completely discharged the incarcerative portion of his federal sentence. As previously noted, telephonic communication with the Federal Bureau of Prisons has confirmed that Bronaugh was in fact released from custody on September 26, 2002, having completed the service of the incarcerative portion of his sentence. Bronaugh's term of imprisonment has, therefore, expired. Thus, the question in this case is whether dismissal is warranted, because the case has been rendered moot by Bronaugh's release.
Because a habeas petition challenges prison officials' authority to keep a prisoner in custody, in general, the petitioner's release moots a habeas petition. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982). However, a petition is not moot if the released prisoner can show that the challenged conviction will cause him to suffer some future collateral consequences. Id.; Carafas v. Lavalle, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). Thus, where the petition challenges the validity of the petitioner's underlying conviction, he can often satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution by showing that the conviction affects his ability to vote, engage in certain businesses, serve as juror, or hold public office. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237. While the presumption of collateral consequences may comport with the reality in the context of criminal convictions, the Supreme Court has held that the same cannot be said for other situations where a conviction is not being attacked. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998). See also Lane, 455 U.S. at 624 (holding that where prisoner only challenges his sentence, and not his conviction, Carafas does not apply). Accordingly, Spencer dictates a cautious approach to the presumption of collateral consequences, requiring the petitioner to affirmatively allege and demonstrate such consequences. See Beachem v. Schriro, 141 F.3d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir.) (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12-14), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 938 (1998).
In the instant petition, Bronaugh does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence, only the execution of his sentence. Specifically, Bronaugh challenges prison officials' disciplinary action with the resultant loss of good conduct time and other sanctions. Thus, Bronaugh must show that the disciplinary action itself will cause (or is still causing) him to suffer some actual, future harm and that a writ of habeas corpus can prevent this harm. As indicated, the principles enunciated by Spencer militate against a presumption of collateral consequences, and Bronaugh has made no demonstration whatsoever that he will suffer any collateral consequences from the subject disciplinary proceeding and sanctions. He is no longer subject to the disciplinary sanctions, and is not suffering any current consequence of the disciplinary proceeding. And, even if he did so allege, the mere possibility of future consequences is too speculative to give rise to a case or controversy. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1. See also Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding habeas petition challenging prison discipline for insolence and failure to obey moot after petitioner's release). Dismissal of this petition is therefore appropriate as moot based upon the expiration of Bronaugh's incarcerative sentence and his release from federal custody. See Loth v. Guzik, No. 4:00-CV-0377-G, 2001 WL 649650, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2001).
Bronaugh has not alleged that collateral consequences would stem from his term of supervised release, and, therefore, the Court need not address the issue. In any event, it appears that any such claim would be meritless since the decisions on the issue indicate that no collateral consequences would stem from the petitioner's term of supervised release. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000) (holding that term of supervised release remains unaffected by reason of excess time served in prison). See also Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1988); Vandenberg v. Rodgers, 801 F.2d 377, 377-78 (10th Cir. 1986).
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as moot.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is hereby extending the deadline within which to file, not merely place in the mail, specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation until October 22, 2002. Pursuant to Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), failure to file specific written objections within the specified time shall bar a de novo determination by the district court of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court.
ORDER SETTING DEADLINE FOR OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to Section 636, Title 28 of the United States Code, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until October 22, 2002, to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections. It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.