From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Broman v. Stern

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Apr 1, 1991
172 A.D.2d 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

Opinion

April 1, 1991

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.).


Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On July 26, 1988, the plaintiffs' attorney mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the attorney for the defendants-respondents, and the latter attorney admitted that he "accepted service * * * on behalf of" his clients. However, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendants-respondents had in fact authorized their attorney to accept process on their behalf. We agree with the Supreme Court that the mailing of the summons and complaint to the attorney for the defendants-respondents did not constitute valid service and that the action should, therefore, be dismissed on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [8]).

In general, service of process is valid only when it is accomplished in some method permitted by the CPLR (see, Macchia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592, 595; Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 288; Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 241; McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 115-116; Cooney v. East Nassau Med. Group, 136 A.D.2d 392, 393). Nothing in the CPLR authorizes service of process by mail upon the attorney for the party to be served (cf., CPLR 312-a). CPLR 308 (3) permits service upon an individual to be made "by delivering the summons within the state to the agent for service of the person to be served designated under rule 318". However, there is no proof that the defendants-respondents ever designated their attorney as their agent for the receipt of process.

An attorney is not automatically considered the agent of his client for the purposes of the service of process (see, Pergament Distribs. v. Net Realty Holding Trust, 120 A.D.2d 578; Greenthal Co. v. 301 E. 21st St. Tenants' Assn., 91 A.D.2d 934; Wichlenski v. Wichlenski, 67 A.D.2d 944, 947). In the absence of proof that the defendants-respondents designated their attorney as their agent for the purposes of accepting service of process, we must conclude that the attorney lacked authority to accept service on their behalf.

That the attorney for the defendants-respondents claimed that he was authorized to accept service on behalf of his clients is immaterial under the circumstances of this case. In general, representations made by an individual who accepts the service of process are not binding on the defendant in the absence of proof that the defendant himself knew of such representations (see, e.g., Espy v. Giorlando, 85 A.D.2d 652, affd 56 N.Y.2d 640 [nurse held herself out as agent of doctor]; Davidson v. Community Gen. Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 748, affd 76 N.Y.2d 956; Dorfman v. Leidner, 150 A.D.2d 935, affd 76 N.Y.2d 956; Selby v. Jewish Mem. Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 651; see also, Caudle v. Adler, 146 A.D.2d 598 [receiver of process falsely identified himself as defendant without defendant's knowledge]; Phi Sigma Phi Sorority v. Simons, 137 A.D.2d 873, 874 [defendant's roommate misrepresented herself as defendant]; Matter of Upstate Milk Coops. v. State of New York Dept. of Agric. Mkt., 101 A.D.2d 940 [statements made by attorney for New York State Department of Agriculture with respect to acceptance of service not binding on the commissioner]). In accordance with this general rule, it has been specifically held that an attorney who "agree[s] to accept service on behalf of individual [defendants]" (Greenthal Co. v 301 E. 21st St. Tenants' Assn., supra, at 934) does not automatically become an agent for the acceptance of process, in the absence of proof that his clients actually knew of that representation.

Even assuming that the defendants-respondents' attorney had been properly designated as their agent for the service of process, the fact remains that he himself was never properly served. Mailing a summons and complaint to a person to be served does not constitute valid service under CPLR 308 (3). "Service on the agent is * * * made in the same manner as it would be made on his principal, and the rules dealing with personal service by delivery apply" (1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ Prac ¶ 308.13 [b], at 3-232.27 — 3-232.28). Bracken, J.P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Broman v. Stern

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Apr 1, 1991
172 A.D.2d 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
Case details for

Broman v. Stern

Case Details

Full title:CHESTER BROMAN, et al., as Trustees of Local 282 International Brotherhood…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Apr 1, 1991

Citations

172 A.D.2d 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
567 N.Y.S.2d 829

Citing Cases

Riordan v. Garces

Thus, it is reasonably inferred that Kolko accepted service on Local's behalf after being given the authority…

Redbridge Bedford, LLC v. 159 N. 3RD St. Realty Holding Corp.

Rather, they maintain that such service was improper because proper service could only be made upon their…