Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-06-002 WCC
Submitted: December 3, 2001
Decided: March 27, 2002
Upon Claimant's Appeal from the Industrial Accident Board. Denied.
Gary S. Nitsche, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Claimant.
Cassandra Faline Kaminski Natalie S. Wolf, Young Conaway Stargatt Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, DE, Attorneys for Value City Furniture.
OPINION Introduction
On September 15, 2000, Barbara Brogan (hereinafter "Claimant") was employed as a sales associate by Value City Furniture Store (hereinafter "Value City") when she was suddenly assaulted by Ruth Wiatrowski, her supervisor's wife.
Mrs. Wiatrowski, believing that Claimant and her husband were engaged in an affair, stormed into Value City, grabbed Claimant by her hair, threw her on the floor, drug her outside and kicked her in the face. Claimant sustained injuries to her neck, back, knees, and her face, as a result of this attack. She was unable to work for a number of days immediately following the attack, and she has undergone numerous chiropractic treatments to alleviate her back and neck pain.
Procedural Posture
Claimant filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due against Value City on January 23, 2001, seeking a determination that her injuries from the September 15, 2000 attack were work related, and thus compensable injuries. Claimant also sought an award of total disability benefits, for the five days that she was physically incapable of working, and an award of medical expenses, which included the cost of thirty-eight chiropractic treatments. On May 16, 2001 the Industrial Accident Board (hereinafter "Board") held a hearing, and found, in its May 30, 2001 decision, that the attack upon Claimant was personally motivated, that there was no reasonable causal connection between the attack and Claimant's employment. In so finding, the Board determined that Claimant's injuries did not "arise out of her employment," notwithstanding its finding that the injury occurred "in the course of" her employment. Because a compensable work related injury must arise out of ones employment, the Board found that Claimant was not entitled to any disability benefits, or compensation, because the attack was personally motivated.
The parties to this action consented to having a hearing officer resolve the dispute, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2301B(1)(4), as a hearing officer has the identical authority as the Industrial Accident Board to conduct a hearing and resolve the matter. 10 Del. C. § 2301B(1)(6).
Although evidence was proffered at the hearing concerning Claimant's medical expenses and whether or not they were reasonable, the Board did not make a finding about Claimant's medical expenses, as her injuries were found to be non-compensable injuries.
Facts
Prior to the September 15, 2000 attack, Claimant and her supervisor, Michael Wiatrowski (hereinafter "Mr. Wiatrowski") had a friendly, working relationship. Mr. Wiatrowski and his wife had been separated at the time of the incident, and Claimant had recently been through an emotional break-up with her ex-boyfriend. She had discussed with Mr. Wiatrowski taking time off from work, to manage her emotional problems, and therefore was seen in his office on a few occasions. Claimant and Mr. Wiatrowski would also occasionally frequent a nearby bar with fellow co-workers after work. It also appears that prior to September 15th, the Claimant borrowed a Value City truck to move out of her apartment, and Mr. Wiatrowski was present and assisted in the move. During that move, a picture of Claimant fell out of her belongings, and ended up in the truck, which Mr. Wiatrowski found and did not return to the Claimant. Mrs. Wiatrowski eventually found this picture, and brought this picture with her when she stormed into Value City on the day of the incident.In addition to the picture, Claimant and another Value City employee testified that there were rumors spread by Value City co-workers, Linda Galvin and Kelly Drummond, that Claimant and Mr. Wiatrowski were having an affair. Ms. Christine Torres-Cordingley, a Value City employee and co-worker with Claimant, testified that Linda Galvin and Kelly Drummond were known for gossiping, were friendly with Mrs. Wiatrowski outside of the office, and were known to dislike Claimant. Mr. Keith Noel, a Value City employee, testified that he "heard through gossip [that] Linda was involved" in informing Mrs. Wiatrowski that Claimant was at the store that day.
Earlier that day, Mrs. Wiatrowski had made numerous phone calls to Value City to speak to her husband which eventually lead to Mr. Wiatrowski calling the police to cease those incessant telephone calls. Later, after the police had left, Mrs. Wiatrowski came to Value City, stormed into the store, and immediately began screaming at Claimant, grabbed Claimant by the hair, pulled her down to the ground, drug her outside of Value City, and began beating on her. During the assault, Ms. Wiatrowski showed Claimant the photograph she had found in her husband's possession, and continued to accuse Claimant of having an affair with Mr. Wiatrowski. It was this attack, which several Value City employees testified to witnessing, that caused Claimant's injuries.
Throughout the attack, Mrs. Wiatrowski had screamed obscenities to the effect of "you f. . .ing this, and you f. . .ing that!"; accusing Claimant of sleeping with Mr. Wiatrowski, and screaming that she, Mrs. Wiatrowski, was going to kill Claimant.
Standard of Review
The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. On appeal, this Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. This Court's duty is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of fact and whether errors of law exist. As the Court performs this duty, it views the facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below. This Court may overturn the Board's decision only where there is no satisfactory proof in support of the Board's factual findings. Furthermore, this Court will give deference to the expertise of administrative agencies and must affirm the decision of an agency even if the Court might have, in the first instance, reached an opposite conclusion.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del.Super. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del.Super. 1960).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del.Super. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super. 1986), appeal dismissed, 515 A.2d 397(Del.Supr. 1986).
Johnson 213 A.2d at 66.
See Chundnofsky v. Edwards, 208 A.2d 516, 518 (Del.Supr. 1965).
Johnson 213 A.2d at 66.
See 29 Del. C. § 10142(d); Petty v. University of Delaware, 450 A.2d 392, 396 (Del.Supr. 1982); Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671 (Del. 1972).
Discussion
Delaware's worker's compensation statute, 19 Del. C. § 2304, is the exclusive remedy available to an employee, to secure compensation from an employer, for work-related injuries. For an injury to be compensable under this statute, the injury must have arisen out of the employment, and must have occurred in the course of the employment. These two separate and distinct requirements, "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment, must both be met for worker's compensation to be applicable. "In the course of" employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury," and covers "those things that an employee may reasonably do or be expected to do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time." In this case, the parties do not dispute, and the Board found, that Claimant's injuries clearly did occur "in the course of" her Value City employment, thus fulfilling one prong of the two prong analysis. The sole issue presented on appeal, and now pending before the Court, is whether there was substantial evidence presented at the hearing for the Board to have found that Claimant's injuries did not "arise out of" her employment with Value City. Whether an injury "arises out of" one's employment appertains to the "origin of the accident and its cause, and relates to the character and quality of the accident with reference to the employment." In Dravo v. Strosnider, the Court noted that "[i]t is sufficient if the injury arises from a situation which is an incident[,] or has a reasonable relation to the employment, and there [must] be some causal connection between the injury and the employment." In the more recent case of Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Center Properties, the Court held that "in order to be compensable, the injury must have been caused in a time and place where it would be reasonable for the employee to be under the circumstances" and "there must be a reasonable causal connection between the injury and the employment."Claimant contends that the Court should reverse the Board's finding, as Claimant's assault not only occurred "in the course of her employment," but it also "arose out of her employment" because of the conduct of her fellow employees. In support of this position, Claimant contends that the alleged rumors were started and sustained by Value City co-workers, and these false rumors prompted Mrs. Wiatrowski's attack upon Claimant. Value City contends that Claimant's attack was driven by personal animosity and as such, is not a work related injury compensable under Delaware's workers compensation statute.
The Board found that the attack did not arise out of Claimant's employment and specifically noted that during the attack, Mrs. Wiatrowski mentioned the photograph of Claimant found in her husband's possessions; she did not mention the alleged "rumors" that were supposedly passed on by Value City employees; none of the witnesses who testified were able to affirmatively state that they heard Linda Galvin or Kelly Drummond call Mrs. Wiatrowski on September 15 nor knew Linda Gavin or Kelly Drummond spread specific rumors about an alleged affair between Claimant and Mr. Wiatrowski. As such, the Board found Claimant's allegations "speculative" and not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court may only reverse the Board's decision if that decision is not based upon substantial evidence, or if the Board committed errors of law, and the Court may not reverse the Board, even if the Court would have decided the issue differently.
See Petty v. University of Delaware, 450 A.2d 392, 396 (Del. 1982); Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671 (Del.Supr. 1972).
The Court finds that this litigation has been unduly complicated by the development of a record which at best is nothing more than gossip and rumor that would rival an episode of Peyton Place. Obviously recognizing that her incident would not fit the traditional meaning of arising out of ones employment, the Claimant desperately attempts to develop a record that would convince the Board and eventually the Court that the defendant's employment atmosphere fostered the conditions that lead to her attack. Neither the Board or the Court is convinced that such a relationship existed.
Ones knowledge of the meaning of the analogy of Peyton Place derives from being raised in the 60's. Perhaps a more modern analogy would be Melrose Place.
Lost in the arguments made by the Claimant and responded to by the employer is what is being requested by the Claimant in this litigation. She is not seeking compensation from the co-workers that allegedly fostered and supported the attack, nor is she seeking redress from her attacker. She is asking in this litigation for her employer to continue to compensate her because of alleged conduct of employees totally unrelated to the work they were performing. The only common connection that the Claimant has been able to establish by those allegedly involved in this incident is their employment at Value City. But this fact alone is not sufficient. The obvious intent of the workman's compensation law was to provide a continuum of income when one is hurt in the performance of their employment responsibilities. As such, there has to be some causal connection between ones employment and the alleged injury. The acts of Mrs. Wiatrowski and if true, even the conduct of Linda Galvin and Kelly Drummond, are not related to the Claimant's employment at Value City. They were illegal acts in personal retaliation for an alleged affair between the Claimant and Mr. Wiatrowski and the fact that the attack occurred at Value City is nothing more than a coincidence. In order to hold the employer responsible for compensation, there must be some evidence that the company's policies or procedures contributed to the injury or their failure to take appropriate corrective action fostered a work environment that contributed to the events that lead to the injuries. Those conditions are simply not present in this case.
The Court can appreciate the frustration of the Claimant and can sympathize with the injuries she has suffered because they resulted from what appears to be an unjustifiable attack. The Court can also appreciate the resentment and anger that she feels toward Mrs. Wiatrowski and her co-workers. However, the Claimant has other civil remedies available to her to address these concerns. It is to those forums that the Claimant should look for relief, not her employer.
In this case, substantial evidence was presented to the Board for it to have found that Claimant's attack was personally motivated, and not the result of her employment. As such, the Court finds that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and is otherwise free from legal error, and that decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.