Opinion
83807-COA 83865-COA
05-15-2023
DOUGLAS BROFMAN, Appellant, v. GINA FIORE, Respondent. DOUGLAS BROFMAN, Appellant, v. GINA FIORE, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL IN PART AND AFFIRMING IN PART (DOCKET NO. 83807-COA), AND DISMISSING APPEAL (DOCKET NO. 83865-COA)
Gibbons, C.J.
Douglas Brofman appeals from a child custody and support decree and various post-decree orders. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Dawn Throne, Judge.
Brofman and respondent Gina Fiore were never married, but have one minor child together, who was born in 2015. In 2019, Fiore filed a complaint for child custody, requesting that the district court award the parties joint legal and physical custody of the child and direct that neither party would be required to pay child support. Brofman, in turn, filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking joint legal custody; primary physical custody in his favor; an award of child support in his favor; leave to relocate with the child to Cleveland, Ohio; and an order requiring Fiore to repay certain loans that he allegedly made to her. After pre-trial motions, the district court held a one-and-a-half-day trial where both parties were represented by counsel.
During the trial, Fiore argued that, if Brofman was not permitted to relocate with the child, the child should attend the school for which she was zoned. Because Brofman was focused on the relocation issue, he did not present any evidence at trial concerning school choice or otherwise suggest an alternative to the school that Fiore proposed. Consequently, rather than resolving the school choice issue based solely on the evidence and testimony that Fiore presented at trial, the district court orally directed Brofman to file a memorandum addressing his preferred school for the child, and further directed Fiore to file a response. Following briefing on the school choice issue and a non-evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a custody and support decree with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which denied Brofman leave to relocate to Cleveland, Ohio, with the child, awarded the parties' joint legal and physical custody, directed that the child attend the school that Fiore was zoned for, and required Fiore to pay child support to Brofman, Thereafter, several additional issues arose between the parties, which they extensively litigated. Following full briefing and hearings on these issues, the district court eventually entered orders resolving the parties' various disputes on September 20, 2021; October 20, 2021; and November 1, 2021. In particular, in the September 20 order, the district court modified the decree's vacation schedule by setting forth specific dates for the parties to take their respective vacations with the child and granted Fiore's request for make-up parenting time. In the October 20 order, the district court, among other things, (1) denied Brofman's request for an order directing Fiore to show cause why she should not be held in contempt, (2) denied Brofman's request for a new trial under NRCP 59, (3) denied Brofman's request for reconsideration and/or modification of the court's school selection determination, and (4) denied Brofman's request for an "injunction" requiring Fiore to pay certain of his attorney fees and costs and to place funds in a trust to secure payment of unspecified attorney fees and costs that he apparently intended to pursue in the future. Lastly, in the district court's November 1 orders, the district court took the following actions that are relevant to this appeal: the court (1) authorized Fiore to obtain a passport for the child without a signature from Brofman on the passport application, (2) awarded Fiore the attorney fees that she incurred in connection with the passport issue, (3) denied Brofman's challenge to a decision by the parties' parenting coordinator concerning the reallocation of her fees, (4) denied Brofman's request for sole legal custody over medical decisions, (5) awarded Fiore the attorney fees that she incurred in connection with the various issues that the court resolved in its October 20 order; and (6) implicitly denied Brofman's request for the attorney fees and costs that he incurred in connection with certain of the disputes that were resolved by the November 1 orders. Brofman filed the appeal in Docket No. 83807-COA to challenge the custody and support decree, the September 20 order, and the October 20 order, and he brought the appeal in Docket No. 83865-COA to challenge the November 1 orders.
Docket No. 83807-COA
Custody and support decree
Beginning with the decree, although Brofman is dissatisfied with the decision for several reasons, many of his arguments relate to the relief from that decision that he sought in his post-decree motions and these challenges are therefore addressed in the context of those orders. However, Brofman does present three direct challenges to the custody and support decree itself, which we address below, in turn.
In his first challenge to the decree, Brofman argues that the district court incorrectly calculated Fiore's child support obligation and that it improperly denied his request for child support arrears. However, our review of the documents before us on appeal demonstrates that this court lacks jurisdiction over this portion of Brofman's appeal. This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). Here, Brofman argues that this court has jurisdiction to hear his appeal from the decree under NRAP 3A(b)(1), which authorizes this court to hear appeals from final judgments entered in district court actions. However, as Brofman correctly observes, the district court has not entered a written order resolving his counterclaim for repayment of loans that he allegedly made to Fiore during the underlying proceeding. And because this claim remains pending below, see Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 445, 454, 92 P.3d 1239, 1245 (2004) (explaining that a dispositional court order that addresses the merits of a case "must be written, signed, and filed before [it] become[s] effective"), the district court has not entered a final judgment in this case, see Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (providing that "a final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs").
Under these circumstances, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Brofman's challenge to the district court's child support determination, and we therefore dismiss Brofman's appeal to the extent that it is directed at that portion of the decree.
Nevertheless, the custody portion of the decree finally establishes a custody arrangement for the parties' child and is therefore appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(7) (authorizing appeals from orders finally establishing or altering custody of minor children, provided that the orders were not entered in juvenile court actions) to the extent that Brofman challenges issues pertaining to child custody. Thus, we turn to Brofman's second challenge to the decree, which pertains to the custody determination itself. In particular, Brofman argues that, in resolving custody issues, the court improperly admitted reports from the parties' independent medical examinations for various reasons and that it misinterpreted the reports. However, Brofman concedes that his trial counsel stipulated to the admission of the reports, and given that stipulation, Brofman waived any challenge to their admissibility. See Second Baptist Church of Reno v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, 86 Nev. 164, 172, 466 P.2d 212, 217 (1970) (recognizing that "[stipulations are of an inestimable value in the administration of justice" and that "valid stipulations are controlling and conclusive and both trial and appellate courts are bound to enforce them"); see also Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court ... is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.").
Brofman is primarily concerned that the reports were admitted without any testimony from the expert who prepared them. While Brofman asserts that his counsel only stipulated to the reports' admission under these circumstances because there was insufficient time for the expert to testify at trial, this was a strategic decision that does not provide a basis for relief. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (recognizing that parties often stipulate to the admission of evidence that is otherwise objectionable for strategic purposes and that such stipulations will generally be honored); cf. McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2002) (considering a request for relief under the federal counterpart to NRCP 60(b)(1) and explaining that strategic miscalculations do not warrant relief from judgment). Relief is likewise unwarranted insofar as the district court limited the length of the trial to one and a half days, as the district court "ha[s] wide discretion in how [it] wishfes] to conduct a trial," including creating limitations on the presentation of evidence. Young v. Nev. Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 441, 744 P.2d 902, 904 (1987). Moreover, the district court offered Brofman multiple trial dates, and although he could have selected a date that would have allowed for a longer trial, he acknowledges that he accepted the date that only permitted a one-and-a-half-day trial due to a perceived advantage that the trial's timing would afford him, which was another strategic decision. Cf. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203; McCurry ex ret Turner, 298 F.3d at 593.
Moreover, while Brofman asserts that the district court misinterpreted the reports, we cannot fully evaluate his argument because he did not provide this court with a transcript from the portion of the trial where the reports were seemingly discussed, and because the reports are not otherwise specifically referenced in the custody decree. Instead, we presume that the missing transcript supports the district court's decision. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (explaining that it is appellant's burden to ensure that a proper appellate record is prepared and that Nevada's appellate courts presume that materials missing from the trial court record support the district court's decision). Thus, given the foregoing, we conclude that Brofman failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the reports or that any factual findings based on the reports were clearly erroneous. See Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. 770, 772, 406 P.3d 476, 478 (2017) (providing that the district court's decision to admit or deny evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); see also Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (recognizing that the district court's factual findings are entitled to deference and will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence).
Turning to Brofman's third challenge to the custody decree, he argues that the district court improperly resolved the school choice issue based on written memoranda that were unsupported by affidavits rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing. Fiore counters that, because there was a trial in this case where she presented evidence and testimony relevant to a Las Vegas school for the child to attend while Brofman failed to do so given his focus on the relocation issue, the district court should have simply resolved the school choice issue in her favor at the conclusion of trial. And although the district court instead permitted Brofman to supplement his trial presentation with a memorandum on the school-choice issue as it related to Las Vegas schools, Fiore contends that an additional evidentiary hearing was not warranted under the circumstances presented here. We review the district court's child custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007).
Initially, we disagree with Fiore's contention that the district court should have simply resolved the school choice issue at trial when Brofman failed to offer evidence or testimony concerning a school in Las Vegas for the child to attend. In particular, although the record before this court generally confirms Fiore's representation of what happened at trial in connection with the school choice issue, notwithstanding Brofman's failure to provide this court with a copy of the transcript from the first day of trial, it also shows that Brofman lacked notice that Fiore would seek to change the parties' prior schooling arrangement, which entailed home schooling in Las Vegas, in the event that he was not granted leave to relocate to Cleveland with the child. Indeed, Fiore did not submit any briefing on that issue prior to trial, nor did she identify school choice as a pending issue for the district court's consideration at trial in her pre-trial memoranda. Under these circumstances, it is unclear how the district court could have resolved the school-choice issue at trial in a manner consistent with Brofman's due process rights. See Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007) (recognizing that procedural due process requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard); see also, e.g., Micone v. Micone, 132 Nev. 156, 159, 368 P.3d 1195, 1197 (2016) (holding the court's award of custody to paternal grandparents violated due process where the parents had notice that custody was at issue, but did not have notice that the court was considering that particular custody option).
However, the district court instead permitted Brofman to supplement his trial presentation with a memorandum concerning the school-choice issue, thereby providing him with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter, and further directed Fiore to file a responsive memorandum. See CalUe, 123 Nev. at 183, 160 P.3d at 879. Brofman nevertheless contends that the district court improperly proceeded to resolve the school-choice issue without conducting an evidentiary hearing based solely on the parties' memoranda, which he emphasizes were unsupported by sworn affidavits.
This issue, however, is waived as Brofman did not request an evidentiary hearing before the district court resolved the school-choice issue, nor did he assert, in his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the school-choice issue, that the lack of an evidentiary hearing provided a basis for disturbing the custody and support decree. See Old Aztec Mine, 97 Nev. at 52, 623 P.2d at 983 ("A point not urged in the trial court ... is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). And regardless, Brofman's contention overlooks two important points. First, the district court did not solely rely on the parties' memoranda since it also looked to the evidence and testimony that was presented at trial on the school choice issue, as the court expressly explained in the custody and support decree. And second, while the parties did not attach sworn affidavits to their memoranda, they did provide unsworn declarations, which they were permitted to use in lieu of affidavits to support the factual allegations in their memoranda and exhibits attached thereto. See NRS 53.045 (providing that unsworn declarations may be used in lieu of affidavits to establish the existence or truth of a matter); cf. Myers v. Raskins, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 51, 513 P.3d 527, 534 (Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that, in evaluating whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a motion to modify custody, the district court may not consider the moving parties' factual allegations and exhibits unless they are "supported by verified pleadings, declarations, or affidavits").
Insofar as the district court relied on the foregoing to resolve the school-choice issue in Flore's favor without an evidentiary hearing, the court essentially made a determination that Brofman-through his memorandum-failed to demonstrate that he could overcome the pertinent evidence and testimony that the parties presented at trial, including any evidence that Fiore presented with respect to her preferred school and her supplemental offer of proof in her memorandum. And we cannot fully evaluate the propriety of that determination because Brofman failed to provide this court with a copy of the transcript from the portion of the trial where the majority of the evidence and testimony pertinent to the school-choice issue was seemingly presented. See Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135. Consequently, we conclude that Brofman failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by resolving the school-choice issue without conducting a post-trial evidentiary hearing. See Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241. Thus, in light of the foregoing and because Brofman does not present any other direct challenges to the custody and support decree, we affirm that decision in its entirety.
To the extent that Brofman asserts that the district court should have evaluated his memorandum by applying the adequate-cause standard, he has not established a basis for relief because that standard is used to evaluate motions to modify custody, see Rooney u. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542-43, 853 P.2d 123, 124-25 (1993) (explaining that the district court has discretion to deny a motion to modify custody without conducting an evidentiary hearing unless the moving party establishes adequate cause for the same, which arises where the moving party presents a prima facie case for modification), and is therefore inapplicable here since the district court resolved the school-choice issue in the context of its initial custody determination.
September 20 order
With respect to the September 20 order, Brofman does not challenge the portion of the order modifying the custody decree's vacation schedule, but instead focuses on the portion of the order that awarded Fiore make-up parenting time with the child. Having considered the documents before us, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal. Here, Brofman argues that the decision concerning make-up parenting time is substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8), which generally authorizes appeals from special orders entered after final judgment. However, as discussed above, no final judgment has been entered in this case. See Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at 417, and in the absence of a final judgment, there can be no special order entered after final judgment. And regardless, insofar as the September 20 order awarded Fiore make-up parenting time, it did not alter the parties' rights under the custody portion of the decree, which is a requirement for an order to qualify as a special order entered after final judgment. See Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002) (holding that, for an order to be appealable as a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(2), it "must be an order affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered"). Instead, this portion of the order simply enforced the parenting time and vacation schedules established in the decree. Thus, because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order enforcing a prior district court decision awarding make-up parenting time, see NRAP 3A(b); see also Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this portion of Brofman's appeal, and it is therefore dismissed.
October 20 order
Turning to the October 20 order, Brofman challenges the portion of the order denying his motion for a new trial under NRCP 59, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Edwards Indus., Inc. v. DTE/BTE, Inc., 112 Nev. 1025, 1036, 923 P.2d 569, 576 (1996). Initially, while Brofman contends that the district court improperly denied his motion for a new trial without first hearing oral argument, his contention is factually inaccurate. Indeed, the transcript from the relevant hearing reveals that, although the district court began the hearing by announcing its tentative ruling on the motion, it subsequently permitted Brofman to argue the motion's merits and responded with explanations as to why the court disagreed with his position. Although Brofman is dissatisfied with this approach, the district court has "wide discretion to control the conduct of proceedings pending before [it]," Div. of Child & Family Servs., 120 Nev. at 453, 92 P.3d at 1244, and under the circumstances presented here, the court could have simply denied Brofman's motion without any oral argument, see EDCR. 2.23(c) (providing that the district court may consider motions on the merits at any time without oral argument). Thus, relief is unwarranted in this respect.
EDCR 2.23 is found in Part II of the EDCR, which historically applied to all civil actions, including those before the family division, although Part V of the EDCR also set forth rules specifically applicable to the family division. This changed with the 2022 amendments to Part V of the EDCR, however, as EDCR 5.101 was amended to provide that Part II of the EDCR is inapplicable to matters before the family division. See In re Amendment of Part I & V of the Rules of Practice for the Eighth Judicial District Court, ADKT No. 0590 (Order Amending Part I and Part V of the Rules of Practice for the Eighth Judicial District Court, Apr. 11, 2022). Because this amendment did not become effective until June 10, 2022, which was after the district court denied Brofman's motion for a new trial, EDCR 2.23 is the controlling authority. But regardless, even with the amendments to Part V of the EDCR, the district court is authorized to "deny a motion at any time." EDCR 5.702(a).
Continuing with his challenge to the portion of the October 20 order denying his motion for a new trial, Brofman contends that reversal is warranted because he purportedly demonstrated that Fiore misrepresented the timing and content of certain text messages that she introduced at trial or that she otherwise introduced text messages that were fraudulent. Moreover, Brofman contends that Fiore failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the text messages.
To prevail on a motion for a new trial, the moving party must establish grounds, see NRCP 59(a)(1) (listing the various grounds for a new trial), and prejudice "materially affecting the substantial rights of the moving party." Id.; see also Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez, 133 Nev. 261, 263-64, 396 P.3d 783, 786 (2017) f[E]ven if one of NRCP 59<a)'s new-trial grounds has been established, the established ground must have materially affect[ed] the substantial rights of [the] aggrieved party to warrant a new trial" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, even assuming that Brofman's arguments concerning the text messages are correct, which would potentially implicate several of the grounds for a new trial, see NRCP 59(a)(1) (indicating that the new-trial grounds include abuse of discretion by the district court, misconduct by the prevailing party, and newly discovered evidence), he has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice materially affecting his substantial rights notwithstanding his contention that the subject text messages provided the basis for the district court's decision to deny his request to relocate to Cleveland with the child.
In evaluating relocation requests, district courts are required to conduct a complex, multi-pronged analysis that entails making an initial determination as to whether the moving party satisfied all three subparts of NRS 125C.007(1)'s threshold test, and if so, to proceed to consider whether the relocation factors set forth in NRS 125C.007(2) support the moving party's request to relocate. See Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 7, 507 P.3d 588, 589-90 (Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that the district court must consider the relocation factors only if the relocating parent satisfies all three subparts of the threshold test). Here, the district court denied Brofman's relocation request since it determined that he did not satisfy any of the subparts of the threshold test, and the court's only finding concerning a text message was provided as one of several bases why Brofman failed to meet his burden as to one of the subparts. See NRS 125C.007(1) (stating that the relocating parent has the burden of establishing the subparts comprising the threshold test). This suggests that the subject text messages were not material to the district court's determination that Brofman failed to satisfy the remaining two subparts of the threshold test and that the district court would have denied Brofman's relocation request even without considering the text messages, given that all three subparts must be satisfied before the district court is even required to consider the relocation factors. See Monahan, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 7, 507 P.3d at 589-90.
And even assuming that the court did consider these text messages in addressing the other two subparts of this test, we cannot discern the extent to which the text messages may have influenced the findings underlying the district court's determination with respect to those two subparts, given that Brofman did not provide this court with a copy of the transcript from the first day of trial where the bulk of the evidence and testimony were seemingly presented, including the text messages. And because we presume that the missing transcripts supported the district court's decision to deny Brofman's motion for a new trial, see Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135, we conclude that Brofman has failed to show that the use of the text messages at trial materially affected his substantial rights, see NRCP 59(a)(1); see also Pizarro-Ortega, 133 Nev. at 263-64, 396 P.3d at 786, and that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion. See Edwards Indus., 112 Nev. at 1036, 923 P.2d at 576.
Brofman next challenges the portion of the October 20 order that denied his motion for reconsideration of the district court's school-choice determination. In particular, Brofman essentially argues that the district court's initial resolution of the school-choice issue was characterized by legal errors and that this motion demonstrated that Fiore made inaccurate factual allegations in her school-choice memorandum and attached inaccurate exhibits thereto. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997) (explaining that the district court may grant reconsideration of a decision if it was clearly erroneous or if new issues of law or fact are raised). We address his appellate arguments accordingly.
To begin, insofar as Brofman contends that reconsideration was warranted because the district court improperly resolved the school-choice issue based on memoranda that were unsupported by sworn affidavits without conducting an evidentiary hearing, his argument fails for the reasons discussed above in the context of his challenge to the custody and support decree. Moreover, while Brofman argues that the district court's initial resolution of the school-choice issue will force him to move from his home in Las Vegas to another home in Las Vegas that is closer to Fiore's preferred school and that the court therefore should have performed the relocation analysis set forth in NRS 125C.007 in resolving the school-choice issue, his argument lacks merit. Indeed, NRS 125C.007 does not govern the resolution of school-choice issues, but instead, applies when a parent petitions to relocate "outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child." See NRS 125C.0065(1)(b) (providing that, when a parent seeks to relocate under the circumstances discussed above and the non-relocating parent does not consent to the relocation, the relocating parenting must file a petition for primary physical custody for purposes of relocation).
And while Brofman also asserts that he demonstrated that Fiore made inaccurate factual allegations in her school-choice memorandum and attached inaccurate exhibits thereto, we cannot discern whether Brofman properly raised these issues in the context of a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, because Brofman failed to provide this court with a copy of the relevant trial transcript, we cannot determine whether Fiore presented the same factual allegations and exhibits at trial, such that Brofman should have addressed any alleged inaccuracies in his school-choice memorandum prior to the district court's initial resolution of the school-choice issue. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev., 113 Nev. at 741, 941 P.2d at 489. But because we presume that missing documents support the district court's decision, see Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135, we necessarily conclude that Brofman failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion to the extent it denied his motion for reconsideration. See AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration). Accordingly, we affirm that decision.
Aside from challenging the portion of the October 20 order denying his motions for a new trial and for reconsideration, Brofman seeks reversal of the portion of that order that denied his requests for injunctive relief. Having considered the documents before us, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over this portion of Brofman's appeal from the October 20 order. Initially, we recognize that an order denying injunctive relief is ordinarily appealable. See NRAP 3A(b)(3) (listing an order granting or refusing to grant an injunction as an appealable determination). However, while Brofman framed his request in terms of an injunction, what he essentially sought was an ordinary order awarding him certain of his attorney fees and costs as a sanction against Fiore and a pre-judgment writ of attachment to secure attorney fees and costs that he apparently planned to seek at a later time. See, e.g., NRS 31.013(3) (authorizing the district court to issue a pre-judgment writ of attachment when "extraordinary circumstances exist which will make it improbable for the plaintiff to reach the property of the defendant by execution after the judgment has been entered"); see also, e.g., EDCR 7.60(b) (providing that the district court may impose attorney fees and costs against a party as a sanction for various forms of misconduct). And we construe Brofman's request accordingly because our focus is on the substance of a motion rather than its title. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 186, 495 P.2d 359, 361 (1972) (explaining "that it is the nature of the grievance rather than the form of the pleadings that determines the character of the action").
Insofar as the October 20 order denied Brofman's request for attorney fees and costs and a pre-judgment writ of attachment, that decision is not appealable given that it cannot qualify as a special order entered after final judgment in the absence of a final judgment, see NRAP 3A(b)(8), and that no statute or court rule otherwise authorizes an appeal from such a decision. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the order denying his motion for attorney fees and costs and a pre-judgment writ of attachment, see NRAP 3A(b); see also Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851, and it is therefore dismissed.
Docket No. 83865-COA
As discussed above, Brofman's appeal in Docket No. 83865-COA is directed at the district court's November 1 orders. Having considered the documents before us, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. In particular, as with many of the district court's decisions that we discussed above, the November 1 orders are not substantively appealable as special orders entered after final judgment given that a final judgment has not been entered in this case. See NRAP 3A(b)(8). And no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the following types of orders: (1) an order authorizing a parent to obtain a passport without the other parent's signature on a passport application, (2) an order denying a challenge to a parenting coordinator's decision concerning the reallocation of her fees, (3) an order denying sole legal custody over medical decisions, or (4) an order granting or denying attorney fees and costs. See NRAP 3A(b); see also Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to hear Brofman's challenges to the November 1 orders, and we therefore dismiss his appeal in Docket No. 83865-COA.
Insofar as the parties raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal. Once a final judgment has been entered, Brofman may file an appeal from that decision, and he may challenge any interlocutory decisions by which he is aggrieved as part of his appeal from the final judgment, including the various decisions that we lack jurisdiction to consider in the context of the present appeals. See Consol. Generator-Nev., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (providing that interlocutory orders are reviewable in the context of an appeal from the final judgment).
Bulla, Westbrook, J.
Hon. Dawn Throne, District Judge.