Opinion
No. 2010-00857.
March 8, 2011.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered March 8, 2004, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McNulty, J.), dated December 11, 2009, which, inter alia, denied those branches of her motion which were to set aside the child support provisions of a stipulation of settlement entered into by the parties on September 13, 2002, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, on the ground that those provisions did not comply with Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (h), and to recalculate child support de novo.
Wisselman, Harounian Associates, P.C., Great Neck, N.Y. (Lloyd C. Rosen of counsel), for appellant.
Cordova Schwartzman, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Jonathan B. Schwartzman of counsel), for respondent.
Before:Covello, J.P., Belen, Hall and Cohen, JJ.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were to set aside the child support provisions of a stipulation of settlement entered into by the parties on September 13, 2002, which was incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce, on the ground that those provisions did not comply with Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (h), and to recalculate child support de novo. "A postjudgment motion in a matrimonial action is not the proper vehicle for challenging the propriety of child support provisions contained in a stipulation of settlement incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce" ( Lepe v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d 710, 710-711; see Barany v Barany, 71 AD3d 613, 614; Makara v Makara, 65 AD3d 1018, 1019; cf. Luisi v Luisi, 6 AD3d 398, 400). "A challenge to such a stipulation must be made by the commencement of a separate plenary action to set aside the stipulation" ( Lepe v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at 711; see Barany v Barany, 71 AD3d at 614; Makara v Makara, 65 AD3d at 1019).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal or without merit.