Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Crawford v. George & Lynch, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 10-949-GMS-SRF (D. Del. Jul. 5, 2012)   Cited 2 times

    Crawford's amended complaint, which incorporates all factual averments within each count, is sufficient at the pleadings stage to support a breach of covenant claim under the second Pressman category, which applies to misrepresentations "targeted to ensnare a specific employee and alter in some way his status as an at-will employee." Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1351 (D. Del. 1997). In this case, Plaintiffs argue that Crawford was "induced" to accept employment with G&L based on G&L's misrepresentation that it would not have adverse consequences on the ongoing business relationship with CTC. (D.I. 84 at 9) Accordingly, it would be premature to dismiss Crawford's cause of action at this stage.

  2. Milby v. Greater Philadelphia Health Action

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-4556 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 3, 2008)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that because the court found that plaintiff had failed to adduce competent evidence of discrimination against her by the employer, her claims against the individual defendants were without merit

    Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior." (citations omitted));Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1345 (D. Del. 1997). An employer may legitimately favor a candidate who holds a degree over one who does not, even if such a degree was not a prerequisite for employment. Indeed, so long as the decision was not motivated by discriminatory animus, an employer is free to hire the candidate of his or her choice. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons" for not hiring her. Fuentes, 32 F. 3d at 763; Dorsey v. Pittsburgh Ass'n, 90 Fed. Appx. 636, 639 (3d Cir. 2004).

  3. Ulmer v. Home Depot, Inc.

    471 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Del. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    As this Court recognized in Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., "the cases relied upon by the Pressman court in identifying this exception demonstrate the employer must make a misrepresentation which is targeted to ensnare a specific employee and alter in some way his status as an at-will employee." 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1351 (D. Del. 1997) (misrepresentation that plaintiff would be invited to move to North Carolina was insufficient to alter his employment status). Here, Plaintiff makes no allegation in his Complaint that he relied on his managers' remarks to accept a new position with his employer or another employer, or to remain in his current position instead of taking a new one.

  4. Riley v. Del. River Bay Auth.

    457 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D. Del. 2006)   Cited 26 times
    Finding that plaintiff's hostile environment claim against employer under Section 1981 had a four-year statute of limitations

    Common law actions against an employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress "arising from and in the course of employment" are barred by the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act. Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1353 (D. Del. 1997). Therefore, I will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

  5. Parker v. Comcast Corporation

    Civil Action No. 04-344-KAJ (D. Del. Oct. 5, 2005)   Cited 3 times
    In Parker, cited by Relators, and in EEOC v. Avecia, Inc., No. 03-320, 2003 WL 22432911, (D. Del. Oct. 23, 2003), reconsideration denied in 2004 WL 1077915 (Apr. 28, 2004), cited by Defendants, the court held that the employers' actions were insufficient to show a deliberate intent to injure the plaintiffs because the actions taken "were not unusual in the employment environment."

    This statute precludes any tort claims for personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, including for emotional distress. See Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1353 (D. Del. 1997) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from discrimination was precluded); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 938 (Del. 1996) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress from sexual harassment was precluded). However, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that "those claims that involve a true intent by the employer to injure the employee fall outside of the Workers' Compensation Act and remain separately actionable as common law tort claims."

  6. Miller v. Safeway

    170 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2007)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing standard for grant of summary judgment

    The majority of federal cases dealing with constitutional claims against the grooming policies of state and federal employers have upheld the policies as constitutional: If grooming policies generally pass muster in the context of state action and discrimination, they should also survive claims dealing with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. E.g., Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 1337, 1351 (D.Del. 1997); Johnson v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 723 F.Supp. 180, 186 (D.Conn. 1989).See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1996) ("[R]equiring short hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII.

  7. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Company

    2001 WI 23 (Wis. 2001)   Cited 46 times
    Finding at-will employment may be terminated for "good cause, no cause, or morally wrong cause" without exposing the employer to liability under tort law

    Other theories of recovery exist. See, e.g., ¶ 24 of the majority opinion; Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1351 (D.Del. 1997) (a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists when the employer misrepresents some important fact, most often the employers' present intention, and the employee relies thereon either to accept a new position or remain in a present one). ¶ 35. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

  8. Tremlett v. Aurora Health Care

    2003 WI App. 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    The recognition of this doctrine of implied good faith as an exception to the "at-will relationship," however, is induced from a narrow group of decisions demonstrating misrepresentation on the part of the employer "to ensnare a specific employee and alter in some way his [or her] status as an at-will employee." Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337, 1351 (D.Del. 1997) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996)). ¶ 31.