In its per curiam opinion granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, the Appellate Division said (278 App. Div. at page 854, 104 N.Y.S.2d at page 485): "The note or memorandum upon which the respondent relies evidences only a hiring at will * * * and recourse may not be had to parol evidence to establish a different intention of the parties. Drake v. Seaman, 97 N.Y. 230; Matter of Levin's Estate, 276 App. Div. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 148; Brodlie v. Fink, 275 App. Div. 1061, 92 N.Y.S.2d 610." In the Miller case, the plaintiff claimed unsuccessfully both in the Appellate Division and in the Court of Appeals that the phrase "on the basis of $14,000.00 a year" was ambiguous and could be interpreted by oral proof to mean a year's employment, thereby satisfying the Statute of Frauds.

         In an action for damages based upon the alleged wrongful dismissal of respondent in breach of a contract of employment, appeal is taken from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, under rule 112 of the Rules of Civil Practice, on the ground that the alleged contract of employment is void under the Statute of Frauds. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with $10 costs. The note or memorandum upon which respondent relies evidences only a hiring at will ( Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117; Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535; Bulkley v. Kaolin Products Co., 187 A.D. 103; Rider v. Standard Safety Razor Corp., 237 A.D. 853), and recourse may not be had to parol evidence to establish a different intention of the parties (Drake v. Seaman, 97 N.Y. 230; Matter of Levin, 276 A.D. 739; Brodlie v. Fink, 275 A.D. 1061).           Nolan, P. J., Carswell, Adel, Sneed and MacCrate, JJ., concur.

Thus, according to the plaintiff, the consideration for the guarantee was his oral promise, definite in every respect, not to sue the principal debtor for 30 days upon condition that within such time the agreed weekly payments would be made to him. But the Statute of Frauds (Personal Property Law, § 31, subd. 2) requires that such a promise, being a consideration wholly executory and therefore contractual in nature, be stated in writing ( Brodlie v. Fink, 275 App. Div. 1061). The written words "to * * * continue credit", even if read as meaning "to forbear to sue", do not open the door to parol evidence of the specific agreement testified to by the plaintiff concerning the duration of the period of forbearance and the condition upon which such forbearance would be predicated.