Opinion
14-P-998
07-28-2015
DIANE BRODERICK v. KATHLEEN LYNCH, personal representative.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Diane Broderick, seeks relief under theories of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel for services provided to Mildred Marie Burley in the last years of her life. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We affirm.
The judge also denied the defendant's motion for attorney's fees and costs. The defendant did not appeal that issue.
Background. The plaintiff alleges that, for almost twenty-seven years, her relationship with Burley was of a "close familial type." During the time between early 2011, and November of 2012, when Burley died, the relationship changed, with the plaintiff performing "personal services, akin to nursing" and other assistance on a regular basis. Those services included arranging for help from an organization promoting elderly independence, checking Burley's medication and housecleaning needs on a daily basis, as well as accompanying her several times per week for grocery shopping, personal banking, and doctor's visits.
Following Burley's hospitalization in September, 2011, the plaintiff became her health care agent, managing Burley's health care needs and performing the caregiver duties required for her release from a rehabilitation center. The plaintiff also alleges that Burley refused other caretaker services in order to save money and indicated to caretakers that those services were not needed because the plaintiff would provide them. The plaintiff, who resided in the same building as Burley, worked out of her home and "gladly performed these services" for her.
In addition, the plaintiff alleges that, beginning approximately two years before her death, Burley stated to the plaintiff, in the presence of others, as well as directly to others, that "she intended to fairly provide for Plaintiff upon her passing because of all the things that Plaintiff was doing for" her. According to the plaintiff, "[she] expected that [Burley] intended to fairly provide for Plaintiff upon her death," although the plaintiff never asked Burley directly for payment for her services. However, the plaintiff also alleged that Burley was a person who "expected to pay for what she received and did not expect to receive anything for nothing."
Discussion. As an initial matter, contrary to the defendant's argument, the Statute of Frauds does not bar the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim because it carves out an exception from the written agreement requirement for "recovery in quantum meruit for the value of services rendered the testator." Comment to G. L. c. 190B, § 2-514. See Northrup v. Brigham, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 369 (2005) (quantum meruit claim valid, notwithstanding unenforceable oral agreement related to bequest).
"Quantum meruit is a theory of recovery, not a cause of action," J. A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 793 (1986), that "arises under quasi contract theory in which an obligation is created by law for reasons of justice," Finard & Co. v. Sitt Asset Mgmt., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 229 (2011) (citation omitted). In order to recover on a theory of quantum meruit, the plaintiff must prove the following three elements: "(1) that [she] conferred a measurable benefit upon the defendant[]; (2) that the claimant reasonably expected compensation from the defendant[]; and (3) that the defendant[] accepted the benefit with the knowledge, actual or chargeable, of the claimant's reasonable expectation." Ibid.
We allow recovery under quantum meruit either "where there is substantial performance but not full completion of the contract" or in a case of an "unenforceable contract." J. A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 793-794. As the "underlying basis for awarding quantum meruit damages in a quasi-contract case is unjust enrichment of one party," Salamon v. Terra, 394 Mass. 857, 859 (1985), we analyze the plaintiff's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims together.
We need not reach the question whether, in the absence of a written agreement, the plaintiff alleged facts supporting the existence of a contract between her and Burley that is unenforceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds, but allows recovery under quantum meruit. See Finard & Co., supra (quantum meruit has as "basis the contract itself"). Here, the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would support the conclusion that Burley had actual knowledge, or could be charged with knowledge, of the plaintiff's expectation to be paid for her services.
In our analysis, we do not consider the parties' statements and actions "in isolation" but view them "together" with the other actions that form the "tapestry" of "interpersonal dynamics." Northrup, 63 Mass. App. Ct at 367. The plaintiff stated in her verified complaint that she never asked Burley at any point to pay the plaintiff for the help she gave. As a result, the plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Burley knew of her expectation for payment. Nor does the plaintiff allege any facts plausibly suggesting that Burley could be charged with this knowledge. The plaintiff had provided similar services to Burley, without compensation, for decades before Burley first communicated that she would like to provide for the plaintiff in her will because of everything the plaintiff had done for her. Without sufficient facts alleged to support this element of quantum meruit, the plaintiff's claim cannot stand.
The plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim also fails. "Circumstances that may give rise to an estoppel are (1) a representation intended to induce reliance on the part of a person to whom the representation is made; (2) an act or omission by that person in reasonable reliance on the representation; and (3) detriment as a consequence of the act or omission." Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Ct., 457 Mass. 647, 661 (2010) (citation omitted). On this record, Burley made no representation intended to induce reliance and, as a result, the plaintiff cannot show reasonable reliance on her part.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Vuono & Hanlon, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: July 28, 2015.