Brocuglio v. Proulx

6 Citing cases

  1. Golodner v. City of New London

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-cv-00173-VLB (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2015)   Cited 9 times

    Defendant is correct that by labeling the relevant area as "curtilage," plaintiff is not making a factual allegation, but rather stating a conclusion. See, e.g., Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D. Conn. 2007) ("The labeling of a particular area "curtilage" as opposed to "open fields," therefore, states a conclusion that the area is subject to Fourth Amendment protections."). The yard of a residential property is not necessarily curtilage and there is no per se rule for what is and what is not curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 252-60 (2d Cir. 2006).

  2. Oliphant v. Villano

    No. 3:07cv1435 (SRU) (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    "It has long been established that curtilage receives the same protections under the Fourth Amendment as the home itself." Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D. Conn. 2007), aff'd, 324 F. App'x. 32 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2009). The Supreme Court has laid out four factors courts can use in defining the extent of a home's curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage of the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).

  3. State v. Talkington

    301 Kan. 453 (Kan. 2015)   Cited 75 times
    Recognizing that social guests do not have property rights that can serve as a basis for standing to object to a search

    The baggie was found in the center of the backyard a few feet from the back steps. See Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F.Supp.2d 297, 303 (D.Conn.2007), aff'd324 Fed.Appx. 32 (2d Cir.2009) (“[T]he undisputed immediate proximity of the back yard to the home strongly weighs in favor of a determination that the back yard was curtilage.”).

  4. Brocuglio v. Proulx

    324 F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2009)   Cited 7 times
    Finding the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding no fee where the jury awarded $20 in damages

    Proulx and O'Connor have identified no evidence in the record — nor are we aware or any — that causes us to question our earlier decision. Indeed, that Brocuglio's backyard was protected by "a six-foot solid stockade fence that was primarily opaque," Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F.Supp.2d 297, 304 (D.Conn. 2007), only strengthens the basis of our prior ruling. Accordingly, we reject the challenge of Proulx and O'Connor to the District Court's ruling on their assertion of qualified immunity.

  5. Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int'l Distribution Ltd.

    833 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)   Cited 4 times
    Describing Golden Door as the rare case in which exclusion is the proper remedy

    The standard for newly discovered evidence under Rule 59 is identical to that under Rule 60(b)(2). Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F.Supp.2d 297, 300 (D.Conn.2007) (“Whether moving on the basis of presentation of new evidence under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(2), the standard for newly discovered evidence is the same.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One of the present motions is also based upon Rule 60(b)(3), which provides that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.”

  6. Banco Cent. v. Paraguay Humanitarian Foundation

    01 Civ. 9649 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 5, 2007)

    Although the court in Fidelity Partners, Inc. was citing to the requirements for reconsideration on the grounds of new evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), the standard for newly discovered evidence under Rule 59(e) is identical. See Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (D. Conn. 2007) ("Whether moving on the basis of presentation of new evidence under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(2), the standard for newly discovered evidence is the same.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Principal Defendants have failed to meet their heavy burden of establishing that the new evidence is "probably effective to change the result of the former ruling," because the Paraguayan order simply has no bearing on the Court's former ruling of November 29, 2006.