The judge neglected to address appellant in accordance with the requirements of D.C. Code § 23–111(b) to ask him whether he affirmed or denied the convictions and advise him that any challenge to those convictions not made before the imposition of sentence could not be raised to attack the sentence. See, e.g., Brocksmith v. United States, 99 A.3d 690, 702–03 (D.C. 2014) ; Sanders v. United States, 809 A.2d 584, 600–602 (D.C. 2002) ; Smith v. United States, 356 A.2d 650, 652 (D.C. 1976). Our unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment in this case noted that appellant did not identify this omission as a ground for relief. After the issuance of that opinion, appellant moved for leave to file a supplemental brief presenting a claim that the trial judge's failure to comply with D.C. Code § 23–111(b) was plain error.
Appellants attacked Alicia's credibility and her ability to accurately identify the perpetrators; her emotional response was one factor that could assist the jury in weighing her credibility and truthfulness, and was therefore relevant. See Brocksmith v. United States , 99 A.3d 690, 697 (D.C. 2014) (noting that a "witness' demeanor on the stand ... is of the utmost importance in the determination of credibility" (internal quotations omitted)). Similarly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit the government during closing argument to play Alicia's 911 call or to refer to the "pain in her voice," all of which conveyed the seriousness of the assault and was another means of assessing Alicia's credibility.
Id. Accordingly, there may be instances where the fact finder can infer based on its "common sense" and every day experiences that the victim was in "severe" pain on account of evidence of the victim's injuries and the victim's reactions to them. SeeBrocksmith v. United States , 99 A.3d 690, 697 (D.C. 2014) (jury is entitled to draw a "vast range of reasonable inferences from the evidence" using its "common sense" and every day experiences) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoWilson , supra , 140 A.3d at 1221–22 (Belson, J. dissenting) (explaining that the jury should be allowed to infer from the seriousness of the victim's injuries that immediate medical attention was necessary).The instructions given to the jury here regarding "significant bodily injury" emphasize the role of the jury to make those "common sense" inferences.