But an express finding that the scales weigh in favor of admission is not required.White v. State, 213 Ga. App. 429, 430-431 (1) ( 445 S.E.2d 309) (1994), citing Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 640 (3) ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993). (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2b) ( 409 S.E.2d 649). Moreover, after the State has made the necessary showings at the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing, the trial court retains the sound legal discretion to exclude relevant similar crimes evidence on the ground that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 640 (3) ( 436 S.E.2d 316). In the case sub judice, the trial court did not conduct an admissibility hearing pursuant to USCR 31.3 (B), nor did the trial court make a determination on the record that the State had satisfied the three requirements for the admission into evidence of the alleged similar transaction.
In seeking to introduce evidence of other offenses for the purposes of establishing motive, plan, scheme, and bent of mind, the State need show no more than a “logical connection” between otherwise dissimilar crimes. Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 640, 436 S.E.2d 316 (1993). Furthermore, the proper focus in determining admissibility of similar transaction evidence is on the similarity between the separate crimes and the crime in question, not the differences.
In an interim appellate review of Brockman's case, this Court held that the trial court did not err by concluding that Brockman's videotaped statement, as well as other statements made by him to police, were admissible. See Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 637–639(1)(a)–(c), 436 S.E.2d 316 (1993). The revolver used to shoot Lynn was a double-action revolver that could be fired by either pulling the trigger or manually cocking it and then firing it in the same manner as a single-action revolver.
In an interim appellate review of Brockman's case, this Court held that the trial court did not err by concluding that Brockman's videotaped statement, as well as other statements made by him to police, were admissible. See Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 637-639 (1) (a) - (c) (436 SE2d 316) (1993). The revolver used to shoot Lynn was a double-action revolver that could be fired by either pulling the trigger or manually cocking it and then firing it in the same manner as a single-action revolver.
Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 716 (3) ( 482 S.E.2d 330) (1997). See also Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044; Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 639 (1) (b) ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993); Sanders v. State, 182 Ga. App. 581, 583 (1) ( 356 S.E.2d 537) (1987). See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046.
(1c). A defendant who has invoked his right to counsel may waive the right by initiating further communication with the police and knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637 (1b) ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993); Brady v. State, 259 Ga. 573 (1) ( 385 S.E.2d 653) (1989). It is undisputed that appellant initiated further communication with the police by having his mother contact them on his behalf.
Id., 462 U.S. at 1044-1045, 1055, n. 2. See also Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 486, n. 9; Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637 (1) (b) ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993). The record in the case at bar does not reflect that the second inquiry was made after it was determined that appellant initiated the conversation in the car.
It is apparent that the other two burglaries were part of a larger plan or scheme, which included the commission of the burglary for which Mainer was being tried in this case. Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 640 (3) ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993). 3.
Id. at 849. Where, as here, the accused initiates further discussions and knowingly and intelligently waives his Miranda rights, he may be interrogated further even if he has made a previous unequivocal request for counsel. Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 639 ( 436 S.E.2d 316) (1993); Guimond v. State, 259 Ga. 752, 754 ( 386 S.E.2d 158) (1989); Housel v. State, 257 Ga. 115, 121-122 ( 355 S.E.2d 651) (1987). 6. Contrary to Bright's contention in his ninth enumeration of error, the court did not err in denying the defense the opportunity to review before trial photographs of the crime scene, of Bright, and of the victims at the crime scene and during autopsy; and in denying the defense use of the photographs during the suppression hearing.