Opinion
June Term, 1820.
1. When a deed for land contains an acknowledgement of the bargainor of the receipt of the consideration, and a clause exonerating the bargainee therefrom, it amounts to a release, and is a bar to an action for the purchase money.
2. In assumpsit for such purchase money, no parol evidence can be received to show that it is unpaid, because it is contradictory to the deed.
3. A bargain and sale is good, although the deed does not express that the consideration money has been paid.
THIS was an action of assumpsit, from JONES, in which the plaintiff declared for the price of a tract of land sold and conveyed by him to the defendant. Upon the trial it was proved that some months after the deed had been made for the land the defendant acknowledged that a balance of 200 pounds was still due to the plaintiff, which he was to pay him within two years thereafter. The pleas were the "general issue and set-off"; and the defendant, upon the first issue, relied upon the deed, which expressed to be made by the plaintiff, "for and in consideration of one thousand dollars to him in hand paid (65) by the said F., the receipt whereof the said B. doth hereby acknowledge, and thereof doth exonerate the said F., his heirs and executors," and insisted that it was a release; but the court parol evidence was admissible to show that the consideration money had not been paid. The defendant then offered evidence of payments and set-offs subsequent to the period at which the acknowledgment aforesaid was made, so as to reduce the plaintiff's demand to £ 117 10s., for which the jury gave him a verdict.
The defendant obtained a rule for a new trial upon the ground that the court ought to have instructed the jury that the deed contained a full discharge and release; but the rule was discharged and judgment entered for the amount of the verdict, whereupon an appeal was taken to this Court.
Gaston for appellant.
Mordecai for appellee.
said that the defendant contends that the deed, which (66) contains a receipt and a release, cannot be contradicted by parol evidence. The manifest justice of the claim and the unconscientious nature of the defense has made me desirous to ascertain some solid ground of law on which the former can be supported; but I cannot discover how it is to be done without breaking in upon the rule that you cannot by parol contradict a deed.
Two cases have been cited where such evidence has been admitted; but they do not quite come up to this, nor are the reasons for the decision satisfactory. It is truly said that the end of inserting a consideration in a deed is to raise an use, and that the slightest consideration of value is sufficient for that purpose. Still it is not necessary for the same end that a release should be inserted, nor is it, strictly speaking, consistent with the form of a bargain and sale. I may go further and say that the use will arise without an acknowledgement of the receipt of the consideration, as if a man bargain and sell his land in consideration of so much money to be paid at a day to come. Dyer, 337, a. If it be contended that, although you cannot contradict the consideration so far as it is necessary to the efficacy of the conveyance, yet, for any other purpose, it may be done, it ought first to be shown that the only indispensable form of stating the consideration is adopted in this deed. The deed may still be effectual with other modes of stating the consideration by which, if it be not paid at the time, the seller's right to it may be secured and enforced. It might subserve the justice of this case to allow the plaintiff to recover in the face of his deed, but the precedent would be fraught with mischief to the community. The effect of adhering to the rule of law will only be to make men (67) cautious in executing deeds; but if it be understood that a solemn acknowledgement under seal is insufficient to prove the payment of money, it is to be apprehended that many perjuries will arise. To the cases cited at the bar I will add one from 5 Mass. 67, where a deed of tenant in tail purported to be made for good and valuable consideration, but in order to get the judgment of the Court on its effect the parties agreed, in a case stated, that no consideration was paid. Chief Justice Parsons observed that if the parties had not expressly agreed that there was no valuable consideration, it would have been difficult to get over the express averments of the deed. There is also a case to the same effect in 1 Campb., 392. So the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.
The Court was unanimous and the judgment was reversed.
Cited: Graves v. Carter, 9 N.C. 580; Spiers v. Clay, 11 N.C. 26; Woodhouse v. Williams, 14 N.C. 510; Lowe v. Weatherley, 20 N.C. 355; Waddell v. Hewitt, 37 N.C. 253; Bruce v. Faucett, 49 N.C. 393; Mendenhall v. Parish, 53 N.C. 106; Shaw v. Williams, 100 N.C. 280; Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N.C. 584.