Error, however, was found in that case (p. 308) in submitting to the jury the issue of reckless misconduct as a basis for removing the defense of contributory negligence, because the plaintiff's claims of proof were insufficient. We reiterate, and in so doing add emphasis to, what we said in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 80, 14 A.2d 713: "[T]he complaint does not state with desirable accuracy a cause of action based on wanton misconduct. There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brock v. Waldron , 127 Conn. 79, 83, 14 A.2d 713 (1940) ; accord Frillici v. Westport , 264 Conn. 266, 277, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003) ; Craig v. Driscoll , 64 Conn. App. 699, 721, 781 A.2d 440 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 312, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). The municipal defendants offer various arguments as to why allowing claims of this sort to be decided by juries constitutes bad public policy.

The Restatement definition has been utilized in several states in stating the test for recklessness under their guest statutes. De Loss v. Lewis, 78 Cal.App.2d 223, 177 P.2d 589 (1947); Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 14 A.2d 713 (1940); Espeland v. Green, 74 S.D. 484, 54 N.W.2d 465 (1952). The concept of recklessness described in the Restatement definition is more simply stated in Prosser on Torts (2nd ed) p 151:

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 84, 14 A.2d 713 (1940). " Whether [the] defendant's conduct [constitutes] heedless and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights [is] a question of fact for the jury ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498. In support of his motion to strike, the defendant argues that based on the standards of recklessness set out in Brock v Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 14 A.2d 713 (1940), the second count of the complaint is legally insufficient. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff "simply recast a few of the operative facts of [her] negligence claim and called them reckless," and, therefore, she fails to allege specific acts by the defendant that would support a claim of recklessness under § 14-295.

[a]lthough there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted. See Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81, 14 A.2d 713 (1940). In the Craig case, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had actually alleged facts supporting a cause of action for wanton and reckless misconduct:

"There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81, 14 A.2d 713 (1940). "Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough. A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made."

"The reiteration of facts previously asserted to support a cause of action in negligence, without more, cannot be transformed into a claim of reckless misconduct by mere nomenclature." Brock v. Waldon, 127 Conn. 79-81, 14 A.2d 713 (1940). Those cases in the minority have therefore stricken a claim for double or treble damages under § 14-295 where the complaint only alleges the same facts as set forth in the negligence count without more.

The defendants also argues that "[i]n order to assert a claim for common law recklessness, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant's conduct not only created an unreasonable risk of probability that substantial harm would result to plaintiff.' See [Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 84, 14 A.2d 713 (1940)]." (Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, p. 13.)

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 84, 14 A.2d 713, (1940). "The character . . . of [reckless] actions [is] the intent to injure either actually entertained or to be implied from the conduct and circumstances.