Brochin v. Connecticut

16 Citing cases

  1. Solomon v. Aberman

    196 Conn. 359 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 242 times
    In Solomon v. Aberman, supra, 196 Conn. at 375, 493 A.2d 193, the trial court in its memorandum of decision stated that only two trustees testified at trial, although four trustees actually had testified.

    `The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one "of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . ." Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 112-13.

  2. Goldenberry Ltd. v. Thorton

    2002 Ct. Sup. 3320 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    Exceptions to the prior pending action doctrine occur where application of the doctrine would deprive the plaintiff "of any substantial right which the law gives him as incident to the determination of the issues or the direct and speedy collection of his debt." Kolodney v. Kolodney, 2 Conn. App. 697, 699-700, 483 A.2d 622 (1984), citing Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 393, 185 A. 82 (1936); see also Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 77 A.2d 336 (1950) (holding prior pending action doctrine inapplicable where dismissal of second action would destroy security obtained by plaintiff therein for collection of his debt, noting that it was "beside the question that the plaintiff might have stated his cause of action by way of a counterclaim in the [prior] case, obtained permission to cite in [additional parties] and sought an order to garnish the . . . debt. These steps would have been time-consuming and might well have cost him the opportunity of assuring . . . the collection of any judgment he might obtain."); Mola v. Home Depot, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 167635 (April 7, 2000, Karazin, J.) ( 27 Conn.L.Rptr. 60) (holding prior pending action doctrine inapplicable where second action was initiated by plaintiffs to meet statute of limitations, reasoning that "application of the doctrine would deprive the plaintiffs of their recklessness claim.").

  3. Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co.

    207 Conn. 575 (Conn. 1988)   Cited 167 times
    Noting that the goal of the impleader statute, § 52-102a, is the "efficient administration of justice"

    " Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 113; Halpern v. Board of Education, supra, 653. "We must examine the pleadings to ascertain whether the actions are `virtually alike.'

  4. Halpern v. Board of Education

    196 Conn. 647 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 227 times
    In Halpern, supra, the relief sought in the prior pending action was a reversal of the Board of Education's decision to terminate the plaintiff, a declaration that the Board's action was invalid, and an order to remand the matter back to the Board to determine the benefits and back wages owed to the plaintiff.

    `The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one "of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . ." Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 112-13.

  5. Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co.

    183 Conn. 108 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 125 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., 183 Conn. 108, 438 A.2d 834 (1981), the court heard and decided an appeal from the trial court's granting of a substitution of a bond for a mechanic's lien brought pursuant to General Statutes 49-37.

    "The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one `of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . .' Hatch v. Spofford, [supra]." Farley Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393. The Stamford application was brought under 49-35a and sought the reduction or discharge of the mechanic's lien.

  6. General Acceptance Corporation v. Holbrook

    189 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1966)   Cited 2 times

    Finally, where abatement of the second action would cause the plaintiff to lose an advantage gained therein by attachment, it is denied. Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Company, 137 Conn. 350, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 185 A. 82 (1936); Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 136 A. 586 (1927); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1955). James v. Dowell, 7 Smedes M. (15 Miss.) 333 (1846), is not relevant to the present case, because it involved attachments at law, the defendant was a resident of this state, and there were no questions of additional parties and concurrent remedies.

  7. Cohen v. Davis

    152 Conn. 639 (Conn. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    Bridgeport v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 91 Conn. 197, 204, 99 A. 566. An order for an attachment could have been obtained in the New London case; Cole v. Associated Construction Co., 141 Conn. 49, 56, 103 A.2d 529; General Statutes 52-282; and if damages in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas were sought therein, the case could have been transferred to the Superior Court. General Statutes 52-133. The case of Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 77 A.2d 336, upon which the plaintiff places great reliance, is not of benefit to him, because one of the defendants therein was not a party to the pending action at the time the garnishment of the debt owed to it was made. Id., 353.

  8. Cole v. Associated Construction Co.

    141 Conn. 49 (Conn. 1954)   Cited 71 times
    In Cole v. Associated Construction Co., 141 Conn. 49, 54, 103 A.2d 529 (1954), the court merely noted in dicta that, technically speaking, the terminology `a civil action for conspiracy' is improper because the action is not for damages caused by the conspiracy itself.

    General Statutes 8070. It is true that ordinarily an action will not be abated on the ground that another action is pending when to abate the action would deprive a plaintiff of the advantage of an attachment. Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 353, 77 A.2d 336. The basic reason for abating a suit on the ground that another is pending, however, is that there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second action and therefore it must be oppressive and vexatious. Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586. Accordingly, the only justification for refusing to abate an action because an attachment has been made is that, by the abatement, the creditor will be deprived of an advantage which he has fairly obtained. See Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 393, 185 A. 82.

  9. Kolodney v. Kolodney

    2 Conn. App. 697 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 18 times

    The few exceptions to this rule occur where the application of the rule would deprive the plaintiff "of any substantial right which the law gives him as incident to the determination of the issues or the direct and speedy collection of his debt." Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 393, 185 A. 82 (1936); see also Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 77 A.2d 336 (1950). Thus, where a Probate Court appeal and a Superior Court action are both instituted in the same matter, the latter will not be dismissed if it affords the plaintiff a remedy otherwise unavailable before the Probate Court; Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra; or where the plaintiff's only alternative would be "time-consuming and might well have cost him the opportunity of assuring . . . the collection of any judgment he might obtain."

  10. Dialtone Corp. v. Stephen Pont. Cadillac, Inc.

    368 A.2d 242 (Conn. App. Ct. 1976)

    " The mere fact that the parties in one action are the same as those in another pending case does not, in and of itself, deprive the court in the second case of its jurisdiction over the matter. See Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352-53; Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 392; 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) 104. Only by hearing facts outside the record before it can the court in the second action determine if both cases are, in fact, the same cause of action. Accordingly, it has been held consistently that the proper method of raising a claim that there is a prior action pending between the same parties is by a plea in abatement.