Opinion
H048179
03-11-2022
BROADCOM INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. XIAOYAN SU, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 20CH009235)
Greenwood, P. J.
Xiaoyan Su appeals the trial court's grant of Broadcom Inc.'s (Broadcom) request for a workplace violence restraining order against her under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ms. Su argues there is not sufficient evidence to support the order, Broadcom's petition for the restraining order was procedurally insufficient because it lacked accompanying declarations from all of the protected persons listed, the court was biased against her and the restraining order should be lifted because it is negatively impacting her life.
We remand the matter to the Superior Court to modify the names of the protected persons in the order as set forth in this opinion. As modified, we affirm the order.
I. Statement Of The Facts And Case
Ms. Su was employed by Broadcom and was terminated in March 2017.
Following her termination, Ms. Su began contacting and harassing some of Broadcom's employees. In 2017, Ms. Su entered the Broadcom office in San Jose and tried to meet with certain employees without an appointment. Ms. Su left after being told the employees were unavailable. She returned several months later asking to meet with another employee. Broadcom security informed Ms. Su that if she would like to meet with employees, she would need to do so outside of the office. Ms. Su returned to the Broadcom office a third time in 2017 and was escorted out of the building by security. Less than a week later, Ms. Su returned to the Broadcom office and waited on the sidewalk in front of the building to talk to employees. In 2018, Ms. Su loitered on the sidewalk in front of the Broadcom office waiting for employees to leave the building on two days in October, four days in November and eight days in December. During this time, Ms. Su also sent several e-mail messages to two managers she believed were responsible for her termination.
In response to Ms. Su's harassment of its employees, Broadcom filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order against her. On March 26, 2019, Ms. Su stipulated to a voluntary stay-away order prohibiting her from contacting certain employees of Broadcom, and Broadcom agreed to withdraw its petition for a restraining order.
Believing she was tricked into agreeing to the order, Ms. Su filed a motion to vacate the stipulation in August 2019. The trial court denied Ms. Su's motion in September 2019.
Ms. Su filed a request for judicial notice of the trial court records from the 2019 application for temporary restraining order and the stipulated stay away order in Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 19CH008557. These court records are properly subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (b), and we grant Ms. Su's request.
Some months later, Ms. Su went to the homes of Broadcom executives who were not listed as protected persons in the stay-away order to express her concerns that the company was conspiring against her and trying to harm her. On February 23, 2020, Ms. Su went to the home of Broadcom's General Manager, Alexis Bjorlin. Ms. Su did not know Ms. Bjorlin. While at Ms. Bjorlin's home, Ms. Su told her Broadcom was conspiring against her.
Following the visit to Ms. Bjorlin's home, Ms. Su went to Broadcom CEO Hock Tan's house at least two times in March 2020. When she went to the house, no one answered the door, so Ms. Su waited in her car. On one occasion, police responded to Mr. Tan's house and contacted Ms. Su. They searched her car and found a handwritten list of additional Broadcom employees and their addresses that Ms. Su admitted belonged to her. Due to Ms. Su's repeated appearances at the Broadcom CEO's residence, the company hired armed security to protect Mr. Tan and his property.
The parties dispute whether the search of the car was consensual. This fact is not dispositive to our analysis.
As a result of Ms. Su's uninvited contact with its employees, Broadcom sought and received a temporary restraining order against her on March 13, 2020. Accompanying Broadcom's petition were Ms. Bjorlin's declaration about Ms. Su's appearance at her residence, and a declaration from Broadcom's counsel detailing Ms. Su's visits to Mr. Tan's home. The petition also included photographs of Ms. Su outside Mr. Tan's house, the list of Broadcom employees and their home addresses found in Ms. Su's car, and a copy of the 2019 stay-away order to which Ms. Su and Broadcom had stipulated.
The hearing for the permanent order was held on March 30, 2020. Ms. Su represented herself at the hearing. At the request of Broadcom, the court quashed three subpoenas that Ms. Su caused to be issued because she named Broadcom's counsel as the contact person on the subpoena rather than herself.
During the hearing, the court heard testimony from Ms. Bjorlin and Ms. Su, and received an offer of proof from Broadcom's counsel. Ms. Bjorlin testified that she allowed Ms. Su into her house and spoke with her for 30 to 45 minutes. While in Ms. Bjorlin's home, Ms. Su described her grievances with Broadcom and indicated that Broadcom had a restraining order against her that "was an item of quite concern to [her]." She also stated that Broadcom's executives were in collusion or a conspiracy "even with the police or the federal government." At that point, Ms. Bjorlin "realized that there is something really wrong." Ms. Bjorlin stated: "I have never in the course of my career had someone come to my house uninvited. . . . After she left I realized I would have felt very different had my kids been at home or if she had come when I wasn't there and I realized that this was very unnatural behavior. At that point in time my concern grew further when I heard that she sort of went on to visit other executives at Broadcom. I got even more concerned."
Ms. Su testified, admitting that she went to Ms. Bjorlin's house and that she obtained Ms. Bjorlin's address by "search[ing] the website." Ms. Su stated that she went to see Ms. Bjorlin to confirm that two managers Ms. Su believed had harmed and disparaged her when she worked at Broadcom had been fired, hoping that this would make it possible for the stay-away order to be "vacated." Ms. Su admitted that part of the reason that she went to see Ms. Bjorlin was because Ms. Bjorlin was not a protected person listed in the 2019 stipulated stay-away order. She also admitted having a list of other Broadcom employees' names and addresses in her car, although she denied that she planned to contact them.
In his offer of proof, Broadcom's counsel represented that Ms. Su also went to the home of Broadcom CEO Hock Tan three times. On two occasions, the police were called. After searching Ms. Su's car, the officers found a handwritten list with the names and home addresses of other employees of Broadcom that included coworkers and executives. Ms. Su told the officers who found the list that it contained the names of all the lawyers she contacted for her case last year. As a result of Ms. Su's presence at Mr. Tan's residence, the company hired security to patrol Mr. Tan's home.
Broadcom's counsel stated that Ms. Su also went to Silver Lake Partners, a private equity firm in Menlo Park, where a senior member was a former Broadcom executive. Ms. Su would not leave. The Menlo Park Police Department was called. On one occasion at the equity firm, she left her car while it was in gear to take photos. The car then rolled onto a curb. The police came to put the car in park to prevent it from hitting any person or property.
Broadcom's counsel indicated that the employees on Ms. Su's list did not have their home addresses "as part of the public record," and that the fear and concern of the employees was enhanced because of the "shelter at home orders that are in place now," meaning that they were working remotely at home as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was sufficient evidence to support Broadcom's request for a workplace violence restraining order against Ms. Su. The court stated: "The harassment here and the contact is within the scope of a workplace environment, specifically because of the history here after one restraining order made restraining Ms. Su from Broadcom and many named employees, then she clearly sought out and made contact with someone not on the list thinking that would be appropriate behavior. It seems you haven't moved on, Ms. Su, and the first restraining order against you didn't help you with that and my concern is that unless a restraining order is made in this case to enhance the restriction that you are going to keep trying to reach out or will reach out to other people associated with Broadcom. So for that reason I'm going to make a three year order. This order I'm making will expire March 30th, 2023 at 11:59 p.m. . . . For the next three years Ms. Su will not contact Broadcom and will also not contact any of the protected parties . . . . In addition, she will stay at least 300 yards away from Ms. Bjorlin and all other protected parties, the employees' workplace, and employees' vehicles and also the residence and workplaces of all protected persons."
While the court was issuing the order, Ms. Su became disruptive and continued to speak after the court admonished her to stop. The court ordered Ms. Su removed from the courtroom due to her continuing disruptive behavior.
Ms. Su filed a timely notice of appeal of the court's order.
II. Discussion
Ms. Su raises several claims on appeal. She argues the restraining order is improper because there is no evidence that she committed any unlawful acts. She claims Broadcom's petition for the order was procedurally defective because it was not accompanied by a declaration from all of the protected persons listed. Finally, Ms. Su argues the court was prejudicially biased against her and that the restraining order will have negative consequences for her in the future.
A. General Legal Principles
"Section 527.8, the Workplace Violence Safety Act, enables an employer to seek an injunction to prevent violence or threatened violence against its employees." (City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 536.) In relevant part, section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides that "[a]ny employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer." Section 527.8, subdivision (j) provides that "[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence."
The petitioner also "must establish by clear and convincing evidence . . . that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee if a prohibitory injunction were not issued due to the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur in the future." (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 355, fn. omitted.)
In considering a petition under section 527.8, the trial court must "receive any testimony that is relevant . . . ." (§ 527.8, subd. (j).) "The plain language of this provision suggests that the Legislature intended to permit a trial court to consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when deciding whether to issue an injunction to prevent workplace violence pursuant to section 527.8." (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550, 557 (Kaiser).) Proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to parallel those for general civil harassment restraining orders under section 527.6, "which are procedurally truncated, expedited, and intended to provide quick relief to victims of civil harassment. [Citations.] Indeed, a proceeding for an injunction under section 527.6 (and, correspondingly, § 527.8), need not proceed as a 'full-fledged evidentiary hearing with oral testimony from all sides.' [Citation.] Rather, the hearing may be based on affidavits or declarations, which are themselves a form of hearsay evidence." (Kaiser, supra, at p. 557.)
"On appeal, we generally review an injunction issued under section 527.8 to determine whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, resolving all factual conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's findings. [Citation.]" (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944.) We review the court's exercise of discretion to include "any number of other employees at the workplace" in the order for abuse of discretion. (§ 527.8; See Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1234 (Parisi), disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 7.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Order
Ms. Su contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8, which requires the trial court to issue a restraining order '[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence…." (§ 527.8, subd. (j).)
The relevant facts here are not contested. Ms. Su agrees that she went to Ms. Bjorlin's and Mr. Tan's homes uninvited, and that she had a list of other Broadcom associates that included their home addresses in her car when she was contacted by the police while parked in front of Mr. Tan's residence. She does not dispute that Broadcom's employees were working at their homes as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Su contends that she did not commit any violent act, did not threaten anyone and did not do anything unlawful. As a result, she believes that the trial court was not authorized to issue the restraining order. To address this claim, we consider whether Ms. Su's actions fall within the statutory definitions of behaviors described in section 528 that require the court to issue a restraining order. We thus look to the record to determine whether Ms. Su's conduct demonstrates that she "engaged in unlawful violence" or "made a credible threat of violence" as those terms are defined in the statute. (§ 527.8, subds. (b)(7), (j).)
" 'Unlawful violence'" is defined in section 527.8, subdivision (b)(7) as "any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others." (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(7).) Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a) defines stalking in pertinent part as "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family . . . ."
Applying the plain meaning of the statutory language to the facts here, we conclude that the record does not demonstrate that Ms. Su "engaged in unlawful violence" as that term is defined in the section. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Su assaulted or battered any individual. Ms. Su's actions also do not constitute stalking as defined in Penal Code section 646.9 as there is not clear and convincing evidence from which we can infer that Ms. Su intended to place the Broadcom executives in fear for their safety or that of their immediate families, which is a necessary element of that offense. While it is clear that the Broadcom managers experienced fear, that is not enough to demonstrate that Ms. Su intended to elicit this response as required by the statute.
However, the trial court also "shall issue" a workplace violence restraining order if it finds clear and convincing evidence that the respondent made a "credible threat of violence." (§ 527.8, subd. (j).) From her briefing and statements at oral argument, it appears that Ms. Su believes that the statute would authorize the issuance of a restraining order only if she verbally threatened a person with harm. However, the language of the statute is broader than she contends.
A "credible threat of violence" is either a statement or "course of conduct" that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety or that of immediate family members, and that serves no legitimate purpose. (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) Ms. Su's persistent uninvited contact with Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan at their residences qualifies as a "course of conduct," defined in section 527.8, subdivision (b)(1) as a "pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however, short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an employee to or from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during hours of employment . . ." Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan were working from their homes as a result of orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. As Ms. Su admitted that she went to their homes because she was precluded from appearing at Broadcom facilities by the stay-away order, we construe her successful efforts to obtain Mr. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan's residential addresses as following them from Broadcom to confront them about her work-related grievances. These actions meet the definition of a "course of conduct" described in section 527.8, subdivision (b)(2).
Ms. Su's repeated appearances at the Broadcom executives' residences also constitutes a "pattern of conduct" under section 528.8, subdivision (b)(2) that was purposeful and deliberate. By researching and obtaining the home addresses of executives and employees not listed publicly, Ms. Su evidenced the resolution to find each person. From Ms. Bjorlin's description of her conversation with Ms. Su, the court reasonably inferred that Ms. Su intended to confront both Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan with her complaints regarding Broadcom and the stay-away order she felt was issued without cause, as well as her belief that Broadcom was conspiring with the federal government and other authorities against her. Such contact did not serve any "legitimate purpose." (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).)
Section 527.8, subdivision (b)(2) further requires that the "course of conduct" be one that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety. Ms. Su contends that she contacted the Broadcom executives for a benign purpose: to seek relief from the stay-away order. We infer from this that she does not believe that her conduct would cause a reasonable person to be fearful. But by contacting the Broadcom executives where they were working at their homes, she placed them in fear, even if this was not her intent. Ms. Bjorlin testified at the hearing that she was afraid for her family's safety and did not want Ms. Su to return to her home. Mr. Tan was so concerned about his safety that Broadcom hired security to protect him and his home.
Further, their fear was reasonable, as the uninvited appearance of an employee who had been terminated three years earlier, and who was already subject to a stay-away order applicable to other Broadcom employees and Broadcom's facilities, violated their sense of privacy and safety in their homes where, due to the pandemic, they were working on a remote status. That the passage of time since Ms. Su's termination did not diminish her frustration with Broadcom would reasonably cause them to believe that they were exposed to whatever animus she might express because she lost her employment. Ms. Su's insistence on accosting Broadcom associates rather than pursuing available legal remedies for any perceived violation of her employee rights was evidence that she did not recognize, even after Broadcom had first petitioned for a restraining order, that her persistence had developed into a form of harassment.
Section 527.8, subdivision (a) authorizes an employer whose employee "has suffered . . . a credible threat of violence . . . that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace" to seek a restraining order on behalf of the employee. Ms. Su does not challenge the issuance of the restraining order here on the basis that her actions did not take place at Broadcom facilities. We determine that the violative conduct could "reasonably be construed . . . to have been carried out at the workplace" under section 527.8, subdivision (a), as it is not disputed that the Broadcom associates were working remotely at their homes because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ms. Su's stated belief that Broadcom was conspiring with the government and other authorities to interfere in her life long after her termination also reasonably generated fear. The fact that she obtained the homes addresses of the Broadcom CEO, general manager, and other executives, when those addresses were not publicly listed, was evidence that she was determined to make contact with someone in a position of authority. Her choice to contact persons not included in the stay-away order and away from Broadcom's physical sites was evidence that she was sufficiently sophisticated to differentiate between the two groups of Broadcom associates and to avoid any contention that she had violated the original stay-away order. In short, Ms. Su's persistent and deliberate efforts to obtain redress from Broadcom management three years after her termination, based on her perception that Broadcom was working in concert with other agencies against her interests, would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or that of immediate family members as contemplated by the statute. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Ms. Su made a "credible threat of violence" against Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan as defined in the statute. Having made that finding, the trial court was required to issue the restraining order to protect Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan. (§ 527.8, subd. (j) ["If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence."].)
The trial court included the other Broadcom employees who were listed in the notes located in Ms. Su's car. While these persons had not themselves suffered a credible threat of violence as defined in section 527.8, subdivisions (b)(2) and (7), under the relevant statute, Broadcom was not required to wait until Ms. Su contacted them to seek protection on their behalf. Once it is established that an employee has suffered a credible threat of violence, other employees may also be included as protected parties. "Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer." (§527.8, subd. (a).)
We review the trial court's decision to include additional Broadcom employees as protected persons for an abuse of discretion. (See Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1234.) We reverse the decision of the trial court only when it has" '"' "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" [Citation.]'" (In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44, 51.)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it extended the protection of the restraining order to the other persons on the list found in Ms. Su's car. Based on Ms. Su's possession of the list of multiple employees and her efforts to contact Broadcom employees not protected by the existing stay-away order, including Ms. Bjorlin, Mr. Tan and the executive employed at the Menlo Park equity firm, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Ms. Su intended to contact others on the list in the future, and that a restraining order was necessary to prevent her from continuing these actions. It was also proper to include Samir Aboulhouda as a protected person because Ms. Su referenced him by name in her declaration accompanying her response to the petition for restraining order, stating: "he is the root source to purposely cheat company and make trouble on me . . . ."
However, we conclude that the court's inclusion of additional employees who were not on Ms. Su's list was an abuse of discretion. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Su intended to contact the additional employees as she had Ms. Bjorlin and Mr. Tan, and therefore no basis to include them as protected persons in the order.
The list seized from Ms. Su's car appears in Exhibit C attached to the Temporary Restraining Order filed on January 29, 2019. Those pages are stamped "redacted", making it impossible for us to fully discern the names contained therein; further, one portion of the list includes only the first names of some individuals. On remand, the trial court may have access to an unredacted copy of the exhibit or may more easily read the first and last names of the persons included on the exhibit. Under our analysis, those persons whose first and last names can be discerned on Exhibit C should be included by the trial court as protected persons in the restraining order.
C. Declarations of Protected Persons
Citing section 527.8, subdivision (e), Ms. Su argues Broadcom's petition for the restraining order was procedurally deficient because it was not accompanied by declarations from each of the protected persons listed. However, Ms. Su is incorrect about the requirements of the statute. Section 527.8, subdivision (e) provides: "Upon filing a petition under this section, the petitioner may obtain a temporary restraining order in accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 527, if the petitioner also files a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof that an employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee . . . ." This provision is expressly limited to temporary restraining orders. Nothing in the statute requires a declaration from each person protected in a final order made after a hearing.
Here, Broadcom submitted its petition with two declarations-one from Ms. Bjorlin detailing her experience with Ms. Su when she came to her home, and another from Broadcom's counsel detailing Ms. Su's visits to Mr. Tan's home and the need for Broadcom to hire security for his protection. These declarations supported Broadcom's application and the court's initial issuance of the temporary restraining order under section 527.8, subdivision (e).
The order that is the subject of this appeal was made after a hearing during which the court considered testimony from Ms. Bjorlin, Ms. Su and an offer of proof from Broadcom's counsel. The court also had the list of employees with their home addresses that Ms. Su had created and admitted was hers. Those employees were listed by Broadcom as protected persons in the application for restraining order. The court properly considered the evidence presented. (§ 527.8, subd. (j) ["At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry."].) Under the terms of section 527.8, Broadcom was not required to present a declaration or testimony from each of the protected persons in the application. As discussed above, upon a finding that one Broadcom employee had suffered a credible threat of violence as defined by the statute, it was within the trial court's discretion to include other Broadcom employees as protected persons under section 527.8, subdivision (a).
Ms. Su also complains that none of the six people she had subpoenaed appeared at the hearing. However, the record from the hearing reflects that there were only three subpoenas and the court ordered them quashed because they improperly listed Broadcom's counsel as the contact person rather than Ms. Su. The failure of any of Ms. Su's witnesses to attend the hearing was due to flaws in the subpoenas that she herself prepared.
D. Judicial Bias
Ms. Su asserts she was prejudiced because the court was biased against her at the hearing. Specifically, she points to comments of the court that Ms. Su suffered from mental health problems, asserting the comments were without support. Ms. Su argues the court's statements reveal "an attitude of extreme prejudice and bias against me."
The record reflects that Ms. Su and the trial court struggled to communicate effectively. In part this was because Ms. Su was challenged in her efforts to be understood in English, but it was also because she interrupted the court. She was escorted out of the courtroom as she was making what the court characterized as an "outburst." Broadcom's counsel then requested that the existing stay-away order be extended to expire at the same time as the newly issued workplace violence restraining order. The court denied his informal motion, correctly stating that notice to Ms. Su was required for the court to consider any such extension of the stay-away order. Counsel expressed his hope that "she probably did get the message that she shouldn't be reaching out to additional people that aren't included on this restraining order . . ." In response, the court stated, "I don't know what kind of warning would help. I think there may be some mental health problems or inability to move on . . . ."
We do not agree that the court's comments demonstrate that the court was prejudiced or biased against Ms. Su. The court's statements regarding Ms. Su's mental health were made in part because of Ms. Su's disruptive behavior and inability to follow the court's directions during the hearing. The court's statement also reflected the court's concern regarding Ms. Su's ability to comply with the newly issued order given the evidence of her efforts to contact Broadcom managers despite an existing stay-away order, and her statements that Broadcom was involved in a widespread conspiracy. There is no indication that the court considered anything other than the evidence of Ms. Su's conduct when it issued the restraining order. As discussed above, there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's issuance of the restraining order in this case. "[A]dverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are subject to review, do not establish a charge of judicial bias." (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112; Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795-796.)
E. Negative Consequences of Restraining Order
Ms. Su seeks reversal of the restraining order because it is resulting in negative consequences to her. She expresses concern that discovery of the order through a background check could lead to "adverse employment actions, denial or loss of professional license, rejection from college or university, and loss of housing." Ms. Su also notes that "violation of a restraining order can trigger criminal and fine consequences, including up to one year in jail or up to $1000 fine."
Ms. Su is correct that a restraining order may have negative consequences for the restrained party. However, as we have indicated, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Ms. Su engaged in behavior requiring the issuance of an order under section 527.8, subdivision (j). Broadcom and Ms. Su initially stipulated to a stay-away order that did not have the same negative consequences of a restraining order. However, Ms. Su did not want to adhere to the conditions of that agreement, and instead, attempted to have it vacated. When Ms. Su contacted additional Broadcom associates not included in the stay-away order, the company exercised its right to seek a workplace violence restraining order to protect its employees from further unwanted contact with Ms. Su.
III. Disposition
The matter is remanded for the sole purpose of modifying the list of names included as protected persons in the workplace violence restraining order issued on April 6, 2020 to include only Alexis Bjorlin, Hock E. Tan, Samir Aboulhouda, Ken Hao, Maryann Aminjan, Wei Tang, Bryan Ingram, Mark Brazeal, and any other persons discernable by first and last name on the list seized from Xiaoyan Su's car contained in Exhibit C attached to the Temporary Restraining Order filed on January 29, 2019. The order is otherwise affirmed.
The Clerk of the Superior Court is directed to forward a copy of the modified order to a law enforcement agency to be entered into the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS).
WE CONCUR: Grover, J., Danner, J.