Commonwealth v. Rink, et al., 267 Pa. 408, 110 A. 153. In Broadbent v. McFerson, 80 Col. 264, 250 P. 852, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided that the title "An Act relating to banks and bankers" was sufficient to embrace a provision with reference to liability of stockholders of insolvent banks and bank commissioner's exclusive right to sue thereon. This Court, in Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias, etc., v. Moore, 120 Fla. 761, 163 So. 108, held that "An Act relating to the regulation, supervision, and control, of Fraternal Benefit Societies" was constitutional although in the body there were provisions relating to the status of benefit certificates, together with Constitution and bylaws of society, with amendments, as constituting agreements and admissible evidence.
[2, 3] The first of these is that every statute, duly passed must be held constitutional unless the contrary appears beyond a reasonable doubt. Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. School Dist., 63 Colo. 159, 165 Pac. 260; Broadbent v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 Pac. 852. The reasons for this rule are found in the presumption that public officials, in the discharge of their duties, have acted lawfully; and the fact, of which the courts take judicial notice, that members of the General Assembly have taken an oath to support the state Constitution. Hence follows the presumption that they have not passed an act which violates the fundamental law. It therefore clearly appears that an equally binding rule of legislative conduct is that that department shall pass no law whose constitutionality is a matter of grave doubt, and that if the General Assembly ignores that rule the reason for the judicial presumption of constitutionality disappears and the courts are thus greatly embarrassed in the discharge of the duty devolving upon them. 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 375. It will be observed that the judicial presumption above stated is not here applicable because the principal reason upon which it rests is absent.
In Lowdermilk v. People, 70 Colo. 459, 202 Pac. 118, the title of the act in question is "An act concerning chattel mortgages," and we held that it covers a provision making a mortgagor guilty of larceny if he should sell or transfer the mortgaged property without complying with certain specified requirements. And see Broadbent v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 Pac. 852. In Italia America Shipping Corporation v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N.E. 198, the act in question was entitled "An act in relation to the buying and selling of foreign exchange and the transmission or transfer of money to foreign countries."
For the reason of the nonassignability of the claim, the First Bank Trust Company is not a real party in interest, and therefore cannot maintain the suit. Broadbent v. McFerson (Colo.) 250 P. 852. It is contended by counsel that, even if the assignee bank cannot bring action, inasmuch as the Bank Commissioner is made a party, he can prosecute the suit for the bank's benefit.
But if that were not the necessary construction of the title, it is a construction which is evidently possible and makes said section 17 (C.L. 3797) constitutional; and we must construe the title so as to make the act constitutional if we can. Industrial Commission et al. v. Continental Investment Co., 78 Colo. 399, 242 P. 49. Even if that were not so, however, there is at least a reasonable doubt, and therefore we cannot hold the statute unconstitutional. Broadbent v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 P. 852; Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649. Second.