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Brkic v. Apfel

United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Jul 29, 1999
Civil Action No. 98-1039 (NHP) (D.N.J. Jul. 29, 1999)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 98-1039 (NHP)

July 29, 1999.

Lawrence E. Kwazmierczak, Esq., Oakland, N.J., Attorney for Plaintiff.

Barbara L. Spivak, Chief Counsel, Region II, Dennis J. Canning, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.



THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT


Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Mirko Brkic brings this action before the Court seeking to overturn the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Brkic filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits on June 9, 1995, alleging disability due to fatigue, tension, irritability, nervousness and depression. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff next requested a hearing on February 1, 1996, which was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael H. Noorigian. By decision dated July 2, 1997, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits.

In his decision dated July 2, 1997, the ALJ determined that the claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on November 22, 1994, and continues to meet them through September 10, 1999. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 22, 1994. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe valvular heart disease and small airways disease (and a nonsevere adjustment disorder), but that he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. The ALJ found that although the claimant may experience some chest pain and shortness of breath, these symptoms do not functionally limit the ability to perform sedentary work. The ALJ stated that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work related activities except for work involving lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds frequently or more than 20 pounds occasionally. The claimant's past relevant work as a sewing machine operator, as generally performed in the national economy, does not require the performance of work related activities precluded by the above limitations. Thus, the ALJ held that the claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the holding. This decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, on February 19, 1998, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. This appeal followed.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Based on § 405(g), this Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. It is well settled that substantial evidence incorporates any "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Additionally, the ALJ's ruling should clearly explain the foundation upon which it rests. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3rd Cir. 1981). Furthermore, it is clear that the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of analyzing all the relevant evidence and explaining why certain evidence was considered relevant while other evidence was dismissed. Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3rd Cir. 1978). Although administrative decisions are accorded a certain level of deference, it is the responsibility of this Court to closely sift through the record in order to determine whether the ALJ's ruling is buttressed by substantial evidence. Id.

In order for a claimant to be determined disabled, and thus be awarded benefits, he or she must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. To comply, the claimant must first meet the insured status requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c) and the resource and income restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (a) and (b). Secondly, the claimant must establish that he or she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity as defined in §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382 (c)(3)(A). In the case at bar, the plaintiff has satisfied both of these requirements.

Finally, the claimant must show that he or she is disabled as defined by the statute. This final determination is the issue on appeal, and this Court must decide if the ALJ's ruling denying the plaintiff's "disabled" status is supported by substantial evidence.

The Social Security Act prescribes a five-step process that must be satisfied in order for a claimant to be entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). Initially, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he is not currently employed or engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a) (1995);Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n. 5 (1987). Then, the plaintiff must also prove that he is inflicted with a severe medical impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c) (1995); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. In addition, as a third requisite, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart. P, Appendix. 1 (1995). If the claimant's impairment does not meet the criteria set forth in the list of impairments, the ALJ must move to step four.

Pursuant to step four, the claimant is under the obligation to prove that he or she cannot return to the particular type of work the claimant had previously performed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (e) (1995); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Failure to prove this requisite will result in a denial of benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (e) (1995). Finally, if the claimant has proven that he or she is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (f) (1995). If the Commissioner is unable to carry this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.

In the case at bar, this Court finds that the ALJ's decision to deny the plaintiff's claim for benefits is supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to pursue substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff primarily points to subjective complaints of pain. Symptoms alone are not enough to trigger the Act. A claimant must demonstrate by medical findings the existence of a disabling condition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (b), 416.929 (b); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186, (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993); Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (3rd Cir. 1984).

As the record demonstrates, plaintiff has been examined by several doctors in order to diagnose his particular ailments. The ALJ determined that plaintiff's valvular heart disease and small airways disease were not severe. The ALJ noted that the echocardiograms from 1991 and 1995 revealed essentially the same abnormalities. However, plaintiff remained working until November 1994. Thus, even in 1995, his condition had not deteriorated from the way it was prior to his layoff. Dr. Scerbo, plaintiff's treating physician, opined on July 18, 1995, that plaintiff's heart condition and small airway problem restricted him to sedentary and light work. On June 3, 1997 based on the same impairments, Dr. Scerbo opined that plaintiff could still perform sedentary work. Further, plaintiff had been examined by Dr. Messihi, who noted the lack of any use of medications and made minimal clinical findings upon examination. For example, there were no motor deficits noted, plaintiff exhibited a good grip and lungs were clear. The doctor's impression was that no active disease was present.

With respect to plaintiff's psychological problem, Dr. Messhi observed that plaintiff was slow to respond to questions, but the doctor attributed that to the language barrier and plaintiff's third grade education. Once plaintiff understood a question, his answers were appropriate and more intelligent. When Dr. Glover, a psychiatrist, performed a mental status examination, plaintiff was fully oriented and exhibited no signs of anxiety, depression or psychosis. However, plaintiff emphasized his health worries. The doctor did note plaintiff's difficulty with English and some problems with math, likely related to his upbringing and limited education in Croatia. Despite the lack of any objective sign of anxiety, Dr. Glover diagnosed adjustment disorder with anxiety symptoms associated with plaintiff's health.

The ALJ reasonably determined that plaintiff's adjustment disorder was not severe because: 1) there were no objective manifestations revealed during medical examinations; 2) Dr. Scerbo did not report observing plaintiff having any such difficulty, and 3) plaintiff has never been treated for that condition. It is proper for the Commissioner to attach significance to plaintiff's failure to seek any treatment during the crucial alleged disability period. See Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 39 (2nd Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ made a selective analysis of the record pertaining to plaintiff's testimony and the medical evidence. It is within the ALJ's discretion to evaluate the credibility of the plaintiff's testimony and to render an independent judgement based upon the medical findings and related evidence regarding the true extent of disability.See Brown v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Lacorte v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D.N.J. 1988).

In the instant case, the ALJ relied on a number of factors to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff's subjective complaints and the doctors' findings were not sufficient to trigger the Act's coverage. He noted that plaintiff had stopped work due to being laid off, not for any medical reason. As noted earlier, clinical findings from 1991, when plaintiff was working, and 1995, after his layoff, were essentially identical. Plaintiff was seen by his treating doctor sporadically and, insofar as his airway problem is concerned, there is no evidence that he had ever been placed on steroids. Thus, the objective evidence did not support the severity or degree of complaints alleged by plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff cared for his personal needs, walked to the store and used public transit.

The ALJ must view the subjective complaints of pain in light of the medical evidence in the record. Brown at 284. There must be objective medical evidence that supports the claimant's complaints of pain. In this case, the ALJ did not neglect the plaintiff's assertions of pain. Rather, the complaints in conjunction with medical evidence were analyzed. It is within the discretion of the ALJ to grant less weight to subjective complaints of pain when such evidence conflicted with the objective medical evidence. Id.

The ALJ's determination that plaintiff was not disabled by his symptoms was supported by substantial evidence. There were only plaintiff's complaints of assorted problems, but the objective physical examinations and medical reports discussed above showed minimal findings and even his own treating physician opined that he could work. If plaintiff's symptoms suggest a greater restriction of function than can be demonstrated by objective evidence alone, consideration will also be given to such factors as daily activities, medications, treatment, functional limitations, frequency and duration of pain and factors that precipitate it. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 416.929. The ALJ did not find plaintiff credible. Moreover, the ALJ noted that plaintiff generally used no medication, had only sporadic treatment and had ceased work after he was laid off. Further, plaintiff had reported that he handled light household tasks, such as going to the store.

The Administrative Law Judge found that plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a sewing machine operator and the full range of light and/or sedentary work. Herein, the ALJ noted that plaintiff retained the capacity to perform light work. However, plaintiff described his former job as more than light work. The ALJ found that plaintiff could nevertheless perform that job as it is generally performed in the national economy since the Dictionary of Occupational Titles describes sewing machines operator jobs in the garment industry as light work. Thus, plaintiff's residual functional capacity for light work does not prevent him from meeting the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work as a sewing machine operator as it is generally performed in the national economy.

The Commissioner determined that plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof that he was under a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and on the basis of the record as a whole, this Court finds that the Commissioner's determination that plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act should be and is hereby AFFIRMED.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.


Summaries of

Brkic v. Apfel

United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Jul 29, 1999
Civil Action No. 98-1039 (NHP) (D.N.J. Jul. 29, 1999)
Case details for

Brkic v. Apfel

Case Details

Full title:Mirko Brkic v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

Court:United States District Court, D. New Jersey

Date published: Jul 29, 1999

Citations

Civil Action No. 98-1039 (NHP) (D.N.J. Jul. 29, 1999)