Britton v. Lorenz

27 Citing cases

  1. Murphy v. Waterhouse

    113 Cal. 467 (Cal. 1896)   Cited 21 times
    In Murphy v. Waterhouse, 113 Cal. 467 [45 P. 866, 54 Am. St.Rep. 365], it was held that an attorney, who was attorney for both the maker and payee of a promissory note and who was present with them when the note was executed, was not disqualified as a witness in litigation between the parties based on the note.

    The contract made in his presence was not a confidential communication. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1881; In re Bauer , 79 Cal. 304, 312, and cases cited; Britton v. Lorenz , 45 N.Y. 51; Gallagher v. Williamson , 23 Cal. 331; 83 Am. Dec. 114; Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kan. 195; Coveney v. Tannahill, 1 Hill, 33; 37 Am. Dec. 287; Hughes v. Boone , 100 N.C. 347; Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453; Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127; Patten v. Moor , 29 N.H. 163; Appeal of Goodwin etc. Co ., 117 Pa. St. 514; 2 Am. St. Rep. 696.) Every error is prima facie an injury to the party against whom it is made; and the other party must clearly show that no injury could have been done or was done. (Jackson v. Feather River Water Co ., 14 Cal. 25; Carpentier v. Williamson , 25 Cal. 167; Norwood v. Kenfield , 30 Cal. 400; Rice v. Heath , 39 Cal. 612.)

  2. Alexander v. United States

    138 U.S. 353 (1891)   Cited 65 times
    Noting that the exclusion of the defendant's testimony that another person was armed and searching for the eventual murder victim might be "such error . . . as to require reversal" if such evidence "might have a material bearing upon the identification of the murderer"

    " It is evident from this statement that defendant consulted with Ralls as a legal adviser, and while, if he were guilty of the murder, it may have had a tendency to show an effort on his part to defraud his partner's estate, and to make profit out of his death, by appropriating to himself the partnership property, it did not necessarily have that tendency and was clearly a privileged communication. If he consulted him in the capacity of an attorney, and the communication was in the course of his employment, and may be supposed to have been drawn out in consequence of the relations of the parties to each other, neither the payment of a fee nor the pendency of litigation was necessary to entitle him to the privilege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394; Andrews v. Simms, 33 Ark. 771. In the language of Mr. Justice Story, speaking for this court in Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 294: "Whatever facts, therefore, are communicated by a client to a counsel solely on account of that relation, such counsel are not at liberty, even if they wish, to disclose; and the law holds their testimony incompetent."

  3. United States v. Grand Jury Investigation

    401 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Pa. 1975)   Cited 5 times

    If he consulted him in the capacity of an attorney, and the communication was in the course of his employment, and may be supposed to have been drawn out in consequence of the relations of the parties to each other, neither the payment of a fee nor the pendency of litigation was necessary to entitle him to the privilege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394; Andrews v. Simms, 33 Ark. 771. In the language of Mr. Justice Story, speakingfor this court in Chirac v. Reinicker [ 24 U.S. 280], 11 Wheat. 280, 294 [ 6 L.Ed. 474, 477]: `Whatever facts, therefore, are communicated by a client to a counsel solely on account of that relation, such counsel are not at liberty, even if they wish, to disclose; and the law holds their testimony incompetent.

  4. Rossi v. Blue Cross

    73 N.Y.2d 588 (N.Y. 1989)   Cited 279 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications concerning business matters

    The memorandum, written the very day plaintiff's summons and complaint were drafted, began by referring to Blaney's conversations with plaintiff's counsel and went on to express the lawyer's views regarding the rejection language of the form. Communications from an attorney to a client dealing with the substance of imminent litigation generally will fall into the area of legal rather than business or personal matters (see, Britton v Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51, 57; Whiting v Barney, 30 N.Y. 330, 334). That the memorandum does not reflect legal research is not determinative, where the communication concerns legal rights and obligations and where it evidences other professional skills such as lawyer's judgment and recommended legal strategies (see, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2296, at 567 [McNaughton rev ed 1961]). So long as the communication is primarily or predominantly of a legal character, the privilege is not lost merely by reason of the fact that it also refers to certain nonlegal matters (id.; see also, Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, at 3-30 [1987]).

  5. Harrison v. State

    276 Md. 122 (Md. 1975)   Cited 77 times
    Recognizing waiver by implication for attorney-client privilege

    "If he consulted him in the capacity of an attorney, and the communication was in the course of his employment, and may be supposed to have been drawn out in consequence of the relations of the parties to each other, neither the payment of a fee nor the pendency of litigation was necessary to entitle him to the privilege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394; Andrews v. Simms, 33 Arkansas, 771. "In the language of Mr. Justice Story, speaking for this court in Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 294: `Whatever facts, therefore, are communicated by a client to a counsel solely on account of that relation, such counsel are not at liberty, even if they wish, to disclose; and the law holds their testimony incompetent.'"

  6. People v. Alfani

    227 N.Y. 334 (N.Y. 1919)   Cited 83 times
    In People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 A. 671, and Land Title Abstract and Trust Company v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650, the phrase has been discussed in these terms: "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts.

    Section 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in substance that an attorney shall not be allowed to disclose a communication made by his client to him or his advice given thereon, in the course of his professional employment. Such communications have referred to a deed ( Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72); an affidavit ( Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546); a chattel mortgage ( Yates v. Olmsted, 56 N.Y. 632) and a bill of sale ( Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51). Also the summary power of courts over attorneys may be exercised in matters unrelated to court proceedings, the rule being stated in Matter of Husson (26 Hun, 130).

  7. Wallace v. Wallace

    216 N.Y. 28 (N.Y. 1915)   Cited 61 times
    In Wallace v. Wallace, 216 N.Y. 28, the evidence in favor of an agreement seems stronger than in the present case, and yet it was held insufficient.

    The attorney then testified that the copy was the second will. It was held that the evidence of the attorney and his stenographer and the paper offered were properly excluded. I think that decision is inapplicable and that the case under consideration rather falls within the principle of Hurlburt v. Hurlburt ( 128 N.Y. 420); Doheny v. Lacy ( 168 N.Y. 213) and Britton v. Lorenz ( 45 N.Y. 51). In Hurlburt v. Hurlburt a father and son went together to an attorney for advice on a matter in which they were both interested.

  8. People v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co.

    60 N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1901)   Cited 9 times

    It is the completeness of the transfer and its effect upon the debtor in business, and not the name or form of the instrument or transaction, that gives it character. Any transfer by a trader or merchant of all his stock and business, when it covers substantially all his property, may be an assignment within the meaning of the policy in spite of its form or the name given to it. ( Brown v. Guthrie, 110 N.Y. 441; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt. 390; Kendall v. Bishop, 76 Mich. 634; White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U.S. 329.) In case of ambiguity or uncertainty concerning the meaning of conditions in contracts of this character, that meaning is to be adopted which is most favorable to the assured.

  9. Rogers v. Pell

    154 N.Y. 518 (N.Y. 1898)   Cited 34 times
    In Rogers v. Pell (154 N.Y. 518, 529) the Court of Appeals ruled: "An instrument is not `duly acknowledged' unless there is not only the oral acknowledgment but the written certificate also, as required by the statutes regulating the subject."

    ( Sheldon Hat Co. v. Eickemeyer Hat Co., 90 N.Y. 607; Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159.) Hostile third parties, such as judgment creditors, could not elect for the corporation nor take any advantage of the president's mistake, except to make use of it upon an application to the proper authority for the removal of the assignee as a person unfit to discharge the duties of the trust. Under the Assignment Act of 1860 it was held that both the acknowledgment and the indorsement of a certificate thereof were essential to the transfer of title. ( Hardmann v. Bowen, 39 N.Y. 196; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; L. 1860, ch. 348.) The Assignment Act of 1877 requires that every assignment for the benefit of creditors shall be "duly acknowledged before an officer authorized to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and every such * * * assignment shall be recorded."

  10. Rapp v. Whittier

    113 Cal. 429 (Cal. 1896)   Cited 10 times
    In Rapp v. Whittier, supra, a creditor's bill was sustained, although no proceedings supplementary to execution had been taken.

    The issue, however, as to consideration of the alleged bill of sale is immaterial, as the assignment was a general one for the benefit of creditors and void under the statute. (Bishop on Insolvent Debtors, sec. 104; Civ. Code, sec. 3449; O'Kane v. Daly , 63 Cal. 317; Beardsley v. Frame , 85 Cal. 134; Dana v. Stanford , 10 Cal. 269; Britton v. Lorenz , 45 N.Y. 51; Beers v. Lyon , 21 Conn. 604; Bishop v. Hart , 28 Vt. 71; Kimball v. Evans , 58 Vt. 655.)          JUDGES: Britt, C. Vanclief, C., and Haynes, C., concurred.