Opinion
DA 17-0621
01-29-2019
BRIAN SCOTT BRITT, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent and Appellee.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Jamie Young, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert Scott Padmos, Liberty County Attorney, Chester, Montana
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, In and For the County of Liberty, Cause No. DV-17-05 Honorable Daniel A. Boucher, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Jamie Young, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert Scott Padmos, Liberty County Attorney, Chester, Montana Filed: /s/_________
Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Brian Scott Britt appeals from the order entered by the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Liberty County, denying his petition for reinstatement of his driver's license. ¶3 Liberty County Sheriff's Deputy Dallas Gardner was patrolling Highway 2 between Chester and Joplin, Montana, shortly after midnight on April 7, 2017. Traveling eastbound, Gardner observed a truck slow down and almost come to a stop before turning onto Highway 224, without using a turn signal. Gardner likewise turned onto Highway 224 and followed the truck for approximately 150 yards, observing it slowly move back and forth across the center line. Gardner testified that, based on his training and experience, he believed the driver was "possibly impaired" and decided to pull him over for the two traffic violations he had observed—turning without a signal and driving over the center line. ¶4 Gardner initiated a stop of the vehicle, identified the driver as Britt, and asked where he was coming from. Britt said he had drunk a couple of beers at a bar in Chester and was now driving home to Rudyard. Gardner testified he found it odd that Britt was reportedly traveling to Rudyard because, prior to the stop, Britt had been traveling away from Rudyard. Gardner noticed Britt's murmured speech and that he would "stall and stop on sentences." He testified Britt "had a droopy facial demeanor" and, when Britt stepped out of the vehicle, appeared to have difficulty balancing, because he continuously leaned against the truck and "bounced into" the deputy when asked to walk to the front of the vehicle. Gardner testified that, at this point, he believed there was reasonable suspicion Britt was impaired, and administered three field sobriety tests, which Britt failed. When Gardner asked Britt again about his alcohol consumption, Britt said he had "too much to drink to be driving." Gardner then informed Britt he would be transported for further testing. ¶5 Concerned that his truck would block traffic, Britt asked Gardner for permission to move it out of the way. Gardner allowed Britt to move the truck approximately 15 yards, although testified this was a "wrong decision" and "a lack of judgment," which in hindsight "is not something I would do again." Despite that error, Gardner stated he still believed he had probable cause to arrest Britt for DUI. ¶6 During his testimony, Gardner also described an odor of alcohol emanating from Britt while they drove to the Sheriff's office. There, Gardner administered the same three field sobriety tests, which Britt again failed. Gardner then placed Britt under arrest, read him the implied consent form, and asked him to submit to a breathalyzer test. Britt refused the test and his license was ultimately suspended. Britt petitioned for reinstatement of his license and the District Court held a hearing, after which it denied the petition. Britt appeals. ¶7 We review a district court's denial of a petition for the reinstatement of a driver's license to determine whether its conclusions of law are correct and whether its findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Kummerfeldt v. State, 2015 MT 109, ¶ 8, 347 P.3d 1233. We presume that the suspension of a driver's license is correct, requiring the petitioner to bear the burden of proving that the State's action was improper. Brunette v. State, 2016 MT 128, ¶ 11, 383 Mont. 458, 372 P.3d 476. ¶8 First, Britt argues the District Court erred by finding that Deputy Gardner had reasonable grounds for Gardner's stop of his vehicle. The "reasonable grounds" requirement in § 61-8-403(4)(a)(i), MCA, is equivalent to the "particularized suspicion" that must exist for law enforcement to conduct an investigative stop. Brunette, ¶ 32 (citing Kummerfeldt, ¶ 11). Though we have adopted a two-part test to determine if a police officer had sufficient facts to support particularized suspicion and justify a traffic stop, such an analysis is unnecessary here because "[a] statutory violation alone is sufficient to establish particularized suspicion for an officer to make a traffic stop." State v. Schulke, 2005 MT 77, ¶¶ 12, 16, 326 Mont. 390, 109 P.3d 744 (officer had particularized suspicion to stop a vehicle after observing the defendant commit a statutory violation by slowly drifting back and forth across the center dividing line). Here, Gardner observed Britt commit two statutory violations. See § 61-8-336, MCA (failure to use a signal while turning); and § 61-8-321, MCA (failure to drive on the right side of the roadway). The District Court grounded its finding of particularized suspicion only in Britt's failure to signal, in violation of § 61-8-336, MCA. This was consistent with our previous decision in Brunette, where we affirmed a district court's determination that failing to signal a turn in violation of the statute, established particularized suspicion for a stop. Brunette, ¶ 29. ¶9 We are unpersuaded by Britt's contention that because Gardner admitted he typically does not stop drivers for failing to signal a turn, it was "clearly improper" for the District Court to justify the stop on this ground. Particularized suspicion must be based on "objective data" derived from the totality of the circumstances, not an officer's subjective practices. Weer v. State, 2010 MT 232, ¶ 10, 358 Mont. 130, 244 P.3d 311. Here, there is no dispute that Britt failed to signal his turn from Highway 2, thus violating § 61-8-336, MCA. ¶10 Second, Britt argues the District Court erred by failing to provide "the requisite finding that Deputy Gar[d]ner had reasonable grounds or particularized suspicion for a DUI investigation, or even reference the required element[s] of § 61-8-403(4)(a)(i)." We consider a court's oral and written findings and will not overturn those that are "sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision and are supported by evidence." State v. Whiteman, 2005 MT 15, ¶ 12, 325 Mont. 358, 106 P.3d 543. See also Brunette, ¶ 33 (oral and written findings are appropriate for this Court's review). In its oral and written findings, the District Court concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to show that the officer had reason to pull over Mr. Britt," describing how, prior to the initiation of field sobriety tests, Gardner observed Britt's vehicle turn without signaling and "straddle the center line." The District Court also noted that Britt admitted consumption of alcohol and described the "uncontroverted" testimony that he was "driving on what is a public highway" while "under the influence" of alcohol. Deputy Gardner, whom the District Court found to be credible, testified that Britt claimed to be going home to Rudyard, but he was actually traveling in the opposite direction when Gardner pulled him over. Gardner also testified that Britt exhibited a lack of balance and "a droopy facial demeanor," spoke with a murmur, "slowed down in the middle of his sentences," and "bounced" into Gardner when asked to walk around the truck. "Probable cause for an arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's personal knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense." Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 1, 961 P.2d 75. The District Court did not err by concluding that these observations provided reasonable grounds for Gardner's initiation of a DUI investigation and, upon that investigation, including that Britt twice failed field sobriety tests, probable cause existed for his arrest. ¶11 Britt argues that Gardner "should not have been given any credibility" as a witness because of his action in allowing Britt to move his truck, which undermines the particularized suspicion and probable cause determined by Gardner, and that, by accepting his testimony, the District Court committed reversible error. However, during the hearing, the District Court acknowledged this error in judgment but found there was "no consequence to it" because it did not "establish[] whether this person was fit to drive or not fit to drive." The District Court was best suited to assess Gardner's credibility. See Ditton v. DOJ Motor Vehicle Div, 2014 MT 54, ¶ 33, 374 Mont. 122, 319 P.3d 1268 (citations omitted) ("[T]he fact-finder is uniquely in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses" and we "accordingly defer to the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony."). ¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. The District Court's interpretation and application of the law were correct and its findings of fact not clearly erroneous. ¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE We concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR