Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-05715.
July 17, 2004
ORDER
NOW, this 17th day of July 2004, upon consideration of Defendant, County of Northampton's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Jeffrey Britland's Complaint Per Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which motion was filed on February 6, 2004, and Plaintiff, Jeffrey Britland's Brief Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Defendant, County of Northampton, which brief was filed on February 19, 2004; it appearing that plaintiffs filed a five-count Complaint by Jeffrey Britland Only against defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania on September 15, 2003; it further appearing that defendant County of Northampton ("County") was named as a defendant in Counts IV and V only, alleging tortious interference with contracts and promissory estoppel, respectively; it further appearing that, accepting all well-pleaded facts of that complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff Jeffrey Britland, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for tortious interference; it further appearing that accepting all well-pleaded facts of that complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff Jeffrey Britland, plaintiff has successfully stated a claim against defendant County for promissory estoppel,
Each of the five counts raised in the Complaint is raised by plaintiff Jeffrey Britland only and the complaint is entitled Complaint by Jeffrey Britland Only. Interestingly, plaintiff Karen Brandau does not raise a single claim in the complaint despite being named as a plaintiff in this action. We decline to take any action on that issue at this time because the parties have not raised the issue with the court.
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion is granted insofar as it seeks the dismissal of Count IV of plaintiffs' complaint. Count IV of the complaint is dismissed.
Of the five counts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiff Jeffrey Britland raises only the following two counts against defendant County: (1) Count IV — tortious interference; and (2) Count V — promissory estoppel. Plaintiff Karen Brandau raises no causes of action against defendant County.
In its motion to dismiss, defendant County argues that Counts IV and V should be dismissed because plaintiff Jeffrey Britland has failed to state a claim against it. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be granted if, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000). For the reasons explained below, this court finds that plaintiff Jeffrey Britland has failed to state a claim for tortious interference, but has adequately stated a claim for promissory estoppel against defendant County.
In furtherance of its motion, defendant County argues that plaintiff's claim of tortious interference in Count IV is barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8501- 8564 ("Act"). We agree. Pursuant to § 8542 of the Act, local agencies maintain governmental immunity unless, inter alia, the injury alleged is the result of a negligent act.
Plaintiff's claim of tortious interference with contractual relations is an intentional tort from which local agencies are immune. See McMillian v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., No. 99-CV-2949, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12240, *8-9 (E.D. Pa. August 4, 1999). Because defendant County is immune from claims of tortious interference with contracts, such claims raised by plaintiff against it in Count IV of the complaint must fail as a matter of law.
Defendant County next argues that Count V of the complaint fails to state a claim for promissory estoppel because the promise alleged by plaintiff cannot be proven, that the promise was in fact an implied promise and that the promise was an ultra vires promise. To prove a claim of promissory estoppel, plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the promisor made a promise reasonably expected to induce the promisee's action or forbearance; (2) the promisee took or refrained from taking the action in reliance on the promise; and (3) enforcing the promise is the only way to avoid injustice. Holewinski v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 649 A.2d 712, 715 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1994).
In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the County promised to protect plaintiff's employment or provide plaintiff with alternate employment in exchange for cooperating with the County's investigation. Plaintiff further alleges that he relied upon those promises. On that basis, we find that plaintiff has adequately alleged a cause of action for promissory estoppel against the County.
Defendant's arguments to the contrary are premature at this stage where the court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint. Thus, defendant's motion is denied insofar as it seeks to dismiss Count V of the complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion is denied insofar as it seeks the dismissal of Count V of the complaint, without prejudice to raise this issue on summary judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant County of Northampton shall file an answer to plaintiffs' complaint within ten days of the date of this Order.