Opinion
Index No. 512548/2022
05-10-2024
Ladwin Brissett, Plaintiff, v. The City of New York, THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, LARRY GARLAND, SAFE COACH BUS INC., Defendants.
Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, Manhattan (Mark J. Linder of counsel), for plaintiff. Johnson Liebman, LLP, Manhattan (Charles D. Liebman of counsel), for Defendants Larry Garland and Safe Coach Bus Inc.
Unpublished Opinion
Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, Manhattan (Mark J. Linder of counsel), for plaintiff.
Johnson Liebman, LLP, Manhattan (Charles D. Liebman of counsel), for Defendants Larry Garland and Safe Coach Bus Inc.
Aaron D. Maslow, J.
The following numbered papers were used on this motion, which was determined on submission pursuant to IAS Part 2 Rules, Part I, Subpart C, § 6 :
An interim order advising the parties that this motion would be considered on submission was filed on NYSCEF on May 7, 2024 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 85).
Submitted by Plaintiff:
NYSCEF Doc No. 71: Notice of Motion
NYSCEF Doc No. 72: Affirmation of Mark J. Linder, Esq. in Support
NYSCEF Doc No. 73: Exhibit A - Proposed Amended Summons and Amended Complaint
NYSCEF Doc No. 82: Affirmation of Charles D. Liebman, Esq. in Opposition
NYSCEF Doc No. 83: Affirmation of Charles D. Liebman, Esq. Pursuant to 12 NYCRR 130-1.1-a
Submitted by Defendants the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education:
NYSCEF Doc No. 84: Affirmation of Service of Charles D. Liebman, Esq.
Filed by the Court:
NYSCEF Doc No. 85: Interim Order
Upon the foregoing papers and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows:
Question Presented
Should a motion to add a spouse as an additional plaintiff and to amend the summons and complaint to add a cause of action for loss of consortium be granted where, in addition to a copy of the proposed amended summons and complaint, the only other evidence in support is an attorney's affirmation bereft of personal knowledge? This Court has found no direct appellate authority on point.
Background
This action concerns a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Brooklyn on December 7, 2021. Plaintiff Ladwin Brissett alleges that he sustained serious and permanent injuries as a result of Defendant Larry Garland's operation of a vehicle owned by Defendant Safe Coach Bus Inc. Prior hereto, the complaint was dismissed as against Defendants the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education as a result of their successful motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff now seeks leave of Court to amend a summons and complaint to add his purported wife as a plaintiff and to add a cause of action in the complaint for loss of consortium; he also seeks to amend the summons and complaint to reflect that the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education are no longer parties. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 72, Linder aff.)
Contentions
The only papers submitted by Plaintiff in support of his motion are an affirmation from his counsel, Mark J. Linder, Esq., and a copy of the proposed amended summons and complaint. In pertinent part, Attorney Linder avers as follows:
4. On December 7, 2021 and prior thereto, COURTNAY BRISSETT was the spouse of Plaintiff LADWIN BRISSETT.
5. On December 7, 2021 and prior thereto, she was entitled to and did receive the companionship, comfort, love, affection, support, assistance, services, and consortium of Plaintiff LADWIN BRISSETT.
6. That by reason of the negligence of the Defendants, COURTNAY BRISSETT has been deprived of and will be deprived in the future of the companionship, comfort, love, affection, support, assistance, services, and consortium of Plaintiff LADWIN BRISSETT.
7. Based on above and in order to protect the rights of the Plaintiffs herein, it is necessary to add the above named party as a Plaintiff to this matter. Exhibit "A" is the proposed amended complaint along amended summons.
8. Therefore, Plaintiff is requesting an Order of the Court allowing COURTNAY BRISSETT be named as a Plaintiff to this action. (Id. ¶¶ 4-8.)
The proposed amended complaint alleges as a first cause of action on behalf of Courtnay Brissett:
24. This Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs of this complaint numbered "1" through "23" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though the same were more fully set forth at length herein.
25. On December 7, 2021 and prior thereto, COURTNAY BRISSETT was legally married to Plaintiff LADWIN BRISSETT.
26. That at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff COURTNAY BRISSETT has been deprived of the comfort, society and companionship of her husband, LADWIN BRISSETT, and upon information and belief, will be so deprived in the future.
27. That at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff COURTNAY BRISSETT has been caused to incur medical expenses on behalf of her husband, LADWIN BRISSETT, and upon information and belief will be so compelled to do in the future.
28. That by reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff COURTNAY BRISSETT has been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that otherwise have jurisdiction. (NYSCEF Doc No. 73, complaint ¶¶ 24-28.)
Defendants Larry Garland and Safe Coach Bus Inc. do not object to amendments reflecting that the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education are no longer parties. However, they do object to the introduction of Courtnay Brissett as a new plaintiff, as they completed Plaintiff Ladwin Brissett's deposition "and would, therefore require a further deposition from this plaintiff, regarding the services and/or assistance he provided to his wife, Courtnay Brissett, as well as providing defendants the opportunities to serve an additional demand for Bill of Particulars, and to conduct the deposition of Courtnay Brissett with regard to such claims as she may have" (NYSCEF Doc No. 82, Liebman aff ¶ 3).
Discussion
(A) Amending Pleadings
"It is without question that motions to amend pleadings 'shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just with the decision to allow or disallow the amendment committed to the court's discretion' (Rothfarb v Brookdale Hosp., 139 A.D.2d 720, 721-722, citing CPLR 3025 [b]; Barnes v County of Nassau, 108 A.D.2d 50, 52; Koch v St. Francis Hosp., 112 A.D.2d 142; Scarangello v State of New York, 111 A.D.2d 798)" (Courageous Syndicate v People-To-People Sports Comm., Inc., 141 A.D.2d 599, 599 [2d Dept 1988]). "While a court has broad discretion in deciding whether leave to amend should be granted, it is considered an improvident exercise of discretion to deny such leave absent an inordinate delay and a showing of prejudice, and the merits of a proposed amendment will not be examined on the motion to amend unless the insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt" (Noanjo Clothing v L & M Kids Fashion, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 436, 437 [2d Dept 1994]). "However, when such an examination is necessary, leave to amend should be denied where 'the amendment sought is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law' (Barnes v. County of Nassau, supra, 108 A.D.2d at 52)" (Courageous Syndicate v People-To-People Sports Comm., Inc., 141 A.D.2d at 600).
"The requirements for obtaining leave to amend a pleading, incorporated in CPLR 3211 (subd. [e]), were intended to obviate the former loose practice and undue liberality with which leave to replead was granted under the Civil Practice Act after the dismissal of a pleading for insufficiency. (4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ. Prac., par. 3211.01.) The privilege of serving an amended pleading must now rest not only upon formal corrections in the deficient pleading, but also upon an evidentiary demonstration to satisfy a court that the party 'has good ground to support his cause of action'. In other words, it is not enough that a party may be able to state a cause of action; there must be some evidentiary showing that the claim can be supported." (Cushman & Wakefield v John David, Inc., 25 A.D.2d 133, 135 [1st Dept 1966].)
Therefore, while the law promotes liberality in amending pleadings for the most part, "the movant must make some evidentiary showing that the proposed amendment has merit (see Curran v. Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 280 A.D.2d 636, 637). Otherwise, the amendment will not be permitted (see Heckler Elec. Co. v. Matrix Exhibits-New York, 278 A.D.2d 279)." (Mohan v Hollander, 303 A.D.2d 473, 474 [2d Dept 2003].) This begets the question of what evidence should be submitted on a motion to amend the complaint. In CFJ Assoc. of NY v Hanson Indus. (260 A.D.2d 836 [3d Dept 1999]), the answer provided was, "[W]hile an attorney's affidavit made without personal knowledge of the salient facts, such as was submitted in support of plaintiff's cross motion, is ordinarily insufficient for this evidentiary showing (see, Mathiesen v Mead, 168 A.D.2d 736, 737; Cushman & Wakefield v John David, Inc., 25 A.D.2d 133, 135), we recognize that based on the totality of the record before it, including affidavits of those with personal knowledge of the relevant facts, Supreme Court was able to make the requisite threshold evaluation of the merits of the proposed amendment" [emphasis added].
(B) Loss of Consortium
While under the common law a husband had a right of claim to loss of consortium due to injuries sustained by his wife, the same was not so vice versa. In New York, the right of a wife to loss of consortium was recognized in Millington v Southeastern El. Co., Inc. (22 N.Y.2d 498 [1968]), which is notable not only for its recognition of the need to modernize the law to reflect society's movement toward equality between the sexes, but also for its discussion of the legal concept of consortium:
The concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services, it also embraces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace and more. (Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 36; Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., supra., 34 Wis.2d, p. 557.) Consequently the interest sought to be protected is personal to the wife. It is the interest which may have turned a happily married woman into a life-long nurse and deprived her of the opportunity of rearing children. Disparagingly described as "sentimental" or "parasitic" damages, the mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving companionable mate turned into a shell of a person is real enough. To describe the loss as "indirect" is only to evade the issue. The loss of companionship, emotional support, love, felicity and sexual relations are real injuries. The trauma of having to care for a permanent invalid is known to have caused mental illness. There may not be a deterioration in the marital relationship, but it will certainly alter it in a tragic way. (Id. at 502-503.)
Our Court of Appeals rejected arguments that the way to modernize outdated common law was to reject the concept of loss of consortium entirely - for both sexes. In responding, the Court, quoted from Michigan's Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Stephan (359 Mich. 33, 48-49, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234-235 [1960]). The Michigan decision stated (quotation more extensive than that at 22 N.Y.2d at 503-504):
The gist of the matter is that in today's society the wife's position is analogous to that of a partner, neither kitchen slattern nor upstairs maid. Her duties and responsibilities in respect of the family unit complement those of the husband, extending only to another sphere. In the good times she lights the hearth with her own inimitable glow. But when tragedy strikes it is a part of her unique glory that, forsaking the shelter, the comfort, the warmth of the home, she puts her arm and shoulder to the plow. We are now at the heart of the issue. In such circumstances, when her husband's love is denied her, his strength sapped, and his protection destroyed, in short, when she has been forced by the defendant to exchange a heart for a husk, we are urged to rule that she has suffered no loss compensable at the law. But let some scoundrel dent a dishpan in the family kitchen and the law, in all its majesty, will convene the court, will march with measured tread to the halls of justice, and will there suffer a jury of her peers to assess the damages. Why are we asked, then, in the case before us, to look the other way? Is this what is meant when it is said that justice is blind?
No, we see the suffering. But it is urged that the precedents tie us. A wife, said the ancient precedents, could not sue because she was a legal nonentity. And, even if she could, she had no cause of action to assert because a servant has no 'right' to the services of her master. But none of this is true today, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. The Married Women's Acts[ ] and common constitutional provisions have wrought a revolutionary change. Legally, today the wife stands on a par with her husband. Factually, as we well know, her position is no less than that of an equal partner. The precedents of the older cases are not valid precedents. They are violative of women's statutory rights and constitutional safeguards. They are out of harmony with the conditions of modern society. They do violence to our convictions and our principles. We reject their applicability. The reasons for the old rule no longer obtaining, the rule falls with it. The obstacles to the wife's action were judge-invented and they are herewith judge-destroyed. We conclude that the wife before us has pleaded a cause of action.
The Court in Millington further described loss of consortium as "not rest[ing] on any medieval theory but on the real injury done to the marital relationship" (22 N.Y.2d at 504), recognizing that a spouse possesses an interest "in the continuance of a healthy and happy marital life" and is entitled to pursue a cause of action for compensation for the injury to that relationship (id. at 505). In arriving at this determination, the Court (id. at 504) quoted from Deems v Western Md. Ry. Co. (247 Md 95, 108-109, 231 A.2d 514, 521-522 [1967]):
"[T]here is, in a continuing marital relationship, an inseparable mutuality of ties and obligations, of pleasures, affection and companionship, which makes that relationship a factual entity... We see no valid reason why that concept should not be extended to permit recovery for wrongs negligently caused to the legal unity through the physical injury of either spouse.
"That both spouses suffer when the marriage relationship is adversely affected by physical injury to either is a fact evidenced, if not by logic, by human experience since the institution of marriage became a basic part of our mores... Today, at least, it is unquestioned that the desire to have children and the pleasures of sexual intercourse are mutually shared. If the husband's potency is lost or impaired, it is both the man and woman who are affected. If the physical injury is to the wife, she sustains the same kind of loss in the marital relation as he does in the converse situation."
(C) Application to Plaintiff's Motion
While there is Appellate Division case law on contested motions to add a spouse and a cause of action for loss of consortium, this Court's research has disclosed that the opposition usually centers on around an issue of the statute of limitations having elapsed. There then ensue discussions of the relation back doctrine, such as "Since the husband's cause of action for loss of services was time-barred when the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint, the court erred in granting her motion. The husband, who possessed the claim sought to be added, was never a party to the action and, moreover, the prior pleadings gave the defendants no notice that a claim for loss of services would be asserted. In light of the foregoing, the husband's action cannot be construed as relating back to the time when the action was originally commenced and is, therefore, time-barred under the Statute of Limitations." (Clausell v Ullman, 141 A.D.2d 690, 690-691 [2d Dept 1988].) However, it was also held, "The derivative claim sought to be added here relates to the same series of events as the original complaint. We conclude then, that Supreme Court properly allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint. [¶] In so finding, we express our disagreement with the line of cases which has held that a spouse's derivative cause of action for loss of services cannot be added to a pending action through the "relating back" provisions of CPLR 203(e) upon a motion to amend the complaint after the Statute of Limitations has run as to the main action...." (Anderson v Carney, 161 A.D.2d 1002 [3d Dept 1990].)
No such statute of limitations argument is offered here by the Defendants in opposition. Their argument is grounded on the presence of prejudice. This Court sees a more fundamental problem with Plaintiff's motion - the paucity of an evidentiary foundation for the proposed amendments. In terms of the evidentiary submission on a motion to add a purported spouse's loss of consortium cause of action being just from the attorney, there is no appellate case law directly on point.
Since loss of consortium is a cause of action which may be maintained only by a spouse, it behooved Plaintiff herein to demonstrate that the proposed additional plaintiff, Courtnay Brissett, was actually his wife. As was noted in a trial court decision, "Under New York law, the right to recovery for loss of consortium derived from personal injury is granted to the victim's spouse. Quinto v. NY City Transit Auth., 7 A.D.3d 689 (2nd Dept.2004). Here, there is no evidence that Ruffin was, or is, Powell's spouse." (Powell v City of NY, 6 Misc.3d 1033[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50282[U], *2 n 4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2005].)
Moreover, as was noted by Defendants in opposition, a deposition of Plaintiff was already conducted. This is relevant with respect to the issue of whether an amendment would prejudice other parties due to an inordinate delay. In another context, the apparent deficiencies in the evidence submitted on a motion to add a spouse as a plaintiff and to amend the complaint to include loss of consortium as a cause of action, it was held, "Here, plaintiff proffers no excuse for his delay in moving to add his wife as a party and to assert a claim for loss of consortium on her behalf. However, the lack of any prejudice to defendants is evident from the fact that they have not opposed the instant motion. Moreover, by submitting his marriage certificate (Doc. 26), plaintiff has established that the loss of consortium claim is facially sufficient." (Marte v Tishman Constr. Corp. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 31705[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2019].)
In the case at bar there was no explanation offered at all as to why Plaintiff elected to include his wife's claim in this action close to two years after the action was initiated and after Plaintiff was deposed, such as that "the plaintiff's wife only recently decided to pursue a consortium claim" (Ramjit v F.J. Sciame Constr. Co., Inc., 2017 WL 469790, *1 [Sup Ct, NY County, Jan. 31, 2017, No. 157731/15]). Unlike in Marte, the remaining Defendants have indeed opposed the motion and clearly articulated that they would be prejudiced. And, unlike in Marte and Ramjit, Plaintiff here did not submit evidence of his marriage to the proposed additional plaintiff. "The plaintiff also submits a marriage certificate showing he was legally married to the proposed additional plaintiff at the time of the accident" (Ramjit, 2017 WL 469790, *1).
The action was commenced on April 29, 2022 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1, summons and complaint), and the motion was filed on February 21, 2024 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 71, notice of motion).
A defendant opposing a motion to add a spouse and her derivative claim for loss of consortium has merit when "there is nothing of substance in the pleadings that would alert the defendants to the possibility of a loss of services, society and consortium cause of action" (Blanc v Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery of Nassau & Queens, LLP, 2018 WL 11417828, * 1 [Sup Ct, Nassau County, Apr. 27, 2018, No. 602777/16]). "[T]he court should consider how long the amending party was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated, whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered, and whether prejudice has resulted therefrom" (id.). Not only has Plaintiff herein failed to explain why he waited so long to include his wife as a co-plaintiff, nothing in the record, including the original complaint, evidenced any intention on the part of the wife to assert damages resulting from plaintiff's sustained injuries. The remaining Defendants herein should not have to undergo the expense of litigating a claim for loss of consortium, having spent time and attorneys' fees in discovery relating to Plaintiff's claim (see NYSCEF Doc No. 82, Liebman aff ¶ 3).
A defendant's having previously subpoenaed the spouse defeats its argument that it was prejudiced by the plaintiff's motion to add her as an additional plaintiff (see Ferrara v Pacolet Milliken Enter., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 30964[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]). That does not appear to have transpired in the instant case, which lends credence to the opposing Defendants' claim of prejudice.
Ultimately, what prevents this Court from granting Plaintiff's motion is the palpably insufficient evidentiary basis for the application (see Courageous Syndicate, 141 A.D.2d at 600). This constituted a fundamental neglect of the duty to impart to the Court that there is a meritorious claim on the part of Courtnay Brissett, of whom this Court has no knowledge whether she is indeed Plaintiff's wife and was so when the December 7, 2021 accident occurred (see Powell, 2005 NY Slip Op 50282[U], *2 n 4; cf. Marte, 2019 NY Slip Op 31705[U]; Ramjit, 2017 WL 469790, *1). Before granting an amendment at this stage in the proceedings, where discovery has already taken place, the Court should be free of any doubt as to the relief requested (see Noanjo Clothing, 207 A.D.2d at 437). Yet, Plaintiff has failed to persuade the Court on its "evidentiary showing that the claim can be supported" with "good ground" (Cushman & Wakefield, 25 A.D.2d at 135; see Mohan, 303 A.D.2d at 474; Heckler Elec. Co. v Matrix Exhis-N.Y., 278 A.D.2d 279).
Since the Court of Appeals described the nature of a loss of consortium claim as one where there is a loss of support, services, love, emotional support, companionship, affection, society, felicity, solace, and sexual relations, with the possible development of mental and emotional anguish from seeing a healthy, loving companionable mate turn into a shell of a person, and an unexpected burden of having to need to assume a disproportionate share of domestic duties (see Millington, 22 N.Y.2d 498), the proponent of amending a complaint to include a spouse's loss of consortium at a point far along in the litigation must bear the burden of making some evidentiary showing to support such a claim. The attorney affirmation submitted by Plaintiff is bereft of any such showing.
Plaintiff's attorney asserted that prior to the accident date, Courtnay Brissett "receive[ed] the companionship, comfort, love, affection, support, assistance, services, and consortium of Plaintiff" and was "deprived of and will be deprived in the future of the companionship, comfort, love, affection, support, assistance, services, and consortium of Plaintiff" (NYSCEF Doc No. 72, Linder aff ¶¶ 5, 6). Yet he fails to assert personal knowledge of these contentions (CFJ Assoc. of NY, 260 A.D.2d 836). While the proposed amended complaint is verified, the verification is by the attorney through a typed italicized font, not an actual signature. The complaint is not verified by Plaintiff or his purported wife, and neither did either of them submit their own affidavit to support the motion. Not a modicum of detail from Plaintiff or Courtnay Brissett supports the barebones attorney assertions. Did Plaintiff's injuries result in Courtnay Brissett's having to take over more family responsibilities, suffer a loss of affection and intimacy, or assume the role of leading breadwinner, such that the Court should ignore her tardy legal claim? She has not informed the Court of the answer.
While the attorney affirms that he is "fully familiar with the facts and circumstances of this action," such a declaration is not the equivalent of asserting personal knowledge of the underlying causes of action (see David Graubart, Inc. v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 47 N.Y.2d 554, 559 [1979]; Intervale Ave Assoc v Donlad, 38 Misc. 1221[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50210[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2013]; Pappalardo v Long Is. R.R. Co., 11 Misc.3d 744, 754 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2006]).
Presumably Plaintiff's attorney lacks personal knowledge of any loss on the part of Courtnay Brissett of love, emotional support, companionship, affection, society, felicity, solace, and sexual relations. Likewise, presumably he does not know personally whether she developed mental and emotional anguish from seeing a healthy, loving companionable mate turn into a different type of person, or whether she had to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the domestic chores. (See Millington, 22 N.Y.2d 498.) These are matters close to home, literally, and personal familiarity with these details is not expected of someone residing outside the household.
The Court cannot presume that in every instance of a motor vehicle accident a married injured person has a loving and blissful domestic life, with shared family responsibilities, such that his spouse is now entitled to loss of consortium damages. Boilerplate attorney assertions do not lend sufficient evidentiary support to overcome prejudice to the defendants resulting from a plaintiff's moving to add these damage claims at the post-deposition stage. Something additional in the form of evidence from those with personal knowledge of the relevant facts, is needed (see CFJ Assoc. of NY, 260 A.D.2d 836). It was not present here and this Court is constrained to deny Plaintiff's motion insofar as it seeks to add Courtnay Brissett as a Plaintiff with an amended complaint containing a cause of action for loss of consortium. Therefore, while the law promotes liberality in amending pleadings, it likewise dislikes prejudice or surprise to the opposing parties resulting from a delay (see McCaskey, Davies & Assoc. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755 [1983]; Fahey v County of Ontario, 44 N.Y.2d 934 [1978]; Jacob Post, Inc. v Samuel Hampton, LLC, 216 A.D.3d 625 [2d Dept 2023]; Flanders v E.W. Howell Co., LLC, 193 A.D.3d 822 [2d Dept 2021]).
This Court answers the question presented at the outset, supra at 2, by holding that on a motion to add a purported spouse as an additional plaintiff and to add a cause of action for loss of consortium, in addition to the submission of a proposed amended summons and complaint, an attorney's affirmation alone is insufficient, particularly where the action is close to two years in litigation, a deposition of the plaintiff already took place, there is no explanation why the claim was interposed at this stage in the litigation, there is no evidence of the marital status of the plaintiff and the proposed additional plaintiff as of the accident date, and there is no personal knowledge by the attorney of the domestic aspects of their presumed marital relationship.
Since the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education prevailed in having the complaint dismissed against them, that branch of Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to delete them is meritorious.
Conclusion
It is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(a) That branch of Plaintiff's motion seeking to amend the caption and pleadings to add Courtnay Brissett as a Plaintiff is DENIED.
(b) That branch of Plaintiff's motion seeking to amend the caption to delete the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education as Defendants is GRANTED.
(c) The caption of this action is AMENDED to read as follows:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS
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LADWIN BRISSETT,
Plaintiff,
against-
LARRY GARLAND and SAFE COACH BUS INC.,
Defendants.
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(d) Notice of amendment of the caption SHALL be given by Plaintiff to the Kings County Clerk by filing NYSCEF Form EF-23.