(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brint v. State, 306 Ga.App. 10, 12–13(2), 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010). The evidence showed that the officer merely requested a pat-down search of Kirkland as they conversed outside of Kirkland's vehicle.
See, e.g., Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 757(4), 725 S.E.2d 280 (2012) (carrying weapons “not unusual in the drug trade”); 643State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652(2), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (being armed “not unusual among drug dealers”). See also Brint v. State, 306 Ga.App. 10, 12(1), 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010) ( “ ‘[f]irearms are tools of the drug trade’ ”). I can think of no principled rationale for purporting to require the jury to make an express finding of dangerousness in every felony drug transaction, when it is obvious that such transactions are dangerous by their very nature. Doing so only creates a potential avenue for attacking an otherwise sound verdict without providing any meaningful additional protection of the defendant's rights.
See Jackson, supra, 287 Ga. at 652, 697 S.E.2d 757 (defendants “planned an armed robbery of someone they believed to be a drug dealer, who also turned out to be armed, an occurrence not unusual among drug dealers”). See also Brint v. State, 306 Ga.App. 10, 11–12(1), 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (it is not unreasonable to anticipate that those involved in the drug trade might be armed, as “firearms are tools of the drug trade”); Jones v. State, 237 Ga.App. 847, 850(2), 515 S.E.2d 841 (1999) (a reasonably prudent man would be justified in his belief that his safety was in danger when going to a known drug area). Whether or not the Davis brothers brought a weapon to the transaction is not determinative. Under the circumstances, the risk of death from this particular felony was reasonably foreseeable and the attempted armed robbery did not break the causal link between the drug deal and the killing.
See Walker v. State, 299 Ga.App. 788, 790(1), 683 S.E.2d 867 (2009) (officer told defendant to “ ‘hold on ... come here,’ and sit on the pavement, and ... then asked [him] questions pursuant to a ‘field investigation’ ”); Brown v. State, 301 Ga.App. 82, 83, 686 S.E.2d 793 (2009) (after defendant denied having a weapon, officer drew his gun and told defendant to walk to the patrol car); Barnes v. State, 228 Ga.App. 44, 44–45, 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997) (police asked defendant to stop, “started tussling” with him, took a box containing crack cocaine from him, and told him to place his hands on the car). See Brint v. State, 306 Ga.App. 10, 13(2), 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010). “A valid consent eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brint v. State, 306 Ga. App. 10, 12-13 (2) ( 701 SE2d 507) (2010). Compare Johnson, supra at 849 (denial of motion to suppress reversed where state could not provide voluntary consent as officer did not testify that he asked for consent to search the defendant's pocket).
This Court and others have recognized that violence is inherent in the business of dealing illegal drugs. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760, 725 S.E.2d 280 (2012) (explaining that drug transactions are foreseeably dangerous); Jackson, 287 Ga. at 652-653, 697 S.E.2d 757 (noting the "dangerous and violent nature" of drug dealing); Brint v. State, 306 Ga.App. 10, 12, 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (" ‘Firearms are tools of the drug trade.’ " (citations omitted) ).