Opinion
No. 38144.
January 14, 1952.
1. Taxation — assessments — notice to taxpayers — proof of publication.
When the final order of the board of supervisors approving the assessment rolls recited that the notice by publication had been duly given to the taxpayers advising them of the meeting at which objections to the assessments would be heard, this is sufficient to establish that fact in the absence of proof to the contrary.
2. Taxation — assessments — notice to taxpayers.
Where the order of the board of supervisors directing the notice to taxpayers of the meeting at which objections to assessments would be heard was adopted at a day of the regular term for making such order, and before adjournment, the fact that the notice was dated two days thereafter did not render it invalid.
3. Assessments — tax levy — failure to specify on what valuation based.
It is not required that the board of supervisors in making the annual tax levy shall specify that the valuation was based on the assessment roll of the county.
Headnotes as approved by Holmes, C.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Jefferson County; R.W. CUTRER, Chancellor.
Truly Truly and Matthew Harper, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
I. The assessment rolls of Jefferson County for the years 1930 and 1931 were void because the proof of publication of the notice to taxpayers was not on file with the board of supervisors or the clerk thereof. Pinkerton v. Busby, 42 So.2d 387; Pettibone v. Wells, 181 Miss. 425, 179 So. 336; Webb v. Anderson, 206 Miss. 398, 40 So.2d 189; Hayes v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 162 Miss. 877, 140 So. 340.
II. The assessment for the years 1930 and 1931 was void because the notice published to the taxpayers showed on its face that it was adopted after the adjournment of the board of supervisors.
III. The tax levy for the year 1931 was void because the order of the board of supervisors making the levy did not specify that the valuation should be based on the assessment roll of the County. Barron v. Eason, 199 Miss. 739, 25 So.2d 188.
IV. Adverse possession of the State and of the appellee has not been sufficient to divest the appellants, heirs of the original owner, of all right, title and interest in the land. Sec. 717 Code 1942; Neely v. Johnson-Barksdale Co., 194 Miss. 529, 12 So.2d 924; Smith v. Myrick, 201 Miss. 647, 29 So.2d 924; Thompson v. Reed, 199 Miss. 129, 23 So.2d 888; Sec. 711 Code 1942; 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, Sec. 23.
B.D. Statham, for appellee.
I. Reply to appellants' Point I to the effect that the assessment rolls of Jefferson County for the years 1930-31 were void because the proof of publication of the notice to taxpayers was not on file with the board of supervisors or the clerk thereof. Fed. Land Bank v. Cox, 183 Miss. 250, 183 So. 482; Pinkerton, et al. v. Busby, 42 So.2d 387; Pettibone v. Wells, 181 Miss. 425, 179 So. 336; Austin Western Road Machinery Co. v. Webster County, 170 Miss. 601, 154 So. 723.
II. Reply to Point II to the effect that the assessment for the years 1930-31 was void because the notice published to the taxpayers showed on its face that it was adopted after the adjournment of the board of supervisors. Sec. 9786 Code 1942; State, ex rel. Knox v. Wyoming Mfg. Co., 138 Miss. 249, 103 So. 11.
III. Reply to appellants' Point III to the effect that the tax levy for the year 1930 was void because the order of the board of supervisors making the levy did not specify that the valuation should be based on the assessment roll of the County. Sec. 9889 Code 1942; Barron v. Eason, 199 Miss. 739, 25 So.2d 188.
Affirmative argument for appellee.
I. The adverse possession of the State and the appellee has been sufficient to divest the appellant heirs of all right, title and interest in the land.
Appellee filed his original bill in the Chancery Court of Jefferson County seeking to confirm his asserted title to the East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 18, Township 9, Range 5 East, in said county, alleged to have been acquired under and by virtue of a forfeited tax land patent from the State of Mississippi. The state was named as a defendant to the action, as were also the heirs at law of Aaron Brinston, deceased, to whom the land was assessed for taxes at the time of the sale thereof to the state. The state filed its answer averring fraud in the procurement of the patent arising out of alleged misrepresentations in the application for the patent, and incorporating in its answer a cross-bill seeking the cancellation of the patent. The individual defendants answered attacking the validity of the tax sale. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor entered his decree granting the prayer of the original bill and dismissing the cross-bill of the State.
The evidence on the issue of fraud in the procurement of the patent was conflicting and we are unable to say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in deciding this issue adversely to the contention of the State.
(Hn 1) The record discloses that the land in question was sold to the State on April 4, 1932 for the non-payment of taxes thereon for the year 1931. There was no redemption of the land and the State's patent was issued to appellee on November 1, 1941. Appellants contend on this appeal that the tax sale was void for several reasons. First, it is contended that the assessment rolls for the years 1930-1931 were void because there was not on file with the board of supervisors the proof of publication of the notice to taxpayers advising of the meeting at which objections to the assessment rolls would be heard and considered. The order approving the assessment rolls adjudicated that such notice had been duly given and the proof was insufficient to show the contrary or to establish the fact that proof of publication of such notice was not duly on file. We think that the case of Pinkerton et al. v. Busby, Miss., 42 So.2d 387, decides this contention adversely to the appellants. The same question was there presented and the Court said: "In other words, the order of the board expressly adjudicated the ultimate jurisdictional fact that such notice, which, on its face, complies with the requirements of law, was in fact published, as above stated.
"Assuming that the notice was in fact published in the manner above stated, as we are entitled to assume from the adjudication of the board of supervisors on its minutes to that effect, in the absence of any proof in the record before us to the contrary, we are of the opinion that the adjudication is sufficient to have conferred jurisdiction on the board of supervisors to hear any objection to the assessment and to approve the assessment roll."
(Hn 2) It is further contended by the appellants that the tax sale was void because the published notice to the taxpayers showed on its face that it was adopted after the adjournment of the meeting of the board of supervisors. The record shows that the order of the board of supervisors directing the notice to be given was adopted by the board on July 23, 1930. It is true that the published notice was dated July 25, 1930, but the order directing that the notice be given was adopted as shown by the record before the adjournment of the board on July 23, 1930. We find no merit, therefore, in this contention.
(Hn 3) It is further argued on behalf of the appellants that the tax levy for the year 1930 was void because the order of the board of supervisors making the levy did not specify that the valuation was based on the assessment roll of the county. This contention on the part of appellants is decided adversely to them by the case of Barron v. Eason, 199 Miss. 739, 25 So.2d 188, wherein it was held that the statute does not require the order of the board of supervisors to specify that the taxes are to be collected upon each dollar of valuation upon the assessment rolls of the county for county taxes, and wherein it was further held that such provision of the statute is a direction to the collector and not the board of supervisors.
We are accordingly of the opinion that the decree of the court below is correct and that it should be, and it is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the Court and for the reasons therein indicated, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.