Opinion
KNLCV156024669S
12-27-2016
Timothy Brink v. Diane Dubreuil
Filed December 28, 2016
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge
In this matter, the plaintiff, Timothy Brink, a Connecticut State Trooper, alleges that he was injured while using his cruiser to attempt to stop a vehicle being driven erratically by the defendant, Diane Dubreuil, on September 11, 2014 on Route 12 in Jewett City, Connecticut. In the accident, the plaintiff maneuvered his cruiser ahead of the defendant's vehicle, and another trooper drove his cruiser behind the defendant, in an attempt to box her in and bring her car to a controlled stop. The defendant failed to yield, causing her vehicle to collide with the rear of the plaintiff's cruiser. The complaint is in two counts, alleging negligence and recklessness. In advance of trial, the defendant admitted liability as to the negligence count and the plaintiff agreed not to press the recklessness count. A trial on the issue of damages as to the negligence count was tried to the court without a jury on November 17, 2016. For the following reasons, the court renders judgment for the plaintiff, Timothy Brink, and against the defendant, Diane Dubreuil, and awards the plaintiff $5, 252.79 for economic damages and $45, 000.00 for noneconomic damages, for a total of $50, 252.79.
I
At the trial, the court heard the testimony of the plaintiff, Timothy Brink and his wife, Rachel Brink. The parties stipulated to the admission of twenty sets of exhibits consisting of numerous reports, photographs, medical records from this accident and from plaintiff's prior accidents and injuries, medical bills from this accident and a transcript of the deposition of the plaintiff. Counsel for the parties later filed post-trial briefs in support of their respective positions.
The court makes the following findings: The plaintiff was injured when the state police cruiser which he was driving, a 2011 Ford Police Interceptor sedan, was struck from behind by the defendant driving a 2008 Ford Mustang, on September 11, 2014 at approximately 10 a.m. on Route 12 in Jewett City, Connecticut. Before the accident, defendant was driving erratically and she did not comply with police attempts to stop her with lights and siren. In the accident, the plaintiff maneuvered his cruiser ahead of the defendant's vehicle, and another trooper drove his cruiser behind the defendant, in an attempt to box her in and bring her car to a controlled stop. The defendant failed to yield, causing her vehicle to hit with the rear of the plaintiff's cruiser. The plaintiff was almost at a complete stop, and the defendant was traveling at about 20 miles per hour at the time of impact. There was no visible damage to the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle, although the bumper absorbed the impact. The passenger side of the front bumper of the defendant's vehicle appeared to be slightly scuffed. After the accident, the defendant appeared to be incoherent and unable to stand on her own due to intoxication.
The plaintiff's head snapped forward and then back in the accident, but it did not hit anything. He was treated at the William W. Backus Hospital in Norwich, CT later that same day. The emergency department notes contained the following clinical impression: " Cervical strain; close head injury S/P MVA." No loss of consciousness was reported. He reported feeling nausea pain and stiffness. He was given medication for pain, instructions, and released. His instructions on release read as follows: " ED Concussion, No Wake Up, MVA."
The plaintiff sought no further treatment, but he did lose one day of work. He was seen by an orthopedist, Dr. Gabriel Abella, on October 16, 2014. He reported a history of concussions and brain injury prior to this accident. The doctor noted that the cervical CT scan report from Backus Hospital showed no acute cervical spine fracture or dislocation. There were mild changes with anterior osteophytes involving C6-7 with mild disc space narrowing. His impressions were a " [r]esolving cervical sprain/strain injury status post work-related motor vehicle accident. Overall, the patient appears to be doing well. He is neurologically intact. No medications are issued today. His range of motion is good and will forego physical therapy referral. He can start full time duty tomorrow. He can follow up here on an as needed basis."
The plaintiff seeks damages for a permanent injury to his neck and memory loss from the concussion he sustained in this accident. However, he admits that he had neck and memory issues before this accident. Indeed this was his fifth concussion. The first was sustained in a skiing accident when he was a teenager when he hit a tree and lost consciousness. Another occurred when he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed a car at age 21 and lost consciousness. Next, he was in a multi-car chain reaction motor vehicle accident on September 25, 2008, where he sustained, inter alia, a cervical strain and experienced memory loss causing him to be out of work or on light duty for months. He reports being involved in another motor vehicle accident on March 1, 2010, where his vehicle was rear-ended while he was stopped. He sustained neck pain and a headache in that accident. He reports that he has had so many concussions that it is extremely easy for him to sustain a concussion now.
He also reports other accidents and injuries, sustained before and after this accident, but he testified that they were minor and/or that those injuries are not related to the injuries sustained in the subject accident. His medical records reflect that he has been totally incapacitated and/or on light duty at work from time to time since 2008 due to his injuries. He received chiropractic treatments for his neck and other areas of his back between November 14, 2008 and November 19, 2010 related or unrelated to conditions exacerbated by this accident.
Currently, the plaintiff is 39 years old and he continues to work full time as a state trooper in a K-9 Unit. According to the standard actuarial tables, he has a life expectancy of an additional 40.1 years. He maintains that he can still do his job to the fullest extent, but that this accident has changed his abilities. He reports that, prior to this accident, he was in such excellent condition that, shortly before the accident, he tried out for the State Police SWAT Team, and he was able to participate in rigorous GORUCK competitions, which simulate the military training required of military special forces. He no longer participates in GORUCK competitions due to the accident but he does go jogging about every other day. When driving in his cruiser, he now has a hard time turning his neck, and he has difficulty getting in and out of his bite suit. He also has other persistent disabilities or pain from other injuries, but he admits that they are unrelated to the subject accident. At trial, the plaintiff testified that his memory issues have also gotten worse since the accident. In his deposition, he testified that his memory has gotten significantly worse: that before the accident, his memory issues mainly related to just setting things down and not remembering where he put them, but now, " I couldn't even tell you what you asked me two seconds ago." Deposition of April 5, 2016, p. 53. In an example, he said that when his wife tells him something, " I don't remember her even talking to me." Id. His wife, likewise, testified that since the subject accident, his short term memory loss has gotten much worse. She said he has gone from simply misplacing his keys from time to time to behaving like a person with Alzheimer's disease, like her 84-year-old grandfather. His behavior on the witness stand, however, did not reflect any memory problems, and there is nothing in the medical records measuring or rating any cognitive deficits. Also, the plaintiff testified that his condition has not progressed such as to cause his work duties to change at all.
II
In determining the amount of damages to be awarded in cases such as this, where liability is admitted, the court is guided by certain well-established considerations:
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff who establishes tort liability is entitled to fair, just and reasonable compensation for his injuries. Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 139, 459 A.2d 521 (1983); Hulk v. Aishberg, 126 Conn. 360, 362, 11 A.2d 380 (1940). " Damages in personal injury cases cannot be computed mathematically, nor does the law furnish any precise, definite rule for their assessment." Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895 (1946); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 494, 464 A.2d 847 (1983). The court has, and must exercise, a wide discretion in the amount of damages for personal injuries, and the amount awarded in each case depends largely on the judgment of the trier. Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 500, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975). " That damages may be difficult to assess is, in itself, insufficient reason for refusing them once the right to damages has been established." Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 420, 446 A.2d 799 (1982); Ball v. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549, 551, 143 A. 855 (1928). The fact that it is difficult to measure pain and suffering in terms of money does not prevent a recovery; Sadonis v. Govan, supra, 132 Conn. 670, 46 A.2d 895; see also, Doeltz v. Longshore, Inc., 126 Conn. 597, 600, 13 A.2d 505 (1940); as long as there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for that recovery. Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 191 Conn. 494, 464 A.2d 847.
These same principles apply here where the injury proven was mental and emotional, rather than physical. " Medical science and mental health fields have advanced sufficiently to enable a trier of fact to determine the extent of mental suffering by the same standard of proof as physical suffering. See, Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970). In today's world, both supply equal grist for the [trial court's] mill, based on '[t]he ordinary knowledge acquired from everyday experience by the [trial court] . . .' Id., 122." Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn.App. 579, 589, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984).Leabo v. Leninski, 2 Conn.App. 715, 726-27, 484 A.2d 239 (1984).
The court may award damages for permanent injury or physical impairment and future pain and suffering, even in the absence of expert medical testimony, if the injuries of such a nature are readily apparent. Dibble v. Ferguson, 15 Conn.App. 97, 100, 543 A.2d 294 (1988).
The plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for all injuries and losses proximately caused by the defendant's negligence even though those injuries and losses are more serious than they otherwise would have been because of a pre-existing condition. The plaintiff cannot be compensated for the pre-existing injury itself. However, the aggravation of such an injury, proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, is a proper item of damages. See, DeFelice v. Barbarino Rental Corp., 157 Conn. 231, 234, 253 A.2d 37 (1968); Tuite v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 45 Conn.App. 305, 310 n.2, 696 A.2d 363 (1997).
In reporting its award of damages, the court is required to distinguish between economic damages and non-economic damages. General Statutes § 52-572h(f).
III
In light of the above, the court finds that the plaintiff has proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an exacerbation of his neck injury, a concussion, and disability that is permanent in nature. A review of the records relative to lost wages and medical expenses shows that the plaintiff sustained a loss of $261.18 for lost wages and $4, 991.61 for medical costs for a total of $5, 252.79. Accordingly, the court awards a total of $5, 252.79 for past economic damages. There was no evidence, and therefore no basis, for an award of future economic damages, therefore, no award will be made for that category.
The court does not find any evidence in the record measuring plaintiff's brain injury or its progress, nor any proof of the type of severe short-term memory loss reported by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's wife, only their self-report. Their testimony did not appear consistent with the plaintiff's performance on the witness stand or his testimony regarding his satisfactory performance as a full-time, full-duty State Police Trooper. There is no proof or even a claim that he has lost police equipment or criminal case evidence, nor that he has forgotten dispatch calls.
Defendant argues that the facts show that the plaintiff's injuries sustained in the accident were merely minor exacerbations or aggravations of his pre-existing neck and memory issues and did not significantly alter the natural course of those conditions. Nevertheless, the court finds that the plaintiff did sustain injury to his neck and brain in the accident which exacerbated his pre-existing conditions. The exacerbation has not been so severe as to cause the plaintiff to seek further treatment for the neck or any consultation concerning his brain, but there can be no doubt that a trauma occurred causing some additional damage to the neck and brain which are permanent in nature. Accordingly, the court awards damages for those additional injuries to the neck and brain from the date of the accident to date, and damages for future pain and suffering, both physical and mental, and for permanent injury over the period of his future life expectancy. The plaintiff requests $45, 000.00 for those non-economic damages. The court finds that request to be fair and reasonable in light of the facts showing a change in the plaintiff's condition and abilities and, therefore, it awards the amount requested.
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court renders judgment for the plaintiff, Timothy Brink, and against the defendant, Diane Dubreuil, and awards the plaintiff $5, 252.79 for economic damages and $45, 000.00 for non-economic damages, for a total of $50, 252.79.