Engstrand asserts her termination also constituted discrimination under Iowa Code Chapter 216. Generally, Iowa courts have held that the state's civil rights statutes, including Chapter 216, are "patterned after Title VII." Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996). Iowa courts characterize federal case law on Title VII as "instructive."
The Eighth Circuit has held that, "for employment discrimination cases, ‘the Title VII standards for proving discriminatory treatment should apply to claims arising under Title IX.’ " Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) ); see also Kazar, 679 Fed.Appx. at 163 (reasoning that "[t]he standard for proving Title IX and VII gender discrimination claims is the same," and evaluating the plaintiff's "Title IX claim under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)"). "Per the language of Title IX ... ‘acts of discrimination’ must be ‘on the basis of sex.
In Brine v. University of Iowa, the Eighth Circuit remarked that "to the degree [a plaintiff] relies upon teaching conditions, such as course assignments," a Title IX claim "merely duplicates" a Title VII claim. Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986)). In Brine, however, the university did not "challenge the proposition that a private right of action exists under Title IX;" therefore, the Eight Circuit did not directly address the issue.
Plaintiff also asserts a private cause of action under Title IX based upon the alleged sexual harassment. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff has a private right of action under Title IX. The Eighth Circuit has remarked that "to the degree [a plaintiff] relies upon teaching conditions, such as course assignments," a Title IX claim "merely duplicates" a Title VII claim. Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1986)). In Brine, the Eighth Circuit stated:
In fact, the Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected the argument-made by Thomas here-“that because the language of the two statutes . . . is slightly different, the elements of proof are slightly different.” Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996).
In Brine v. University of Iowa, the Eighth Circuit cited the O'Connor footnote and stated that a Title IX employment discrimination claim “merely duplicates” a Title VII claim, although in that case the university did not challenge the proposition that a private right of action existed for the associate professors who raised Title IX claims. 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996).
A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title IX need not establish a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss. SeeSwierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 510-11, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case is not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas to survive a motion to dismiss, as that "is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement"); see alsoBrine v. Univ. of Iowa , 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII standards in a Title IX discrimination case). But to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, a plaintiff must plead facts that would establish the ultimate elements of her claim.
The analysis of claims for retaliation under Title IX employs the same legal standards as its analysis of claims for retaliation under Title VII. See Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 273 (8th Cir.1996) (analyzing Title VII and Title IX retaliation claims together); See also Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 67 (1st Cir.2002) (“[T]he jurisprudence of Title VII supplies an applicable legal framework”); Murray v. New York Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2nd Cir.1995) (“In reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII”)
The Eighth Circuit has remarked that "to the degree [a plaintiff] relies upon teaching conditions, such as course assignments," a Title IX claim "merely duplicates" a Title VII claim. Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1986)). In Brine, the Eighth Circuit stated:
We think it is latter. In many trials some factual issues are to be resolved by a jury and others by a judge, e.g., Brine v. University of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir.1996); Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 F.3d 343 (8th Cir.1996); Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir.1989); Ogonowski v. State, 87 Md. App. 173, 589 A.2d 513 (1991); People v. Willis, 217 Ill.App.3d 909, 160 Ill.Dec. 644, 577 N.E.2d 1215 (1991), and in these mixed bench/jury trials all the evidence is introduced in the presence of both triers of fact and the jury resolves the issues triable by the jury and the judge the other issues, except that if there are factual issues common to both the jury- and the judge-tried claims the jury's verdict binds the judge. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1990).