AGGRAVATED ASSAULT We recently set out the elements of assault with a deadly weapon in Brightwell v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1981). "* * * [T]he elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon in Wyoming are now the unlawful attempt with unlawful intent (maliciously) to commit a violent injury (attempted battery) upon the person of another, with the use of a deadly weapon in that attempt and the apparent ability to accomplish that injury."
Therefore, to warrant the giving of instructions 8 and 9, it was necessary that there be evidence that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. Another difference is that to violate § 6-4-506(b) the defendant must act intentionally ("maliciously"), Brightwell v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1048 (1981) and Brown v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1312 (1979), while under § 6-4-107 the crime of involuntary manslaughter does not require that defendant intend to kill another human being. Our review of the record forces us to the conclusion that the instructions were erroneous. The only evidence with respect to a deadly weapon were the boots allegedly worn by appellant on the evening in question.
(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; . . .Cazier v. State, 148 P.3d 23, 27 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)); see also Brightwell v. State, 631 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Wyo. 1981) (finding that the elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon in Wyoming are now the unlawful attempt with unlawful intent (maliciously) to commit a violent injury (attempted battery) upon the person of another, with the use of a deadly weapon in that attempt and the apparent ability to accomplish that injury."). Petitioner's offense related to stabbing his former spouse three times, which resulted in her hospitalization for 12 days.
Id. at 904. See also Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1135-36 (Wyo. 1987); Simmons v. State, 674 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1984); Brightwell v.State, 631 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Wyo. 1981). In the present case, the trial court's "Jury Instruction No. 8" properly informed the jury that such inferences were permissible by stating, "[Specific intent] may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case."
At a minimum, the terms "assault," "maliciously," "intent," and "dangerous or deadly weapon" need to be defined for the jury. Brightwell v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1048, (1981). Assault in the context of § 6-4-506(b), supra, is defined as:
Here, it cannot be seriously argued that Lenz wielded the knife and uttered a deadly threat without an appreciation that — under the circumstances — the knife could be considered a deadly weapon. See State v. Gordon, 120 Ariz. 172, 584 P.2d 1163 (1978); State v. Thompson, supra; Brightwell v. State, 631 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 1981). We hold that I.C. § 18-905 is not constitutionally defective for failure to define precisely the meaning of a "deadly weapon."