"An appellate court uses the clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court's ruling on a motion to change venue." Brightwell v Fifth Third Bank of Mich, 487 Mich 151, 156; 790 NW2d 591 (2010). "A decision is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

There is no dispute that this issue is reviewed for clear error, meaning even if there is some evidence to support the trial court's conclusion, we are definitely and firmly convinced it was a mistake. Brightwell v Fifth Third Bank of Mich, 487 Mich 151, 156; 790 NW2d 591 (2010); In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Under this standard, there may be more than one permissible outcome, much like the abuse of discretion standard.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Brightwell v. Fifth Third Bank of Mich, 487 Mich. 151, 156; 790 N.W.2d 591 (2010). Additionally, "[v]enue is determined at the time the suit is filed and is not normally defeated by subsequent events."

However, "[a]n appellate court uses the clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court's ruling on a motion to change venue." Brightwell v Fifth Third Bank of Mich, 487 Mich 151, 156; 790 NW2d 591 (2010). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

"The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statute." Brightwell v Fifth Third Bank, 487 Mich 151, 157; 790 NW2d 591 (2010). A guaranty is "'an independent, collateral agreement by which [the guarantor] undertakes to pay the obligation if the primary payor fails to do so.'"

Id.Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court would likely consider decisions from the highest courts of other states interpreting provisions like Section 2715, see, e.g. , Brightwell v. Fifth Third Bank of Michigan , 487 Mich. 151, 790 N.W.2d 591, 596 n. 29 (2010) (looking to decision of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applying identically-worded statutory provision); Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital of Detroit , 389 Mich. 249, 205 N.W.2d 431, 434 (1973) (looking to decision of Ohio Supreme Court interpreting similar statute), and the majority of these decisions "have found that attorney fees are not included as incidental damages." Olbrys , 1996 WL 143466, at *5 (citing Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge–Winnebago South , 310 N.W.2d 71, 79 (1981), Devore v. Bostrom , 632 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1981), Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc. , 83 Wis.2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513, 527–28 (1978), and Jelen & Son, Inc. v. Bandimere , 801 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Colo.

Moreover, other courts have rejected similar arguments by employees who posited that venue was proper in the district where the company was headquartered and made policy decisions, and not at the local office at which the employees worked. See, e.g., Cook v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8842, 2006 WL 760284, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2006); Darby v. U.S. Dep't of En., 231 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2002); Donnell v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 568 F. Supp. 93, 94 (D.D.C. 1983); cf. Brightwell v. Fifth Third Bank of Mich., Nos. 138920, 138921, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2010 WL 2990298, at *4-6 (Mich. July 30, 2010) (holding that adverse action takes place under Michigan's Civil Rights Act where the employee worked, not where the discriminatory decision was made). In such cases, the courts found that venue was proper in the district where the employees worked because that is where the specific decisions impacting the plaintiff were made or where the most substantial part of the discriminatory conduct occurred.