Opinion
Case No. 03-21054-CIV-MOORE.
December 30, 2005
Steven Briecke, DC # DO3823, South Florida Reception Center, Miami, FL, for pro se.
Steven Briecke, DC # DO3823, Century Correctional Institution, Century, FL, for pro se.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Thaddeus Jones's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #64).
UPON CONSIDERATION of the motion and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order.
BACKGROUND
This is a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed by Plaintiff. Steven Briecke (DE #1). Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Thaddeus Jones, Elizabeth Bridges and Lois Spears arising from his incarceration at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Facility in 2002. Briecke alleges that Jones denied him access to the courts by interfering with his outgoing legal mail and refusing to notarize documents. Compl. at ¶ IV. Briecke alleges that Jones did this in retaliation for Briecke having filed grievances while incarcerated. Id. Plaintiff further claims that Jones explicitly denied his access to the law library because Plaintiff had a "bad attitude." e.g., he had filed grievances against Jones and Bridges. Pl. Resp. to Initial Mot. for Summ. J. (DE #43) at 12.
After a preliminary report by Magistrate Judge White (DE #12), this Court dismissed all claims against Defendant Spears (DE # 1 5). Subsequently, Defendants Bridges and Jones filed motions for summary judgment. This Court, adopting Magistrate Judge White's report and recommendation (DE #52), granted summary judgment as to the claims concerning the opening of legal mail, denial of access to courts and denial of meaningful grievance procedures (DE #55). In addition, the Court granted summary judgment as to the claim of retaliation against Defendant Bridges. Defendant Bridges was dismissed as a party to this action (DE #55). The Court denied summary judgment as to the claim of retaliation against Defendant Jones (DE #55). The Court. adopting the Magistrate's report, further found that because material issues of fact remain, it could not be said that Defendant Jones is entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
On September 7, 2005 this Court held a status conference and granted Defendant Jones permission to file a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment on the last remaining claim — retaliation — against Defendant Jones.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The applicable standard for reviewing a summary judgment motion is unambiguously stated in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions. answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994). The moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). It is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id.
In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. However, the nonmoving part y:
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 254. Summary judgment may be granted if the nonmovant fails to adduce evidence which, when viewed in a light most favorable to him, would support a jury finding in his favor. Id. at 254-55.
Additionally, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will hear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and requires the court to grant the motion for summary judgment. Id.
B. Analysis
On September 22, 2005, Defendant Jones filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment (DE # 64). Defendant Jones argues that Magistrate Judge White's report and this Court's Order adopting the Magistrate's report failed to consider whether the denial of access to the law library constituted a sufficient "adverse action" to implicate Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-5. Defendant Jones argues that the temporary denial of access to the law library does not rise above the level of a de minimus act. Id. In his response, Plaintiff reasserts his claims for denial of access to the courts. interference with legal mail — all which have already been dealt with by the Court. Significantly, Plaintiff repeatedly argues that the injury suffered with respect to his retaliation claim was "interfer[ence] with Plaintiffs constitutional right to access to the court." Pl. Opp Brief at 4, 8, 13, 15-17. Indeed, it appears from Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Thaddeus Jones's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #79), that Plaintiffs claim for denial of use of the law library relates solely to his claim for denial of access to the courts. "It was the totality of circumstances . . . which is sufficient as a matter of law to state a meaningful access claim. . . . Pl. Opp. Brief at 8. "The allegations of the Plaintiff portray a completely unjustified interference/denial of Plaintiff's rights to access to the courts. The only reasonable conclusions for the actions of Jones is that he was retaliating against Plaintiff for filing numerous grievances/complaints against the Defendant." Id. at 13. "However, the denial of reasonable access to the courts was born of a pattern of behavior of the defendants. . . . Id. at 16.
This Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs allegations of denial of access to the library have failed to rise to the level of denial of access to the courts. "Plaintiff has provide absolutely no evidence to show that any . . . denial of use of the law library actually prejudiced a criminal appeal or any other ongoing litigation that involved an attempt to vindicate basic constitutional rights." Magistrate Judge White's February 22, 2005 Report at 10. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate his denial of access to the courts claim through a separate retaliation claim, that claim has already been dismissed. Plaintiff's last remaining claim in the instant case is that he was subjected to unconstitutional retaliation for filing grievances in the form of denial of access to the law library.
A prisoner's constitutional rights are violated if adverse action is taken against him in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. See Farrow v. West. 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), Wright v. Newsome. 795 F.2d 964 968 (11th Cir. 1986); Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1986). In the prison setting "the state may not burden [First Amendment rights] with practices that are not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives . . . nor act with the intent of chilling that First Amendment right." Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85-89 (1987). and Wildberger v. Bracknell. 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989)). In general, a prisoner may establish retaliation by "demonstrating that the prison official's actions were `the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.'"Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1248 (citing Wildberger, 869 F.2d at 1468). The prisoner must, however, come forward with more than "general attacks" upon a defendant's motivations and must produce "affirmative evidence" of retaliation from which a jury could find that plaintiff had carried his burden of proving the requisite motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citations omitted).
A prisoner does not automatically cast doubt upon an institutional decision, nor is the decision "subject to exhaustive challenge," solely because he was engaged in a First Amendment right. Adams. 784 F.2d at 1082. Even though prison officials do not have the authority to prohibit inmates from filing grievances it does not follow that every time an inmate files a grievance the act of doing so renders the exercise of prison authority suspect. See Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has not established a standard at summary judgment for determining the validity of First Amendment retaliation claims in the prison setting. In the public employment setting, however, it has adopted a four-stage inquiry based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), to determine whether a state actor has unlawfully retaliated against an employee because of the employee's protected speech. See Chesser v. Sparks. 248 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2001).
In assessing the validity of a retaliation claim, the Court must first determine whether the employee's speech related to a matter of public concern. Bryson v. City of Waycross. 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989). If so, the court must weigh the employee's First Amendment interests against "the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. (citations omitted). If the employee prevails on this balancing test, the court then determines whether the employee's speech played a substantial role in the state's employment decision. Id. If the employee shows that the speech was a substantial motivating factor, the state must prove that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected speech. Id. This analysis stage has been referred to as a `but for' test, the employer must show that `its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.' Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1566 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)).
While the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed First Amendment retaliation claims made by prisoners, other circuits have addressed the matter. The Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have expressly applied the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework to retaliation claims in the prison context. See Rauser v. Horn. 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
Under this line of cases, once the prisoner establishes that his exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's alleged retaliatory conduct, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the same action would have been taken even absent the protected conduct.Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 2002); Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34; Babcock, 102 F.3d at 275.
In applying the burden-shifting framework courts should incorporate the deferential balancing test articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that official conduct that impinges on the constitutional rights of an inmate is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"). "This means that, once a prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.
Other circuits have adopted this general framework in reviewing retaliation claims by prisoners, but have not adopted the burden-shifting element. These courts have required the prisoner to come forward with direct or circumstantial evidence that "but for the retaliators motive, the incidents to which he refers . . . would not have taken place." See Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998): Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993): McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979).
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected this approach. In Adams v. Wainwright. 875 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), a First Amendment retaliation case in the prisoner context, the Government urged the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the "but for" standard set forth by the First Circuit in McDonald v. Hall, in which the burden remains on the prisoner/plaintiff rather than shifting to the defendant. Without discussion, the court declined to do so. "to the extent that the `but for' test places a greater burden of proof on the inmate." Adams, 875 F.2d at 1537 (citingHall v. Evans, 842 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1988) (table decision vacating district court order granting summary judgment to Defendants based on "but for" analysis).).
This Court is not aware of any case to date in which the Eleventh Circuit has expressly applied the burden shifting analysis to a prisoner's First Amendment retaliation claim. As noted above, however, the Eleventh Circuit has long employed this analysis in the employment setting . Accordingly, this Court applies the Mount Healthy burden-shifting framework to First Amendment claims of retaliation brought by Plaintiff in this case.
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing his grievance. The Court shall thus assume that Plaintiff has met his burden with respect to demonstrating that filing grievances was a constitutionally protected activity.
An inmate has a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials, but only if the grievances are not frivolous. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) ("Depriving someone of a frivolous claim . . . deprives him of nothing. . . .").
The second element requires Plaintiff to show that denial of access to the law library constituted an adverse action. A plaintiff need not show that the retaliatory action taken in response to his constitutional rights independently deprived him of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283 (absence of right to continued employment does not defeat claim for retaliatory firing for First Amendment expression). Rather, under Thaddeus-X, an adverse action is one which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct. However, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the deprivation was more than de minimis 175 F.3d at 394.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this temporary lack of access to the law library would deter future grievances or speech. Moreover. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the denial of access to the law library injured him in some material way or that it was more than a de minimis inconvenience. Therefore, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of an element essential to his claim of retaliation.
There is, however, a disputed issue of fact as to whether Plaintiffs filing the grievance was a substantial or motivating factor in Defendant's decision to deny his access to the law library. As noted by Magistrate Judge White, in his February 22, 2005 report, Plaintiff attests that Defendant Jones specifically told him that he was not going to the library because he filed grievances. Defendant Jones does not deny making such a statement, he simply attests that the denial of access to the law library was due to non-retaliatory reasons. Magistrate Judge White's February 22, 2005 Report at 13.
This disputed issue of fact, however, is not material because even assuming that Defendant's decision was influenced in substantial part by Plaintiffs grievance and that a causal connection has been demonstrated, the Court concludes that the harm was de minimus and therefore Plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of his retaliation claim under the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED.