Opinion
24A-CR-1545
12-18-2024
Steven Allen Bridges, II, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana Attorney for Appellant Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Clinton Superior Court The Honorable Justin Hunter, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 12D01-2303-CM-304
Attorney for Appellant Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAY, JUDGE
[¶1] Steven Allen Bridges, II, appeals following his convictions of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .15 or more. Bridges raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Bridges's conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person; and
2. Whether Bridges's two convictions violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Shortly before 5:00 a.m. on March 5, 2023, Sergeant Jared Yoder of the Clinton County Sheriff's Department was on patrol on State Road 29 in Clinton County. Sergeant Yoder observed a truck cross the fog line on the right side of the road and then veer left and contact the center line. Sergeant Yoder began following the truck. The truck "drift[ed] into the turn lane to turn into Clinton Central Schools . . . but then veer[ed] back out into the road[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10.) He also saw "the vehicle move back and forth in its lane across the fog line again and then come back and cross the center line[.]" (Id.) In addition, the vehicle "was braking several times for no apparent reason[.]" (Id. at 17.) After following the truck for approximately half a mile, Sergeant Yoder initiated a traffic stop.
[¶3] When Sergeant Yoder approached the vehicle, he saw that Bridges was alone in the vehicle. Bridges had difficulty with "manual dexterity" and struggled to produce his license and registration, and Sergeant Yoder smelled the odor of alcohol on Bridges's breath. (Id.) He also observed that Bridges's eyes were bloodshot and glossy and Bridges's speech was slurred. Sergeant Yoder asked Bridges to step out of the vehicle so that he could perform field sobriety tests. Sergeant Yoder administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and Bridges failed it because he was unable to follow the visual stimulus. Sergeant Yoder asked Bridges to perform a portable breathalyzer test and advised Bridges of Indiana's implied consent law, but Bridges refused to perform the test.
[¶4] Bridges claimed he was having a panic attack, so Sergeant Yoder called for an ambulance. After the medics examined Bridges and determined that he did not need additional medical attention for his alleged panic attack, Sergeant Yoder handcuffed Bridges and transported him to a hospital in Frankfort so that medical staff could perform a blood draw to determine Bridges's blood alcohol concentration. Sergeant Yoder advised Bridges again regarding Indiana's implied consent law, but Bridges refused to submit to a blood draw. Sergeant Yoder then applied for a search warrant to authorize a blood draw, and Judge Bradley Mohler of the Clinton Circuit Court issued the warrant. A nurse then performed the blood draw and subsequent testing revealed Bridges's blood alcohol concentration equivalent to be .188.
[¶5] On March 6, 2023, the State charged Bridges with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. The State later amended the criminal information to add a count charging Bridges with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .15 or more. The trial court held a three-day bench trial on April 26, 2024, May 17, 2024, and June 6, 2024. The trial court found Bridges guilty and entered convictions on both counts. The trial court then sentenced Bridges to 180 days in the Clinton County Jail on each count. The judge ordered Bridges to serve the sentences concurrently and suspended each sentence to probation.
Discussion and Decision
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶6] Bridges contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person because the State presented no evidence that he endangered a person. Our standard of review regarding such a claim is well-settled:
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).
[¶7] Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor.
(b) An offense described in subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person operates in a manner that endangers a person.
The "endangerment" element of the offense "may not be established merely by evidence that the defendant was intoxicated, but it is proven through evidence 'showing that the defendant's condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant.'" Lehman v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1097, 1105 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), adopted 929 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. "Endangerment does not require that a person other than the defendant be in the path of the defendant's vehicle or in the same area to obtain a conviction." A.V. v. State, 918 N.E.2d 642, 644-45 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. Endangerment simply requires the State prove the defendant's intoxication resulted in the defendant driving unsafely. Cf. Outlaw, 918 N.E.2d at 382 (holding State failed to present sufficient evidence of endangerment when police stopped the defendant's vehicle because of a nonilluminated license plate and the State did not present any evidence of unlawful or erratic driving). Here, as the State notes, Bridges operated "his vehicle in an unsafe manner by crossing the fog line, crossing the center line, moving within the lane, and veering in and out of a turn lane[.]" (Appellee's Br. at 9.) Therefore, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence of endangerment to sustain Bridges's conviction of Class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person. See, e.g., Staten v. State, 946 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (holding sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person when defendant drove his vehicle left of the center line and ran a stop sign), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
2. Double Jeopardy
[¶8] Bridges also contends his convictions of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or more violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy, and the State agrees that those two convictions represent a double jeopardy violation. Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution states: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." In Wadle v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court held that that provision of the Indiana Constitution prohibited the State from convicting a defendant of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or morewhen both convictions were premised on the same episode of driving while intoxicated. 151 N.E.3d 227, 253 (Ind. 2020). Likewise, Bridge's conviction of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or more should be vacated because it is based on the same episode of operating a vehicle as his conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Bridges's conviction of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or more. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. State, 239 N.E.3d 864, 869 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (reversing defendant's conviction because it violated the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy and remanding with instructions for the trial court to vacate the conviction).
Because the trial court had ordered Bridges to serve concurrent 180-day sentences, which the court suspended to probation, Bridges's sentence is unaltered by the vacation of one of his convictions.
Conclusion
[¶9] The State presented sufficient evidence of endangerment to sustain Bridges's conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. However, the trial court violated the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy when it also entered a judgment of conviction for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or more. Accordingly, we affirm Bridges's conviction of operating while intoxicated endangering a person, reverse his conviction of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or more, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate that conviction.
[¶10] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.