a. The testimony at issue was admissible even if it incidentally placed Lewis's character into evidence. “Any statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of crime, is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.” Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323(2), 271 S.E.2d 471 (1980) (citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted). Brower's testimony showed Lewis's consciousness of guilt for the death of the victim and was admissible on that basis.

Evidence regarding a tattoo is not inadmissible per se. See Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306, 315(10), 528 S.E.2d 217 (2000) (Evidence of tattoo admitted for identification purposes), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 177(1), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008); Allen v. State, 272 Ga. 513, 515(4), 530 S.E.2d 186 (2000) (Evidence of tattoo properly admitted as evidence of motive). Rather, “[a]ny statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of crime, is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.” Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324(2), 271 S.E.2d 471 (1980) (Citations and emphasis omitted). Compare Belmar v. State, 279 Ga. 795, 798–799(3), 621 S.E.2d 441 (2005), in which a tattoo reading “12 gauge” was improperly introduced to support a theory that the defendant had a “propensity” to use a 12–gauge shotgun.

There was no error; the witness merely testified as to his observations, and the weight of such testimony was for the jury. See Bridges v. State, 279 Ga. 351 ( 613 SE2d 621) (2005); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) ( 271 SE2d 471) (1980); Duncan v. State, 269 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) ( 602 SE2d 908) (2004). 5.

In many cases where we have upheld charges to the jury against attacks based on Sandstrom, it appears that the juries were instructed that criminal intent is never presumed, that the burden of proving intent rests on the State, or that intent is always an issue for the jury. Collins v. State, 248 Ga. 687 ( 286 S.E.2d 8) (1982); Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980); Blair v. State, 245 Ga. 611 (5) ( 266 S.E.2d 214) (1980); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 (8) ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814 (4) ( 262 S.E.2d 116) (1979); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). See also Code Ann. § 26-605.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that either interpretation would violate the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Pretermitting that the defendant was found guilty of felony murder, Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323 ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980), and that the charge was more favorable to the defendant than required, Code Ann. § 26-704; McLaughlin v. State, 236 Ga. 577 ( 224 S.E.2d 577) (1976), we find no Sandstrom violation in the first sentence of the jury's instructions under attack. The trial judge charged the jury on the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, direct and circumstantial evidence, and that the burden is not upon the defendant to establish his innocence but that the burden is upon the state to prove his guilt.

Whether the note and Falcons tickets, in conjunction with the foregoing, were evidence of a contemplated suicide attempt and were indicative of consciousness of guilt, or whether these items had an innocent explanation, was a question for the jury.Aldridge v. State, 229 Ga.App. 544(1), 494 S.E.2d 368 (1997), citing Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324(2), 271 S.E.2d 471 (1980). Supra.

Id. at 545 (1). Id. at 544 (1), citing Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) ( 271 SE2d 471) (1980). The only difference between Aldridge and the case at bar is that unlike Duncan, defendant Aldridge did not leave a note.

(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980). "Any conduct of a person indicating a consciousness of guilt, such as flight or concealment, is admissible evidence for whatever value the jury decides to give.

"'" (Emphasis omitted.) Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 471). We cannot conclude the State introduced this evidence, as contended by appellant, solely for purposes of placing appellant's character in issue.

United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1989). Georgia courts have embraced parallel logic, adopting "[t]he broad premise . . . that a statement or conduct by [a] defendant which indicates a consciousness of guilt is admissible against him. Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980)." Parker v. State, 181 Ga. App. 590, 591 (2) ( 353 S.E.2d 83).