Opinion
Case No. 1:03-CV-916.
March 8, 2005
OPINION
Plaintiff, Sheila Bridges ("Bridges"), proceeding pro se, has sued her former employer, Charter Communications ("Charter"), alleging that Charter discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. Now before the Court is Charter's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss Bridges' complaint with prejudice.
I. Facts
Bridges, who is black, became a Charter employee on or about June 26, 2000. In connection with her employment, Bridges completed and submitted Charter's form employment application. The application asked whether the applicant had ever been convicted of a felony and whether the applicant had ever been fired or forced to resign. Bridges checked "No" in response to both questions. Both answers were false. In fact, at that time, Bridges had three previous felony convictions. (People v. Bridges, No. 88-30289-FH (Muskegon, Mich. Cir. Ct.), Plea Tr. at 3-5, 10-12, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 10.) Bridges had also been terminated by at least two employers. (Bridges v. Meijer, Inc., No. 96-3-33976-NO (Muskegon, Mich. Cir. Ct.), Bridges 1/30/97 Dep. at 31, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 16.)
Charter hired Bridges as a Dispatcher at its Norton Call Center in Muskegon, Michigan, at the rate of $10.12 per hour. (Olds Aff. ¶ 2, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 18.) Bridges subsequently transferred to Charter's Walker, Michigan Call Center. (Id.) As a Dispatcher, Bridges was responsible for coordinating interaction between customers, Field Technicians, and Customer Service Representatives and dispatching technicians to respond to customer calls. (Id.) Charter gave Bridges a 7.2% raise on July 5, 2001, retroactive to her anniversary date, which brought her hourly rate to $10.85 per hour. (Id. ¶ 3.) On or about October 21, 2001, Bridges was promoted to the position of Monitoring Specialist. Her duties in that position included monitoring Customer Service Representatives' interactions with Charter customers to ensure quality service. (Id. ¶ 4.) In connection with the promotion, Charter gave Bridges a 26.7% raise, bringing her hourly rate to $13.75.
In the fall of 2002, two positions became open in the Human Resources Department at the Walker Call Center when the Human Resources Manager and the Human Resources Coordinator left Charter for other employment. (Id. ¶ 5.) Veronica Haas ("Haas") was chosen to fill the Human Resources Manager position via a lateral transfer. Prior to the transfer, Haas had been in human resources for approximately 14 years and had been the Human Resources Manager at Charter's Kalamazoo office for approximately six years. (Haas Aff. ¶¶ 1, 2, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 21.) Sharon Olds ("Olds"), Charter's Regional Vice President for Human Resources, and Terie Hannay ("Hannay"), Charter's Vice President for Customer Care in Michigan, decided to offer the Human Resources Coordinator position to Bridges based upon Bridges' previous expressions of interest in Human Resources. (Olds Aff. ¶ 7.) When Olds and Hannay offered Bridges the position, Bridges stated that she was interested in a Human Resources Administrator position — a higher level position than the Coordinator position. Olds informed Bridges that there was no opening for an Administrator position. Moreover, Olds did not think that Bridges, who had not worked in Human Resources prior to that time, had the necessary experience and qualifications for the Administrator position. (Id. ¶ 8.) Bridges accepted the Coordinator position and received a substantial raise that put her rate of pay higher than that of both the previous and subsequent Coordinators and roughly equivalent to the mid-range of pay for an Administrator. (Id. ¶ 9.)
In late November 2002, Haas conducted an investigation into allegations that an employee, Sharon Lyons, used a racial epithet towards a black co-worker whom Lyons had observed threatening a Human Resources Assistant. During the course of Haas' interview of Shelly Yeiter, the employee who witnessed and reported Lyon's comments, Yeiter told Haas that she had already been interviewed by Bridges. (Haas Aff. ¶ 4.) Yeiter also told Haas that Bridges apparently did not realize that Yeiter had reported the incident because Bridges repeatedly asked Yeiter if Yeiter had used the "N word." (Id.) After the interview, Haas spoke with Bridges and informed her that her duties as Coordinator did not include conducting employee investigations and that Haas, as Human Resources Manager, was responsible for conducting such investigations. Haas also told Bridges that she should not jeopardize Human Resources functions, such as investigations, by acting on her own without first conferring with Haas. (Id. ¶ 5.)
On March 28, 2003, Haas conducted an evaluation of Bridges' performance. (3/28/03 Employee Performance Development Discussion Form, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 22.) Some concerns noted were that Bridges had overstepped her boundaries on a couple of occasions by interfering with employee relations investigations and had inappropriately directed employees regarding issues with which she was not familiar, thus undermining her credibility in the Human Relations area. Haas also noted some positives, however, such as that Bridges was a team player, respectful of others, and articulate and diplomatic when expressing herself.
On March 31, 2003, Bridges sent a lengthy e-mail to Olds regarding the evaluation. In short, Bridges was upset with the interview and thought that it was harsh and unfair. More importantly, Bridges claimed that she was entitled to a promotion to Administrator, stating: "I was also told . . . that six months from my transfer over to the HR Department, I would be promoted to Human Resources Administrator, and that no one would try to pull anything to hold me back. You assured no resistance from yourself, Sherry Olds, or anyone else." (Email from Bridges to Olds of 3/31/03, at 2, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 23.) Bridges closed by demanding that she be promoted to Administrator. (Id. at 5.) In contrast to Bridges' recollection, Olds remembered that when Bridges accepted the Coordinator position, she merely told Bridges that they would review the issue of the Administrator position in six months. (Olds Aff. ¶ 8.)
Concerned about the tone of Bridge's email, Olds scheduled a meeting at the Walker Call Center for April 18, 2003. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) Although Bridges insisted on cancelling the meeting unless Olds intended to promote her to Administrator, Olds held the meeting in order to salvage the working relationship and because she still believed that Bridges could be a valuable part of the Human Resources Department. (Email from Bridges to Olds of 4/17/03, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 24; Olds Aff. ¶ 12.) During the meeting, Olds informed Bridges that everyone wanted Bridges to succeed, but Bridges repeatedly insisted that Olds had promised the promotion. When Olds asked Bridges how she could be so certain of that, Bridges said something to the effect of "I have a very, very good memory." (Id. ¶ 13.) Following the meeting, Olds discussed the issue with Hannay, and they concluded that they did not make such a promise because at the time, they had no way of knowing how Bridges would perform in the Coordinator position. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Olds met with Bridges again on May 1, 2003, to discuss the promotion issue. Haas also attended the meeting. During the meeting, Olds tried to explain the reasons why she felt Bridges was not ready for the promotion, including the tone of her emails to Olds and Haas. Bridges became upset and eventually informed Olds and Haas that she had tape recorded all of their prior conversations. Olds asked Bridges whether she was taping the present meeting, and Bridges admitted that she was. Olds then informed Bridges that such behavior was inconsistent with the type of behavior Charter expected of a Human Resources Professional and that it was not in the spirit of attempting to resolve their concerns. Olds told Bridges that her recording was making Olds uncomfortable and that Olds was going to end the meeting. At that point, Bridges informed Olds that she had contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and an attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16; Haas Aff. ¶ 8; Tr. of 5/1/03 Recording, Def.'s Reply Br. Ex. 1.) Olds told Bridges that she was completely within her rights to do so. Olds said, however, that she felt Bridges' failure to disclose the recording was deceptive and showed that Bridges knew her conduct was inappropriate. (Olds. Aff. ¶ 17.)
Shortly after the meeting, Olds and Haas placed Bridges on administrative suspension for secretly recording workplace conversations. (Id. ¶ 18.) The following day, after further discussion with Olds, Haas terminated Bridges on the grounds that her secret recordings were contrary to Charter's open communications policy and could be detrimental to Charter's Human Resources Department. (Haas Aff. ¶¶ 10, 11.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party.Id.The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (quotingMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
III. Discussion
Bridges alleges two discrimination and two retaliation claims under Title VII. Bridges' discrimination claims are that: (1) Charter failed to promote her to Human Resources Manager; and (2) Charter failed to promote her to the Administrator position. Bridges' retaliation claims are that (1) Charter retaliated against her for participating in an internal "civil rights" investigation; and (2) Charter discharged her in retaliation after Bridges informed Charter that she had contacted the EEOC.
As an initial matter, the Court finds it appropriate to address the sufficiency of Bridges' response to Charter's motion. As Charter notes, Bridges did not file an affidavit, either sworn or otherwise subscribed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Instead, Bridges relies solely upon unsworn statements in her brief and miscellaneous documents attached to her brief. Because the statements in Bridges' brief are not sworn, they are not admissible and may not be considered in a motion for summary judgment. See Little v. BP Exploration Oil Co., 265 F.3d 375, 363 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court properly disregarded a letter offered by the plaintiff in response to a motion for summary judgment because it was an unsworn statement). While it is true that pro se plaintiffs such as Bridges are generally afforded more leeway in pleading, see Knecht v. Ohio Adult Parol Auth., No. 98-4201, 2000 WL 659030, at *4 n. 5 (6th Cir. May 10, 2000) (per curiam), the same is not necessarily true with regard to motions for summary judgment. InUnited States v. Ninety Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit discussed the requirement of notice to pro se plaintiffs of the consequences of summary judgment and the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Noting its prior decision in Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988), the court reiterated the rule in the Sixth Circuit that prisoner pro se plaintiffs are entitled to notice of the consequences and requirements of the summary judgment rule, but "no such rule providing `special assistance' exists with respect to nonprisoner pro se litigants." Ninety Three Firearms, 330 F.3d at 427 (citing Brock). Accordingly, Bridges is not entitled to any "special assistance" or leeway with regard to the instant motion. Moreover, the Court notes that this is not Bridges' initial foray into self-representation, and it may be presumed from her prior civil suit and defense of a motion for summary disposition that she understands the requirements. Finally, even if Bridges were entitled to some leeway here, the statements in her brief simply do not address the grounds for summary judgment raised by Charter.
A. Discrimination Claims
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by introducing either credible, direct evidence of discriminatory intent or by circumstantial evidence through the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1997); Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1371 (6th Cir. 1995). In this case, Bridges has not offered any direct evidence, so she must prove her claims through circumstantial proof of discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas based upon a failure to promote, a plaintiff must show that: (i) she is a member of a protected class; (ii) she applied for and was qualified for the position; (iii) she was considered for and denied the promotion; and (iv) an employee of similar qualifications who was not a member of the protected class received the job. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824; Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1996)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of intentional discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to set forth "`a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' . . . for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981)). If the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was motivated by unlawful discrimination rather than by the reasons articulated by the defendant. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S. Ct. at 1093-94).
1. Human Resources Manager Position
Bridges has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the promotion to the Human Resources Manager position because she cannot demonstrate the second and fourth elements of a prima facie case.
As noted above, a plaintiff who seeks to rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework must present evidence showing that he or she was qualified for the position at issue. Charter has presented evidence showing that the preferred requirements of the Human Resources Manager position included: a bachelor's degree in human resources or business administration or equivalent experience; 3 years of human resource or generalist experience; and two years of management experience. (Human Resources Manager II Job Description, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 29.) Bridges has failed to present any evidence showing that she possessed any of these qualifications. See Coleman v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 97-4105, 1999 WL 68711, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' race discrimination claim because they failed to show that they were qualified for the upgraded position of department head). Bridges argues that she was qualified because the prior Human Resources Manager had no prior experience or degree and performed poorly. This argument fails because Bridges has failed to present any evidence to support it. Moreover, even if the prior Human Resources Manager was not qualified, such fact would still not support the proposition that Bridges was qualified for the position. Finally, if what Bridges says was true, it would provide plenty of reason for an employer such as Charter to insist that the next Human Resources Manager be qualified.
The prima facie case also fails because Bridges cannot show that her qualifications were comparable to Haas' qualifications. In order to show that a non-protected employee is similarly situated, a plaintiff must show that the "comparable" is "similarly situated in all respects." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Haas and Bridges are not similarly situated at all. As noted above, at the time of her lateral transfer, Haas had been in human resources for approximately fourteen years and had worked as the Human Resources Manager in Charter's Kalamazoo, Michigan office for approximately six years. Haas also had a master's degree in Human Resources Development. Bridges had none of these qualifications and was not as equally qualified for the position as Haas.
2. Human Resources Administrator Position
Bridges' failure to promote claim regarding the Administrator position must be rejected because Bridges cannot show that an employee of similar qualifications who was not a member of the protected class received the job. There was no opening for an Administrator position and no one ever received a promotion to the position. Moreover, Bridges concedes that there was never an Administrator position at Charter's Walker Call Center. (Bridges Dep. at 244-45, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 2.) Bridges' claimed evidence of discrimination is that Olds or Hannay promised Bridges that she would be promoted to the Administrator position after six months. Even if true, which the transcript of Bridge's tape recording shows it is not, the failure to honor such an agreement does not provide a basis for a discrimination claim.
B. Retaliation Claims
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff's protected activity; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2004). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach may also be applied in evaluating retaliation claims. See Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2000)). If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was mere pretext by showing that the proffered reason: (1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the adverse action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the adverse action. Id. (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
1. Participation in "Civil Rights Investigation"
Bridges' first claim is that Charter retaliated against Bridges for participating in a civil rights investigation, presumably, the Sharon Lyons incident. Charter contends that Bridges' claim fails because she neither engaged in protected activity nor suffered an adverse employment action. Because the Court concludes that Bridges did not engage in protected activity, it finds it unnecessary to address Charter's alternate argument on this claim.
Title VII prohibits retaliation based upon an employee's participation "in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under . . . [Title VII]". 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The internal investigation Bridges relies upon was not in connection with an EEOC charge. In Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit held that "Title VII protects an employee's participation in an employer's internal investigation into allegations of unlawful discrimination where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge."Id. at 543. As support for this holding, the court cited with approval various cases from other circuits, including EEOC v. Total System Services, Inc., 221 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2000), in which the Eleventh Circuit noted that in order for Title VII's protection to apply, "at a minimum, some employee must file a charge with the EEOC (or its designated representative) or otherwise instigate proceedings under the statute for the conduct to come under the participation clause." Id. at 1174 n. 2. As Charter notes, at the time Bridges interviewed Sharon Lyons, no EEOC charge had been filed and no proceedings had been commenced under Title VII. Therefore, Bridges was not engaged in protected activity.
2. Retaliatory Discharge
Bridges' final claim is that Charter terminated her employment in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. Charter contends that Bridges cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot show that Charter would not have discharged her if she had not filed an EEOC charge. In addition, Charter argues that it has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, namely, Bridges' secret recordings of workplace conversations, and Bridges has failed to show that the reason is pretext. The Court agrees on both points.
The Court notes that Charter has presented evidence showing that Bridges' first contact with the EEOC was through correspondence received on May 9, 2003 — eight days after Bridges told Olds and Haas that she had contacted the EEOC. (EEOC Case Log, Def.'s Br. Supp. Ex. 25.)
In order to meet the causal connection requirement of the prima facie case, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference can be reasonably drawn that the employer only took the adverse action because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. See Allen v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 413 (6th Cir. 1999). Bridges' only evidence to support a causal connection is that Olds suspended her 25 minutes after Bridges informed Olds and Haas that she had contacted the EEOC. (Bridges Dep. at 296.) The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that temporal proximity, without other evidence of retaliatory conduct, is insufficient to establish the required causal connection for a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Little, 265 F.3d at 363-64; Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 566; McElroy v. Philips Med. Sys. N. Am., Inc., Nos. 03-6219, 03-6351, 2005 WL 406335, at *10 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 2005) (per curiam); Steiner v. Henderson, No. 03-4195, 2005 WL 221530, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2005). However, in its recent decision in Singfield v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority, 389 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case where he was terminated slightly more than three months after he filed a charge with the EEOC. The court stated that "the temporal proximity of these events is significant enough to constitute sufficient evidence of a causal connection fo the purpose of satisfying [the] burden of demonstrating a prima facie case." Id. at 563. Although Singfield appears at odds with the Sixth Circuit's prior cases holding that temporal proximity alone is insufficient to show a causal connection, there was other evidence in Singfield suggesting a retaliatory motive, such as the fact that the employer did not begin investigating the plaintiff (which led to the grounds for the termination) until after he filed the discrimination charge. Id. at 564.
If temporal proximity alone were enough to establish a causal connection, there would be a strong basis for a causal connection because Olds suspended Bridges shortly after Bridges told Olds and Haas that she had contacted the EEOC, and Haas discharged Bridges the following day. But, the law in the Sixth Circuit is still that the plaintiff "must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the [defendant] took the adverse employment action because [the plaintiff] filed a discrimination charge." Id. at 563. In spite of the close temporal proximity, Bridges revealed her secret recordings — the reason for Bridges' discharge — immediately prior to making the statement about contacting the EEOC. Under these circumstances, there can be no inference of retaliation because Bridges had just admitted the facts supporting the discharge. Moreover, the circumstances suggest that Bridges made the comment about contacting the EEOC not because she had actually filed a charge and therefore sought to use Title VII in a legitimate manner, but in order to insulate herself from discipline because of her deceptive conduct. See Gregg v. Hay-Adams Hotel, 942 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[Title VII] is meant to shield employees from the discriminatory actions of their employers, not to excuse an employee's poor job performance, impudence, or insubordination."). Thus, Bridges has failed to present any evidence supporting an inference that Charter took the adverse action because Bridges claimed she contacted the EEOC.
Bridges' claim also fails because she has failed to show that Charter's reason for terminating her was pretext. Bridges argues in her brief that it is legal under Michigan law for a person to record his or her conversation with another person without the person's consent. Even so, that does not mean that Charter is prohibited from terminating an employee for secretly taping conversations in the workplace. Charter has every right to expect that its employees will not undermine confidence in the workplace by secretly taping conversations. This is especially true for employees in the Human Resources Department. Therefore, Bridges' retaliation claim must fail.
C. Return of Confidential Employee Information
In her response brief, Bridges referred to information regarding other Charter employees which Charter contends was not produced during this litigation. Charter suggests that Bridges either improperly removed this information from Charter during her employment or otherwise received it through illegitimate means. Thus, Charter has requested that the Court order Bridges to return to Charter all confidential documentation in her possession pertaining to Charter, its employees, and former employees, which was not obtained through legitimate discovery methods.
Bridges cited this information in response to Charter's assertion that Bridges falsified her employment application by stating that she had never been convicted of a felony and that she had never been fired or forced to resign from prior employment. The evidence Charter submitted in support of its motion supports this assertion, but it was unnecessary and not relevant to the Court's determination of the summary judgment motion, as was the other evidence pertaining to Bridge's propensity for lying. Therefore, the documents regarding other employees, which Bridges submitted to show that Charter has hired others who have committed crimes, is also irrelevant and unnecessary to the instant motion. In any event, if Bridges improperly took the information from Charter, Charter is entitled to have it returned. Therefore, the Court will order Bridges to return to Charter all documents, if any, pertaining to other employees or former employees that she improperly obtained from Charter.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Charter's motion for summary judgment.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.