Opinion
No. CV06 4016751, CV06 4016758.
November 27, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION APPLICATION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
This matter involves two actions filed by parties to an arbitration conducted by the American Arbitration Association pursuant to a submission to arbitration by the City of Bridgeport (Bridgeport) and the Bridgeport City Supervisors Association (BCSA). The arbitration involved grievances filed by the BCSA on behalf of its member Bonnie Nichols. Bridgeport has filed an application to vacate the arbitration award, and that action has been assigned Docket No. CV06 4016758. The BCSA has filed a separate action to confirm the arbitration award, and that action has been assigned Docket No. CV06 4016751. Both matters address the same issues and facts; the same arbitration decision; and the same employee, Bonnie Nichols. For the purposes of judicial economy, the court issues one memorandum of decision and will file a copy of its decision in each file.
I Procedural History
The City of Bridgeport and the BCSA entered into a written agreement for arbitration pursuant to the current contract between the parties. Nichols, as an employee of Bridgeport, filed three grievances against Bridgeport. The grievances were, thereafter denied, and as a result of these denials, the grievances were arbitrated. The BCSA and Nichols made claims that Bridgeport violated several articles of the BCSA's contract including, failure to follow the proper procedure in transferring employees; violation of layoff and recall procedures; retaliation; unfair labor practices; and a denial of the right to be represented.
Following several evidentiary hearings, the arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), filed a written award on May 10, 2006, finding in favor of the BCSA and Nichols and against the City of Bridgeport. On June 8, 2006, the BCSA and the employee Nichols filed an Application to Confirm the Arbitration Award. On June 9, 2006, Bridgeport filed an Application to Vacate the Arbitration Award. On June 27, 2006 the matters were assigned for a hearing before this court, at which time the court ordered the parties to file a memorandum of law regarding their respective positions on or before July 28, 2006.
II Arbitration: Standard of Review
The court begins its analysis by stating the standard of review for arbitration awards. "Because [courts] favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, [courts] undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution." Board of Police Commissioners v. Stanley, 92 Conn.App. 723, 733, 887 A.2d 394 (2005), quoting State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 252 Conn. 467, 474, 747 A.2d 480 (2000). "The standard of review relative to arbitration awards depends on the nature of the challenge. With a voluntary, unrestricted submission to an arbitrator .º.º. the court may only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission .º.º. In making such a comparison when the submission is unrestricted, the court will not review the evidence or legal questions involved, but is bound by the arbitrator's legal and factual determinations .º.º." Id.
"Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined .º.º. When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement .º.º. When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission .º.º." Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).
"A submission to arbitration is unrestricted if there is no express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights or conditioning the award on court review." Board of Education v. Civil Service Employees, 88 Conn.App. 559 (2005) 870 A.2d 473; Wachter v. UDV North America, Inc., 75 Conn.App. 538, 545 n. 9, 816 A.2d 668 (2003).
"Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that .º.º. the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved .º.º. In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact .º.º." Id. at 80.
"The significance .º.º. of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrators' decision .º.º." Id. at 80-81.
"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have .º.º. recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute .º.º. (2) the award violates clear public policy .º.º. [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 .º.º. [Section] 52-418(a)(4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Id. at 81.
"In our construction of § 52-418(a)(4), we have, as a general matter, looked to a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers .º.º. We have also recognized, however, that .º.º. [a]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 80-81, quoting, Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 86, 92-95, 868 A.2d 47 (2005).
"The standard for reviewing a claim that the award does not conform to the submission requires what we have termed `in effect, de novo judicial review.' State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 265 Conn. 771, 789, 830 A.2d 729 (2003)." Id. at 84. "Thus, a claim that the arbitrators have "exceeded their powers" may be established under § 52-418 in either one of two ways: (1) the award fails to conform to the submission, or, in other words, falls outside the scope of the submission; or (2) the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law." Id. at 84.
"Although we have not explained precisely what `in effect, de novo judicial review' entails as applied to a claim that the award does not conform with the submission, that standard best can be understood when viewed in the context of what the court is permitted to consider when making this determination and the exact nature of the inquiry presented. Our review is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission. Our inquiry generally is limited to a determination as to whether the parties have vested the arbitrators with the authority to decide the issue presented or to award the relief conferred. With respect to the latter, we have explained that, "as long as the arbitrator's remedies were `consistent with the agreement' they were within the scope of the submission." State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, supra, 265 Conn. 790; see also In re Matter of Granite Worsted Mills, Inc., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969) ("where it is clear from face of award itself .º.º. that the arbitrator has included an element of damages specifically excluded by the contract pursuant to which he obtained his very authority to act, he exceeds his powers under the contract and the award thus made must be vacated upon proper application"). In making this determination, the court may not engage in fact-finding by providing an independent interpretation of the contract, but simply is charged with determining if the arbitrators have ignored their obligation to interpret and to apply the contract as written. See Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 3713, 35 Conn.App. 804, 811, 647 A.2d 755 (1994) (concluding that trial court improperly granted plaintiff's application to vacate arbitration award because, in determining whether award conformed to submission, it provided an independent interpretation of contract and thus engaged in fact-finding beyond scope of trial court's powers of review); Board of Education v. Local 818, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 5 Conn.App. 636, 640, 502 A.2d 426 (1985) ("[w]here one party claims that the award, as issued, is inherently inconsistent with the underlying collective bargaining agreement, the court will compare the agreement with the award to determine whether the arbitrator has ignored his obligation to interpret and apply that agreement as written"), citing Hudson Wire Co. v. Winsted Brass Workers Union, 150 Conn. 546, 553, 191 A.2d 557 (1963)." Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., supra, 275 Conn. 85-87.
"To justify vacating an award, however, we must determine that the award necessarily falls outside the scope of the submission. See CT Page 21743 United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ('as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision')." Id. at 98-99.
III The Subject Arbitration Claim
The City of Bridgeport is a municipal employer within the meaning of Connecticut's Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA). See. General Statutes § 7-467(1). The BCSA is an employee organization under MERA and is the legally recognized exclusive bargaining agent for its employee members pursuant to General Statutes § 7-467(6) and the BCSA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 1.1. The parties negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the terms and conditions of employment for BCSA member employees.
Sec. 7-467 reads in relevant part as follows:
(1) "Municipal employer" means any political subdivision of the state, including any town, city, borough, district, district department of health, school board, housing authority or other authority established by law, a private nonprofit corporation which has a valid contract with any town, city, borough or district to extinguish fires and to protect its inhabitants from loss by fire, and any person or persons designated by the municipal employer to act in its interest in dealing with municipal employees;
(2) "Employee" means any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal employer, except elected officials, administrative officials, board and commission members, certified teachers, part-time employees who work less than twenty hours per week on a seasonal basis, department heads and persons in such other positions as may be excluded from coverage under sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 7-471;
(6) "Employee organization" means any lawful association, labor organization, federation or council having as a primary purpose the improvement of wages, hours and other conditions of employment among employees of municipal employers.
Genera] Statutes § 52-417 sets forth the procedure for an order confirming an arbitration award. Section 52-417 provides:
At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.
An award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4), because the arbitrator has exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. LaSalla v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 278 Conn. 578, 898 A.2d 803 (2006). Arbitration in this matter proceeded pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement existing exclusively between Bridgeport and the BCSA. Article 1.1 of the CBA provides:
Sec. 52-418. Vacating award reads in relevant part:
(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
The Employer recognizes the Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the purpose of establishing salaries, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment for all of those supervisory and professional employees in the City of Bridgeport,(listed by classifications herein, see Exhibit A, attached hereto.
The CBA specifically recognizes the BSCA as the "sole and exclusive" bargaining agent for the "Assistant Director-Clean and Green," the position occupied by Nichols, the BCSA's grievant member in this case. The matter proceeded to arbitration on the following issues:
1. Did the City of Bridgeport violate the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Bridgeport and the Union by allegedly transferring, or laying off, Bonnie Nichols?
2. If so, what shall the remedy be?
In his decision dated May 10, 2006, the arbitrator found as facts, that Nichols commenced her employment with Bridgeport in January 1995 as a Community Planner in the Office of Policy and Economic Development (OPED). This position was affiliated with the LIUNA Union and not the BCSA Union. In July 1997, Nichols was appointed a Special Project Coordinator, which was also a LIUNA position and she received a salary increase to $39,000. In July 1999, Nichols was appointed as Assistant Director of Mayoral Initiatives, a BCSA position, with a salary of $55,900. This position was part of Bridgeport's "Clean and Green Initiative" to make the city more attractive. The Clean and Green initiative was funded through the Public Facilities Department's budget.
The City Council "unfunded" and terminated the Clean and Green division in its budget for fiscal year 2001-2002. Nichols and four other positions in the Clean and Green program were transferred to the Parks Administration Division of the Public Facilities Department. In doing so, the Council's actions did not modify Nichols's job title, salary, department or union affiliation. Thus, while the Council eliminated the Clean and Green division, it did not eliminate Nichols's position of Assistant Director of Mayoral Initiatives. Thereafter, in May 2001, Nichols was reassigned to the Construction Management Services (CMS). CMS is within the Public Facilities Department.
As a member of CMS, Nichols was never reclassified as a Project Manager. However, she reported to the Director of the CMS, and she was presented with a job description of a Project Manager. Nichols worked as a Project manager and received business cards identifying her title as Project Manager. She represented herself to others as a Project Manager. The arbitrator also found that she contacted Bridgeport to discuss the irregularity of her title versus her actual job duties, but was unable to resolve the problem.
Eventually, due to budget cuts, the City Council adopted a budget for 2002-2003 fiscal year which eliminated Nichols' position of Assistant Director of Mayoral Initiatives along with the entire CMS Division. On or about June 10, 2002 by way of correspondence, Bridgeport informed Nichols that she was laid off effective June 28, 2002, and that she should contact Bridgeport regarding any "bumping rights" she might have.
On June 14, 2002, Nichols sent a letter to Bridgeport requesting an immediate transfer to one of three positions which were: (1) Deputy Director of OPED; (2) Project Controls Engineer; and (3) Public Works Traffic Foreman. By way of a letter, dated June 25, 2002, Nichols's request was denied. Bridgeport informed her that the Deputy Director of OPED was a LIUNA Union position; that the Project Controls Engineer was an unfunded position; and that the position of Public Works Foreman had been denied after consultation with department supervisors.
The arbitrator then summarized the position of the respective parties and stated that the Union contended that Nichols was discharged or "constructively discharged" by Bridgeport in that Nichols's removal from the Office of Mayoral Initiatives did not follow known policies of Bridgeport. The BCSA contended that Bridgeport violated Article 28 of the CBA regarding transfers, by failing to transfer Nichols to a Project Manager's position. The BCSA alleged, "reluctantly," that the BCSA CBA is controlling concerning that issue because Bridgeport never officially transferred Nichols to a LIUNA Union position, although she was effectively transferred to the new position. Therefore, through no fault of Nichols, her claim must be pursued in accordance with Article 28 of the BCSA CBA. The BCSA contends that Bridgeport violated Article 28 because (1) Bridgeport did not complete the required paperwork; and (2) the transfer was mandatory, not discretionary. According to the BCSA, Nichols was functioning as a Project Manager, not the Assistant Director of Mayoral Initiatives. Therefore, when the lay-off of Nichols occurred, she has bumping rights which were denied by Bridgeport.
The BCSA also argues that Bridgeport violated the terms of the BCSA CBA by failing to follow proper lay-off and recall rights pursuant to Article 9 and Article 8. One position that Nichols requested bumping right for was denied because it was a LIUNA Union position. However, the BCSA claims that if Nichols had been properly transferred, she would have been a LIUNA member and the LIUNA position would have been available to her. The second position, Project Control Manager was denied to her because Bridgeport stated it was not funded in the budget year. The BCSA believed there was sufficient funding. The third position was denied to Nichols because Bridgeport represented that she was unqualified for the position, despite Nichols's contention that she was, in fact, qualified. The BCSA also argued that Bridgeport violated Article 4 of the BCSA CBA by sub-contracting work that Nichols was qualified to perform by hiring a private contractor at a greater cost.
Article 9 is the section pertaining to "Lay-Off and Recall" of employees subject to the BCSA CBA with Bridgeport.
Article 8 contains provisions regarding seniority.
The BCSA also argued that Bridgeport violated Articles 9.3 and 11 of the contract by not allowing bumping and recall rights to Nichols because if Nichols had been properly transferred, she would have been a LIUNA member, allowing her to bump into numerous positions or to be recalled to those positions.
Article 9.3 states "Any employee covered by the terms of this agreement and subject to being laid-off shall have the right to bump down to a job classification previously held, provided they have greater seniority than employees occupying the lower classification .º.º."
Article 11 sets forth the Grievance and Arbitration Procedures to be followed pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the parties.
Lastly, the BCSA contended that Nichols was unfairly retaliated against, was denied representation at a union hearing and was subject to unfair labor practices. The BCSA claims Nichols was treated in a disparate manner after cooperating with the FBI concerning corruption in the administration of the former Mayor of Bridgeport.
The arbitrator also summarized Bridgeport's position in the arbitration hearing. Bridgeport argued that Nichols failed to prove a protected right under Article 28 of the CBA and therefore, it did not violate Article 28. Secondly, Bridgeport contends that Nichols was not transferred, but rather, she was reassigned within the same department. Thirdly, Bridgeport argues that it did not possess the unilateral authority to make Nichols a LIUNA Project Manager, as any reclassification would have been subject to collective bargaining obligations and the rights of LIUNA members, who would have objected to any attempt to reclassify Nichols. According to Bridgeport, Nichols never claimed to be a LIUNA Project Manager, and she retained her same rate of pay and never claimed to be part of LIUNA until it became necessary and beneficial to assert a claim for bumping rights, some two and a half years after her lay-off.
Bridgeport argued that Nichols was not entitled to bumping rights as her classification was a "sole classification" and, thus, there was no one she could bump. Nichols's previous position were with LIUNA and not the BCSA. Bridgeport also maintained that it did not violate Article 28 of the CBA. Transfers under Article 28 were either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary transfers are requests by employees which Bridgeport had the discretion to grant or deny. Bridgeport denied Nichols's requests for voluntary transfers because the positions were (1) not BCSA positions; (2) were unfunded positions; and (3) were denied after consultation with the proper department heads. Bridgeport stated that Article 28 transfers are not bumping rights positions but, rather, are transfer positions.
IV Arbitrator's Decision and Award
The arbitrator found that the BCSA and Nichols had met their burden of proof that Bridgeport has violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between Bridgeport and the BCSA and sustained the grievance regarding Nichols. The arbitrator found that Nichols was not discharged or constructively discharged, but was constructively transferred in May 2001 when she was assigned to the Constructive Services Department. The question the arbitrator needed to resolve was whether Nichols was still the Assistant Director of Mayoral Initiatives and a member of the BCSA, or essentially, a Project Manager with LIUNA. The arbitrator found that "[I]t was apparent the grievant (Nichols) was functionary as a Project Manager with CMS" despite the fact that she still held the salary and title of Assistant Director of Clean and Green on the Bridgeport's records. Upon her transfer to CMS her duties reflected those of a Project Manager. She also received business cards identifying her as a CMS Project Manager and various policies regarding vacation leave associated with project managers applied to her. This transfer, therefore, should have resulted in Nichols becoming a member of the LIUNA Union, not the BCSA. The arbitrator acknowledged that a transfer to LIUNA may very well have been objected to by LIUNA members, but reasoned that this would have forced Bridgeport to confront the issue and to take other proper remedies regarding Nichols's employment.
The arbitrator concluded that Nichols should have remained an employee of Bridgeport because if she had been properly classified as a Project Manager and transferred to LIUNA she would have recall rights with the LIUNA bargaining unit. The arbitrator also found an alternative basis for reinstating Nichols. He found that Bridgeport acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Nichols the position of Public Works Traffic Foreman which was a BCSA position. Nichols had requested a voluntary transfer to this position, and Bridgeport denied it without explanation. The position was later filled within 60 days after Nichol's lay-off by a non-BCSA member.
Lastly the arbitrator found in behalf of Bridgeport regarding the claim that Nichols was retaliated against or that Bridgeport acted in a discriminatory or disparate manner, and that Bridgeport did not improperly sub-contract out Nichol's job functions.
In making his findings the arbitrator ordered that Nichols should be immediately reinstated to either:
1. The Public Works Foreman position; or
2. A LIUNA position that Nichols would have been entitled to transfer into, bump into, or be recalled into, at the time of or after, her lay-off.
The arbitrator additionally found that Nichols should be awarded back pay, seniority and all other benefits, set off by any earnings received by her from the time of her lay-off to the time of her reinstatement.
V Discussion
In its memorandum of law, Bridgeport concedes that the submission in this case was unrestricted for purposes of its motion to vacate the award. Bridgeport argues, however that it is readily apparent that: (1) the award does not conform to the submission because the arbitrator awarded Nichols rights under the collective bargaining agreement that was not before him; and (2) the award fails to conform to the submission and is not mutual, final and definite because it fails to specify an exact location for Nichol's reinstatement.
Bridgeport notes that the submission, as phased by the arbitrator, specifically addresses whether Bridgeport violated the provisions of the CBA between Bridgeport and the BCSA by allegedly transferring or laying off Nichols. Despite the fact that the BCSA CBA was the only union contract at issue, the arbitrator rendered an award granting a BCSA member a reinstatement in a LIUNA union position that Nichols "would have been entitled to transfer into, bump into or recall into at the time of or after her layoff." The BCSA argues that the fact that the arbitrator's award granted Nichols the right to be placed in a LIUNA union position, which is a separate union affiliated position than one under the subject CBA between the BCSA and Bridgeport, has no effect on the award being outside the scope of the submission. The BCSA states that Article 28 of the CBA governing transfers does not state that the affected employee is only allowed to transfer into positions affiliated with the BCSA. Rather Article 28 states that the employee is to be transferred to the same job or job of equal classification, not of equal classification within positions only affiliated with the BCSA. The BCSA continues that the fact the arbitrator awarded Nichols to be placed in either the Public Works Foreman position or the LIUNA position, does not, in fact, give Nichols relief under the LIUNA contract and the award does give Nichols relief she was entitled to under the BCSA collective bargaining agreement.
The court agrees that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the submission. Neither Bridgeport or the BCSA vested the arbitrator with authority to decide issues or to award relief concerning a position in LIUNA, another bargaining unit. The CBA between Bridgeport and the BCSA specifically limited the grievance and arbitration procedure to "[a]ny grievance or dispute, which may arise between the parties, concerning the application, meaning or interpretation of this Agreement .º.º." See Article 11 of the CBA. The arbitrator was not authorized to decide issues or to confer relief beyond the scope of the BCSA collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's authority to award relief must be consistent with the agreement to be within the scope of the submission. Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., supra, 275 Conn. 85-86; State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, supra, 265 Conn. 790. By granting Nichols a right to a LIUNA union position, the arbitrator implicated an analysis of the bumping rights and recall provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Bridgeport and LIUNA, and that analysis would involve an analysis of Nichols's rights in LIUNA both at the time of, and following the layoff of Nichols. As such, the award is beyond the scope of the submission and must be vacated.
Bridgeport additionally argues that the award exceeded the scope of the submission because the relief was not mutual, definite and final because if Bridgeport opts to place Nichols in the LIUNA union position, new litigation will ensue. LIUNA will contest the placement of Nichols into a LIUNA position, and Bridgeport will be forced, at its peril, to determine a BCSA member's alleged transfer, bumping rights and recall rights under the LIUNA CBA from the time of Nichols's layoff to the present. This will invite controversy and more litigation. State v. AFSCME, 49 Conn.App. 33, 36, 713 A.2d 869 (1998).
Section 52-418(a) provides in relevant part: "Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court .º.º. or .º.º. any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects . . . (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Additionally, "an award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitively fixed." State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, 49 Conn.App. 33, 36, 713 A.2d 869 (1998).
In support of this argument Bridgeport notes that the Connecticut Appellate Court vacated a similar award in State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, supra, 49 Conn.App. 33. That case involved the reinstatement of a corrections officer and noted:
The language of the award orders the grievant to be placed at either Niantic or an alternate facility that would be agreeable to all parties. Because the award does not specify an exact location for placement it is indefinite. If we assume, arguendo, that the union's interpretation of the award is correct, there remains a possibility that the grievant will be placed at a facility other than Niantic and that she will not agree to such placement. Once again, because placement has yet to be determined, further litigation continues to be a possibility, and, thus, the award cannot be said to fix definitively the rights and obligations of the parties . . . Thus, this portion of the award did not conform to the submission, which required that the arbitrator provide a specific remedy upon a finding that the grievant was terminated without just cause . . . Because the remedy remained open to negotiation at the time the award was rendered, and because the award left a specific remedy to the predilection of one of the parties, it was not definite and the trial court properly vacated the award.
Id. at 36-37. The BCSA argues that the award of the arbitrator in the present case was very specific as to the remedy that should be granted in that Bridgeport must reinstate the grievant to the position of Public Works Foreman. If Bridgeport does not do so, then Bridgeport must put Nichols into a LIUNA position that she would have been entitled to be moved to under her contract, at the time of her lay-off. The BCSA argues that Nichols is not of the decision making process, but rather Bridgeport must make the decision as to what position Nichols will assume under the subject award. The BCSA, however, ignores the reality that Nichols will once again become embroiled in litigation should she be awarded a LIUNA union position, as LIUNA, in behalf of its members will very likely challenge any attempt by Bridgeport to award Nichols a LIUNA position that she may have been entitled to at the time of her layoff when she was not, in fact, a LIUNA member.
The court agrees with Bridgeport that the award is beyond the scope of the submission. The arbitrator did not possess the authority to grant Nichols any rights under the separate collective bargaining agreement with LIUNA that will require an extensive review and interpretation of rights under the LIUNA collective bargaining agreement with Bridgeport. LIUNA and its members were not a party to this arbitration and to confirm this award would promote further litigation.
Conformity with General Statutes § 52-418 requires that the award meet the minimum requirements of being mutual, final and definite. Rocky Hill Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn.App. 274, 280, 804 A.2d 999 (2002). "[A]n award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitely fixed." Local 63 Textile Workers Union v. Cheney Bros., 141 Conn. 606, 617, 109 A.2d 240 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959, 75 S.Ct. 449, 99 L.Ed. 748 (1955).
Connecticut courts generally have deferred to the award that the arbitrator found to be appropriate and arbitration is the favored means of settling differences. Board of Education v. East Haven Education Ass'n., 66 Conn.App. 202, 207-08, 784 A.2d 958 (2001) "Despite the general rule counseling deference to arbitral awards, § 52-418(a) lists circumstances under which vacatur of an award is required. One such circumstance is an award that is not mutual, final or definite." General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4); Schoonmaker v. Cummings Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 427-28, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000); Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6.
In vacating the arbitrator's award because it is beyond the scope of the submission, the court is aware that "if part of an award is within the submission and part of it is not, the former may be sustained and the latter rejected if the two can be separated without doing an injustice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Local 1303-260, Council 4, 56 Conn.App. 786, 792, 746 A.2d 217 (2000); see also Bodner v. United States Automobile Ass'n., 222 Conn. 480, 489, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992) (where specific questions submitted for arbitration, portion of award outside submission void). However, the court believes that the arbitrator's findings regarding Nichols's "constructive" transfer, her previous union affiliation with LIUNA and her position at the time of her layoff are so indelibly intertwined and interrelated with the arbitrator's award of rights in a LIUNA position, that one cannot separate these findings and the award withoutdoing an injustice to Bridgeport. Steiner v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, 44 Conn.App. 415, 689 A.2d 1154 (1997) The alternative relief ordered in the award are not sufficiently independent and differently structured so as to allow the court to separate them without an injustice. Id.
VI The Court's Orders
For the reasons set forth herein, the BCSA's motion to confirm the arbitration award, filed in Bridgeport City Supervisors Association v. City of Bridgeport, Docket No. CV06 4016751, is hereby denied, and Bridgeport's motion to vacate the arbitration award filed in City of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport City Supervisors Association, Docket No. CV06 4016758 is granted.