Opinion
No. 36/534.
03-11-1915
BRIDGE v. BRIDGE.
Van Cleve & Van Cleve, of Paterson, for petitioner. Edward Maxson, of Jersey City, for defendant.
Action by Phineas Bridge against Alice Bridge. On final hearing. Decree nisi rendered for petitioner.
Van Cleve & Van Cleve, of Paterson, for petitioner. Edward Maxson, of Jersey City, for defendant.
BACKES, V. C. (orally). I will dispose of the case. This is an action for divorce on the grounds of desertion. The defendant defaulted, and the matter was sent to a master, who reported in favor of a divorce, finding that the defendant had been guilty of desertion, as alleged against her, and that the desertion took place in January, 1908. A decree nisi was entered on that report, and then the defendant wrote to the Chancellor intimating that she had a defense. The Chancellor assigned Mr. Maxson to prosecute Mrs. Bridge's defense, and the matter was referred to me. I heard testimony, and concluded that, if what was then testified to by Mrs. Bridge could be sustained on final hearing, there could be no divorce.
There is a marked difference between the testimony taken before me then and the testimony taken before me now, as to the occurrence on the 23d day of January, 1908, the day the desertion took place. As I recall the testimony of Mrs. Bridge at that time, and supported by her oldest daughter, it was that then and at that time the father ordered them out of the house—told them to go; and that it was upon his direction and with his consent that they left. This was the impression I gathered from their testimony, and it was largely upon it that I based my conclusion that the decree nisi ought to be set aside and the defense interposed. Testimony to the same effect was given upon this hearing, but supplemented by this qualification: That after the petitioner told them to go and to take the furniture, which occurred on other days before, and I think also on the day they left, when they got ready to go, and they told him they were going, he asked them not to go; he begged them to stay; to which they replied that it was too late.
Now, that places the case in a different situation from what I understood it to be at the time I opened the decree nisi, and it removes from the case a most important element of defense which was then offered, viz., that the desertion was not an obstinate one. The argument at that time rested upon the notion that the husband had directed his family to go—ordered them away; that it was not an obstinate desertion; that the separation was with his consent, and not against his will.
I find that is not so. The desertion from the time it occurred in January, 1908, up until the time the petition was filed, was against the will of the husband. He made efforts to see his wife; he wrote her a verydecent letter, which embodied all that the law demands of a husband in making overtures looking to his wife's return, especially a wife who left under the circumstances this wife did, which she ignored. He also made four or five trips to her home, where she was living with the other members of her family, and I think upon one occasion the youngest daughter was seen and said the mother was not home. He saw his wife once, but she declined to yield. Upon other occasions she would have nothing to do with him; would not meet him or give him an opportunity to effect a reconciliation. The desertion was continued for 2 years, and it was obstinate.
Now, let us see whether it was willful on the part of the wife. She deliberately left, not by his order, as I have stated, but because of his conduct, as she now claims. The question is: Was she justified in leaving? She says that in 1895 and 1896 she found a letter in her husband's pocket containing endearing expressions. The letter, she says, was signed "Wife." He says there was such a letter, but not signed "Wife;" that it was signed "Mamie;" and he explains that it was at or about the time he was successful in politics, and that somebody sent it as a joke. The wife says that upon the discovery of the letter and the disclosure of the fact that she had it, to the husband, he admitted that he had criminal relations with this woman—"Wife," or "Mamie," whichever it was. This he now denies, and, of course, if the case stood there and only there, it would not be sufficient to prove or establish a charge of adultery at that time, as it would rest solely upon the testimony of the wife, and that testimony resting upon admissions made by the husband.
It was in 1905, in July of that year, the oldest daughter testifies that she disclosed to her mother, that at or about the time this letter was received she (the daughter), who was then about 14 years of age, had gone on a trip with her father, on the Stonington Line, as I recall, and that on the boat and in a stateroom opposite the one that she occupied was a woman, who was the same woman seen by her with her father at different times in and about their home town, and that the next morning she saw her father in this stateroom, being the same stateroom in which she saw the woman the night before as she entered the boat. Now, that testimony, added to what the wife says her husband admitted to her ten years before, is submitted in this case as against his denial, as proof sufficient in law to maintain the charge of adultery. Nearly 20 years elapsed before the daughter, who bears great ill will towards her father, gave her testimony. More than 10 years passed before she revealed the circumstance to her mother. What she said may be true, but it is of a character and quality I cannot and will not accept as sufficient proof of guilt. I simply say that the charge is not proved.
But, assuming that it had been proved, what have we? Shortly after the time when the wife received the letter she resumed relations with her husband, continued in the household as his wife, and occupied his bed. That she did until July, 1905, when the daughter told her of what she said occurred on the Stonington Line in 1895. Then Mrs. Bridge again left her husband's bed. They had been getting along, in a way, for 10 years. Later in the same year, and on the anniversary of their wedding in November, 1905, there was a part reconciliation between the two. Ho took her to New York to the theater, and for 4 or 5 days prior to that time she occupied his bed with a full knowledge of what the daughter had told her and a full appreciation of the statement and admission supposed to have been made by her husband to her in 1896 when this "Wife" or "Mamie" letter was received. It was after the oldest daughter discovered that her father and mother had become, or were about to become, reconciled, and that the mother was again enjoying her husband's company, and the husband her affections, or were about to do so, that she interposed, and to her influence the wife yielded and again left the bed, and continued so until the time of this desertion. The offense, if committed, was condoned. Condonation will avoid a defense of this kind; but condonation is a forgiveness on condition only; the condition being that the husband treat his wife thereafter with conjugal kindness.
His later offenses consisted of getting drunk and coming home frequently in a beastly state of intoxication, using vile language in the house, boasting of consorting with, and conquests over, other women, etc. I am inclined to believe the petitioner's explanation concerning the boasting about women. In the morning, after being on a spree the night before, his oldest daughter, and probably the younger too, would chide the old man. There was no affection lost between the father on one side, and the daughters, on the other. They would chide him about where he had been the night before, and about the women he had been with, and he, quite naturally resenting it, and in exasperation, would blurt out his preference for his supposed night-before companion. That's all there was to it. That he was actually out with women is not shown.
But the question remains: Was his drunkenness and vile language, which I find to be proved in the case, such a breach of the conditions of the condonation as to avoid the condonation? Missteps or such irregular conduct as interfere with bliss or domestic happiness and disturb or prevent home comforts are not violations of the condition. The limitation of conjugal kindness in the legal sense is that the party forgiven shallabstain from the commission of another matrimonial offense; that is, of any marital misdoings of which the law, through the courts, takes judicial cognizance; for instance, like cruelty, abandonment, adultery, or desertion. They will revive the original offense, and it need not be established by the same quality and quantity of proof as is required where the misconduct is the basis of a decree. Drunkenness and vile language, without more, do not constitute extreme cruelty. They must be forborne as an affliction, under that part of the marriage contract which reads "for better or worse." Not being sufficient grounds upon which this court could seize to separate these parties, if an action were brought a mensa et thoro, they are ineffectual in avoidance of the condonation, and it necessarily follows that they cannot be successfully set up in justification of, or excuse for, the desertion.
So I find that the defendant, on the 23d day of January, 1908, deserted the petitioner; that the desertion has continued from that time down; and that during all that period of time it was obstinate, against the will of the husband. There will be another decree nisi.