Opinion
C.A. No. N14C-07-115 DCS C.A. No. N14C-09-019 DCS (Consolidated)
07-20-2017
BRIDEV ONE, LLC, d/b/a PIREES PIRI PIRI GRILL, JAY PATEL, and MEGHA PATEL, Plaintiffs, v. REGENCY CENTERS, L.P., Defendant.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER AWARDING DAMAGES
On October 31, 2016, the Court issued a Decision After Trial resolving the merits of this litigation. Soon thereafter, the matter was referred to the undersigned to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to the prevailing party. On June 8, 2017, an Inquisition Hearing was held and both parties appeared and presented their respective positions. Having considered the record in this matter as well as the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing, this is my Report and Recommendation.
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 55(b)(2), when deemed necessary and proper, the Court may conduct an inquisition hearing to determine the amount of damages to be awarded.
BACKGROUND
Litigation between the parties commenced in 2014 when Bridev One, LLC d/b/a Pirees Piri Piri Grill ("Bridev"), Jay Patel and Megha Patel (the "Guarantors" and collectively with Bridev, the "Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint that included claims of Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings and Common Law Fraud. Through the Complaint, Bridev, as the tenant, and the Guarantors, sought a judgment voiding a commercial lease and awarding consequential damages, punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, attorneys' fees and other relief. Defendant, Regency Centers, L.P. ("Regency" or "Defendant"), the landlord, answered the Complaint and asserted a cross-complaint alleging Breach of the Lease by Bridev and Breach of the Personal Guaranty by both Guarantors.
The fraud claim was later dismissed by Plaintiffs at trial.
The original case was consolidated with the cross-complaint filed in the matter of Regency Centers, L.P. v. Bridev One, LLC, et. al., C.A. No. N14C-09-019 DCS.
The Decision After Trial was issued after a three (3) day bench trial. The Court found that (i) Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Regency breached the Lease or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (ii) Regency had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bridev breached the Lease and the Guarantors breached their Guaranty. The Court therefore entered judgment against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendant.
The Decision After Trial provides a detailed recitation of the relevant facts and should be referred to for additional background. See Trans. ID 59766351.
On November 16, 2016, Regency filed a Motion for Hearing on Damages and Entry of Final Judgment. Plaintiffs responded in opposition and Regency submitted a reply. After denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, the Court issued an Order referring this matter to the undersigned to conduct an Inquisition Hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of damages to be awarded to Regency. Prior to the hearing, Regency submitted an Updated Motion supplementing its damages figures, Plaintiffs objected and presented several arguments in opposition to the relief requested, and Regency replied. The Inquisition Hearing was held on June 8, 2017 at which time Regency presented several witnesses in support of its position and Plaintiffs countered with limited testimony from Mr. Patel.
Trans. ID #59845422.
Trans. ID #s 59941014 and 60086316.
See Trans. ID #s 60178145 and 60178397. See also Administrative Directive of the President Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware No. 2007-5, dated December 6, 2007 (granting Commissioners the power to hear and enter final judgment in Inquisitions under Civil Rule 55(b)(2)).
Trans. ID #s 60641693, 60707319, 60705841.
A request by Plaintiffs to continue the hearing was denied. See Order at Trans. ID # 60679534.
After consideration of the extensive history of this matter, the relevant pleadings, the evidence presented at the hearing, and the argument of the parties, I recommend that damages be awarded to Regency as set forth below.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Regency seeks to recover three categories of damages including: (1) rent, both past and future, and "Additional Rent"; (2) interest; and (3) attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs objected and argued that Regency's attorney fees and costs were excessive, the Lease required Regency to mitigate its damages claim for rent, Regency cannot recover Common Area Maintenance charges, and the application of interest should be capped at the legal rate or no more than 5.75 %. I will address each of these categories in seriatim.
I. REGENCY'S REQUEST FOR RENT AND ADDITIONAL RENT
In support of its request for an award of damages relating to its rent claims, Regency offered the testimony of William A. Madway ("Madway"), an employee and property manager of Regency.
Section 18.2(b) allows the landlord to bring suit for the collection of Rent (defined in Section 4.1 to include Minimum Annual Rent, Percentage Rent and Additional Rent) and damages without canceling the Lease and with or without taking possession of the Premises.
A. Unpaid Rent
Madway testified that the base rent from December 1, 2013 through June 8, 2017 amounted to $257,542.87. Plaintiffs do not contest the method used to calculate the unpaid rent but rather argue that Regency was required to mitigate its damages. Plaintiffs assert that Regency was obligated to take possession of the Premises at the earliest opportunity and that rent should not accrue after the date when Plaintiffs turned over the key to the property. In reply, Regency refers to the Decision After Trial wherein the Court held that in accordance with Section 18.7 of the Lease, "Regency did make 'commercially reasonable efforts' to mitigate any damages." However, Plaintiffs proffer that this finding was limited to the Court's analysis at the time of trial, and Regency was required to continue to establish mitigation of damages post-trial.
See Trans. ID 60641693, Exhibit A. Through its calculations, Regency provided Bridev with a credit in the amount of $14,810.06 representing the security deposit and $7,405.00 representing pre-paid rent.
Section 18.7 of the Lease requires each of the parties to use "commercially reasonable efforts to mitigate any damages resulting from a default of the other party under this Lease." The Landlord's obligations though are tempered by certain possibilities. The Landlord is not obliged to:
(a) enter into negotiations with prospective tenants until the Landlord has complete possession pursuant to a final and unappealable legal right to re-let;
(b) offer the Premises if there is other space available in the Shopping Center suitable for the prospective tenant's use;
(c) lease the Premises for a lower rent or with unacceptable terms and conditions;
(d) enter into a lease if the proposed use would disrupt the tenant mix of the Shopping Center, violate the terms of any other lease, adversely affect the reputation of the Shopping Center, or be incompatible with the operation of the Shopping Center;
(e) enter into a lease with a proposed tenant that has insufficient financial resources; and
(f) expend funds to make the Premises suitable for a proposed tenant.
See Lease Sections 18.7(a) - (f). The burden of proof as to the reasonableness of Regency's mitigation efforts is to be borne by the Plaintiffs pursuant to the agreement.
I find that Regency is not obligated to offer the Premises to a new tenant when other space in the Shopping Center suitable for that prospective tenant's use is, or soon will be, available. Madway testified at the hearing that space continues to remain vacant at the Shopping Center and therefore, Regency has been unable to re-let the Premises. Plaintiffs did not present any compelling evidence at the hearing to contradict Regency's proffer on this issue. In light of the availability of space in the Shopping Center, Regency is not contractually obligated to mitigate its damages further. For these reasons, Regency is entitled to recover its unpaid rent in the amount of $257,542.87.
B. Additional Rent
Regency also seeks "Additional Rent" in the amount of $86,592.00, representing Bridev's Proportionate Share of Common Area Costs, Taxes and Insurance (hereinafter "CAM charges"). According to the Lease, the estimated CAM charges for 2013 would be a total of $1,580.29 based on the gross leasable area of the tenant's premises in relation to the entire gross leasable area of the building. A tenant's proportionate share of Additional Rent can only increase or decrease when there is an addition or deletion to either the tenant's premises or the landlord's building. Therefore, unless or until the gross leasable space changes, the CAM charges remain the same.
See Lease Section 4.1 ("Tenant hereby agrees to pay Minimum Annual Rent, Percentage Rent and Additional Rent."); Section 4.9 ("Tenant shall pay...additional rent...") and Section 8.6 ("Tenant agrees to pay to Landlord, as Additional Rent, Tenant's Proportionate Share of Common Area Costs, Taxes and Insurance...").
See Section 1.1(o) - (s); and Section 1.1(f) (defining the "Tenant's Proportionate Share" as "the percentage that the gross leasable area ("GLA") of the Premises bears to the entire gross leasable area of the Landlord's Building...").
See Section 1.1(f) and 1.5.
Plaintiffs disputed the award of CAM charges on the basis that no notices were sent documenting the amount owed and therefore, Plaintiffs were unable to assess the validity and amount of the charges. In response, Regency argues that despite the passage of time, the gross leasable space did not change and pursuant to Section 8.6(c) of the Lease, any failure or delay by Regency in delivering a statement "shall not" constitute a waiver of Regency's right to payment of the CAM charges.
In consideration of the express terms of the Lease, and the testimony of Madway, I agree with Regency that CAM charges are recoverable. When entering into the Lease, and guarantying the obligations, Plaintiffs understood that the CAM charges would be an additional charge of $1,580.29 per month. The Lease explained how that figure was calculated and Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by it. They cannot now claim ignorance with respect to how that debt is incurred or calculated. The obligation did not increase despite the passage of time, nor did Plaintiffs present any evidence to show the GLA had decreased or changed. Plaintiffs' evidence in rebuttal consisted solely of the testimony of Mr. Patel that he did not receive notices explaining the CAM charges and therefore, Plaintiffs assert they should not be bound by this debt. I am not persuaded by this argument for two reasons. First, the parties were all aware from the negotiation and execution of the Lease that the tenant was responsible for CAM charges. Therefore, they cannot now claim surprise. Second, Section 8.6(c) preserves Regency's ability to seek CAM charges regardless of whether written notice is provided. If the amount billed had changed over time or evidence had been proffered to show a modification of the GLA, perhaps Plaintiffs' argument would convince the Court otherwise. However, absent either change in circumstance and in light of the remaining evidence presented, I recommend an award of CAM charges in the amount of $86,592.00 as "Additional Rent."
Regency's request for "Additional Rent" includes common area maintenance charges, late fees, insurance, and real estate taxes.
C. Future Rent
Forming a third part of its rent claim, Regency seeks an award of future rent pursuant to Section 18.2(c) which provides that in the event of default, the landlord may
retake possession of the Premises from Tenant by summary proceedings or otherwise, either with or without terminating this Lease, and to sue Tenant for an amount equal to the remaining Rent to become due during the Term (or any extension periods then in effect) discounted to its present value at a discount rate equal to the U.S. Treasury Bill or Note rate with the closest maturity to the remaining term of this Lease as selected by Landlord...
Madway calculated the future rent by looking to the base rent from the date of the hearing through the conclusion of the lease term and reduced or discounted it to net present value, resulting in a total of $94,407.61. Likewise, the CAM charges were calculated through the remaining term, and after discounting to net present value, Regency seeks an additional $23,053.93 for future Additional Rents.
Madway applied a discounted rate of 1.14% - the rate applicable to U.S. Treasury Bills issued on May 23, 2017 with a one-year maturity.
See Regency Trial Exhibit A.
At the hearing, I shared Plaintiffs' concern that they were being asked to pay rent for the remaining term of the Lease, without any party - or the Court - knowing when or if the premises would be re-let. Courts have held though that parties may freely agree that the time for the payment of rent may be accelerated and despite the scant legal authority of comparable cases, Delaware has enforced similar provisions. In analyzing the provision, the courts will look to whether the clause allows recovery in an amount that approximates what the landlord could have reasonably expected to suffer in the event of a breach, and whether damages are difficult to estimate accurately. Assuming this test is met, the clause will be upheld as an enforceable liquidated damages provision. Essentially, a clause for accelerated rent is a valid liquidated damages clause as a matter of law if:
W & G Seaford Assoc., L.P. v. Eastern Shore Markets, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1336, 1347 (D. Del. 1989).
See e.g. Ojausmani, Inc. v. T. Patel, 1994 WL 45443, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 1994).
Piccotti's Restaurant v. Grade's, Inc., 1988 WL 15338, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 23, 1988).
Id.
(1) the injury caused by breach of the lease is difficult or impossible to estimate accurately; (2) the parties intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty; and (3) the stipulated sum is a reasonable pre-estimate of the landlord's probable loss; however if these requirements are not met, then the accelerated rent provision fails as a penalty.49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant §583.
There is limited authority in Delaware further analyzing and applying these concepts. A review of a closely analogous case guides the result. In W & G Seaford Assoc., L.P. v. Eastern Shore Markets, Inc., the United States District Court for the District of Delaware recognized the rather sparse legal authority for determining damages in a similar commercial lease scenario. The District Court found guidance in two Delaware cases where it felt that the measure of damages was the difference between the rent stipulated to in the lease and the fair rental for the balance of the term. However, the court recognized that these cases did not include liquidated damages provisions. The defendant in W & G Seaford Assoc., L.P. argued that enforcement of a provision similar to the one at bar, in light of actual damages, was not reasonable because the landlord would obtain a double recovery in the form of accelerated rent, in addition to repossession of the premises and an ability to re-let to another tenant. The District Court disagreed. The court found that the defendant's "double-recovery" argument failed because the plaintiff would not recover as liquidated damages an amount greater than it would have received had there been no default. Further, a sufficient record had been developed demonstrating that the agreed upon damages bore a reasonable relation to the actual and consequential damages that could have been forecast by the parties at the time they entered into the contract. The same is true in the present case. The accelerated rent, discounted to present value, is reasonable in light of the damages that could have been foreseen by the parties at the time they entered into the Lease. As in W&G Seaford Associates, L.P. case, there is no guarantee that the landlord will be able to re-let the Premises. When parties have entered into a contract and taken a calculated risk, it is not unfair to hold the breaching party to the agreement, regardless of whether the damages prove to be less or non-existent. Regency has limited its request for accelerated rent to the discounted present value and the amount of $117,461.54 should be awarded as well.
714 F. Supp. 1336, 1347 (D. Del. 1989).
Id, citing, Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 923 (Del. 1968); Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 A. 432 (Del. Ch. 1931).
Id. at n. 14.
Cf, American Energy Systems of Washington, Inc. v. Galeano, Inc., 1991 WL 166117, at *3 (Del. Super. July 19, 1991) (finding that actual damages could be easily ascertained in breach of an equipment lease and therefore acceleration clause was unenforceable and penal because the provision allowed for repossession plus total accelerated lease payments and "a lessor's damages never will amount to 'the full amount of unpaid rentals plus reclamation of the leased article.'")
II. REGENCY'S REQUEST FOR INTEREST
The next category of relief relates to Regency's request that any award in this matter bear interest at 12% until paid in full. Madway testified that for the period of December 1, 2013 through June 8, 2017, interest on the base rent was $53,928.27 and interest on the CAM charges was $19,099.69. In support, Regency references Section 1.1(l) of the Lease that defines the "Default Rate" of interest as "[t]he lesser of twelve percent (12%) per annum or the maximum lawful rate of interest permitted by applicable law."
Plaintiffs argue that there is no applicable contractual interest rate because the default rate was not explained, and in the face of an ambiguity, the issue should be interpreted against the Landlord as drafter of the Lease. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the legal rate of interest at the time of breach of 5.75% should be applied. In reply, Regency argues that the lease is not ambiguous and points to Section 25(b) which provides that the Lease shall not be construed for or against Landlord or Tenant and Patel testified at trial that he was represented by counsel throughout the negotiation and drafting process.
Pre-judgment interest is awarded as a matter of right, an express contract rate of interest will be set as the default rate, and post-judgment interest may be awarded in the court's discretion. Presumably, Plaintiffs' reliance on the legal rate of interest is premised on 6 Del. C. §2301(a) that provides "[a]ny lender may charge and collect from a borrower interest at any rate agreed upon in writing not in excess of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate including any surcharge thereon.." However, this section does not apply to situations involving commercial leases or where the amount in controversy is more than $100,000.00.
Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2015 WL 1417329, at *10 (Del. Super. Mar. 23, 2015).
Regency also cites to Millcreek Shopping Center, LLC v. Jenner Enterprises, Inc., in support of its position that pre- and post-judgment interest should be awarded at the contract rate of 12%. This case is directly on point and rejects Plaintiffs' application of the statutory rate. In Millcreek, this court addressed the specific legal question of whether the contract rate of interest or 6 Del. C. §2301 applied in the context of a commercial lease dispute. The court held that 6 Del. C. §2301 only applied to a lender/borrower relationship and that in the case of a commercial lease dispute, not involving a personal loan, the contractual rate of interest as set forth in the lease applied. The court found this likewise applied to the personal guaranties of the judgment-debtor's obligations under the lease.
2017 WL 1282068 (Del. Super., Mar. 31, 2017).
I find that there is no ambiguity in the Lease but rather the "Default Rate" is clearly set forth in the Lease as "the lesser of twelve percent (12%) per annum or the maximum lawful rate of interest permitted by applicable law." See Lease Section 1.1(l). Plaintiffs have not cited to any case that contradicts Millcreek nor have they articulated a sufficient basis to disregard the parties' agreed upon default rate of interest. As such, Regency should be awarded pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate of 12%.
III. REGENCY'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Finally, Regency argues it is entitled to recover all of its attorney fees and costs (no less than $273,255.59) pursuant to Section 18.2 of the Lease as the prevailing party. Plaintiffs though argue that the fees charged by Regency were excessive and should be reduced to a total award of no more than $100,000.00 and in support submits that their counsel charged no more than $89,005.06 for the same or similar work. Furthering their efforts to compare/contrast the fees billed by the firms, Plaintiffs presented the Affidavit of Richard L. Abbott, Esquire (Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 1). In summary form, the Affidavit attests that although Mr. Abbott charged a higher hourly rate than Regency's counsel at times, his total fees were substantially less than that of Regency's counsel.
As an initial matter, the Court must look to applicable law as well as the parties' underlying contract. Section 18.3 of the Lease provides:
In the event that any action, suit or other proceeding is initiated concerning or arising out of this Lease, the prevailing party shall recover all of such party's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in each and every action, suit or other proceeding (including any alternative dispute resolution proceedings), including any and all appeals or petitions therefrom from the non-prevailing party. As used herein, "reasonable attorneys' fees" shall mean the full and actual costs of any legal services actually rendered in connection with the matters involved, calculated on the basis of the usual fee charged by the attorney performing such services.The Lease is clear. The parties contractually agreed that as the prevailing party, Regency "shall recover all" of its reasonable fees and costs, i.e. the full and actual costs of legal services rendered. Notably, the parties' contract itself defines what they perceived to be "reasonable attorney's fees." The only 'catch' is that the attorney must charge his or her "usual fee". Thus, by contractual agreement of the parties, there is no other exception to a full award of attorney fees and costs. Despite this, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not award fees and costs that were excessive or unnecessary.
Plaintiffs did not appear to contest the fact that Regency's counsel charged its "usual fee", and the evidence presented indicates that the firm charged Regency a reduced rate, which could only benefit the Plaintiffs as a result of the fee shifting.
In response, Regency presented testimonial evidence and reviewed each of the factors that the courts consider when determining "reasonableness" as a matter of law. Specifically, "[w]hen determining a reasonable amount under a contractual provision, the Delaware Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts 'to consider the factors set forth in the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct.'" Those factors include:
White v. Curo Texas Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 1369332, at *4 (Del. Ch., Feb. 21, 2017), quoting Mahani v. EDIX Media Gp., Inc., 935 A.2d 242, 245-46 (Del. 2007).
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
White v. Curo Texas Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 1369332, at *4, citing Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.5(a).
Plaintiffs are correct though that the court should also consider whether the time devoted was excessive, redundant, duplicative or otherwise unnecessary. Another safeguard allows a court to decline to award costs that could have reasonably been avoided. In doing so though, the courts have repeatedly rejected a "line-item" review when determining reasonableness as neither useful, nor practicable. Likewise, it is not for the courts to second-guess an attorney's judgment or litigation strategy.
Id, citing Mahani, 935 A.2d at 247-49.
Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2015 WL 1417329 (Del. Super. Mar. 23, 2015).
White v. Curo Texas Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 1369332, at *5, citing Aveta Inc. v. Bengoa, 2010 WL 3221823, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2010); Blank Rome, LLP v. Vendel, 2003 WL 21801179, at *8-10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2003), Weichert Co. of Pa. v. Young, 2008 WL 1914309, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2008).
Id. --------
This matter was initiated when Plaintiffs filed a thirteen (13) page Complaint, with fifty-seven (57) paragraphs and four (4) counts against Regency seeking damages of at least $465,715.00 plus consequential damages, punitive damages, pre-and post-judgment interest, costs, attorneys' fees and other relief. Over the course of the last three (3) years, the docket reflects no less than one-hundred ninety-three (193) entries, including at least fifty-four (54) substantive pleadings (such as motions to compel, motions to quash, motions for protective order, cross-motions for summary judgment, motions in limine and a motion for a new trial), twenty-nine (29) orders, six (6) sets of written discovery with responses, fifteen (15) deposition notices, two (2) attempts at mediation, several hearings and teleconferences, and a three (3) day bench trial. Virtually every stage of the litigation has been contested. Regency's cross-complaint sought approximately $463,671.22 in damages plus other relief, and it is evident from the Decision After Trial that Regency prevailed on all of its claims in the litigation.
At the hearing, Regency presented the testimony of Ernst Bell, the Vice-President and General Counsel of Regency. Mr. Bell has been involved in the litigation since its inception and regularly reviewed the attorney invoices as well as approved them when appropriate. Mr. Bell was aware that by accepting the representation, his counsel was precluded from working on other cases, leveraged work to associates and paralegals, and charged a lower rate for fees because of Regency's preferred client status. Throughout the three years of litigation, counsel did not raise its rates and Plaintiffs' counsel charged similar or higher rates.
Although the courts hesitate in performing a "comparison" when awarding fees, I have considered the Affidavit presented by Plaintiffs. Unfortunately though, the Affidavit does not include an itemization of the work performed, invoices, billing statements or other breakdown. Nor did Plaintiffs present any other evidence in support of their counsel's fees. In other words, there is no way for the Court to perform a side-by-side comparison of the fees and costs billed, to know whether Plaintiffs were given any type of preference such as courtesy write-offs, or to ascertain if any arrangements were made that resulted in the lowered fees. In light of the application of the "reasonableness" factors to the present case, and the insufficiency of the Plaintiffs' comparable evidence, I do not find that Regency's fees and costs were excessive. In addition, although Plaintiffs contest the fact that certain fees were incurred as wasteful, when pressured, Plaintiffs could not identify any fees incurred by Regency that resulted in a negative ruling by the Court. Furthermore, the only cost specifically identified by Plaintiffs as unnecessary was the amount incurred for videotaping the depositions of the Patels. However, Bell testified that this cost was de minimis in light of the totality of the litigation and in light of the fact that the Patels were presenting and defending claims, the taping of the depositions does not appear unnecessary.
In summary, the test is not what fees and costs the Plaintiffs believe are reasonable. Rather, pursuant to the parties' contract, the Court "shall" award the "full and actual" fees and costs as long as the amount billed reflects counsel's "usual rate" for similar services. The Lease is clear on this issue. Regardless, after reviewing the factors set forth above, and the evidence presented by Regency, the Court should also award the full amount of Regency's fees and costs as reasonably incurred throughout the long course of this litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, judgment should be entered in favor of Regency and Plaintiffs should be held jointly and severally liable to Regency, as follows:
| Rent and Additional Rent | $461,596.41 |
|---|---|
| Interest | $ 73,027.96 |
| Counsel Fees | $273,255.59 |
| Total Awarded | $807,879.96 |
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Date: 7/20/17
/s/_________
Commissioner Katharine L. Mayer