Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. 11

11 Citing cases

  1. In re Turkey Creek

    2008 OK 8 (Okla. 2008)   Cited 5 times

    ยถ 15 On the notice issue, the COCA relied on three of this Court's prior opinions to support its rejection of the due process challenge mounted by Appellants. The three cases are: In re Conservancy Dist. No. 5, Lincoln County, 1970 OK 81, 471 P.2d 879; Owens v. Tri-County Turkey Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 21, 1966 OK 173, 418 P.2d 674; and Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, in Logan, Oklahoma, Kingfisher and Canadian Counties, 1965 OK 105, 405 P.2d 17, cert. denied 382 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 400, 15 L.Ed.2d 352 (1965). Put simply, the COCA mistakenly relied on the cases because none of them decided the issue as to whether publication notice alone at the appraisers' report stage was sufficient to comply with constitutional procedural due process.

  2. In re the Master Contract between the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict & United States

    85 S.D. 443 (S.D. 1971)   Cited 7 times

    Other courts have determined questions involving similar districts under various legal situations. In Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, 1965, Okla. 405 P.2d 17, the court considered an appeal in a proceeding in the district court where that court entered orders creating the Conservancy District and approving a Works Plan; an original quo warranto proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court was the method that court permitted to challenge that state's Water Conservancy Act which it held valid and constitutional, People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274, and the Supreme Court of Utah also took original jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin a city and water conservation district from performing a contract under its Act. Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 419, 268 P.2d 682.

  3. Owens v. Tri-Cty Turkey Creek Cons. Dist No. 21

    418 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1966)   Cited 2 times

    No appeal was prosecuted to this court from the judgment of the trial court establishing the district or approving the work plan. In Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17, writ of certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, December 13, 1965, this court said: "Where, in the order establishing the district, the court made a finding claimed to be error, but not claimed to be a jurisdictional one, said error, if any, constituted no cause for disturbing the order or dissolving the district, where no appeal was taken from it within 90 days after its entry."

  4. Timpanogos Planning v. Central Utah Water

    690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984)   Cited 25 times
    Overruling a prior case to the extent it addressed a particular constitutional issue but making the decision prospective because the Central Utah Water Conservancy District โ€œand perhaps other water districts have in good faith relied upon our [prior] decisionโ€

    Mont. Code Ann. ยง 85-9-401 (1983); Nev.Rev. Stat. ยง 541.100 (1979). Oklahoma: Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy District No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17 (1965), though upholding the power of the court to appoint the board of directors, points to the checks and balances allowed under its Water Conservancy Act which renders it inviolate from "decisive objections made to the Colorado . . . legislation." Id. at 33.

  5. In re Baby Boy Fontaine

    516 P.2d 1333 (Okla. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    Thus clearly in a case involving an illegitimate baby such as Baby Boy Fontaine, where, at the time his mother's written consent was signed and acknowledged, there was (and still is) no question but that he was a "dependent or neglected child", as that term is defined in S.B. 446 as amended, supra, and he was (by reason thereof) "within the purview of this Act" (Section 1111, supra), the taking, and/or recording, of sworn testimony was not necessary to give the Court jurisdiction "to find" him "a dependent child . . . and to make him a ward of the Court", as the trial court apparently believed. Dispensing with the formal introduction of evidence to establish undisputed facts has been approved in previous cases (see, for instance, Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17, 26); and Jean's counsel's argument has failed to convince us that anything possessing the formal characteristics of "sworn testimony", as that term is used in Section 1111, supra, was necessary to give the Court, acting through Judge U, jurisdiction over Baby Boy Fontaine, as a dependent child. Sections 1104, 1111, 1113, and 1114, supra, which, as Jean's brief points out, were not complied with in this case, obviously apply to proceedings instituted by a party other than the mother of an illegitimate baby.

  6. In re Finley

    1972 OK 155 (Okla. 1972)   Cited 1 times

    With such facts tacitly admitted, there was no need for the Department to prove them. In this connection, notice what we said in Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17, 26, cert. den. 382 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 400, 15 L.Ed.2d 352, about the necessity of proof where a litigant makes no effort to contradict representations made on behalf of his adversary. Under the circumstances, the recitals of the Commissioner's revocation order constituted a prima facie showing in that regard.

  7. In re Conservancy District No. 5, Lincoln County

    1970 OK 81 (Okla. 1970)   Cited 3 times

    The Conservancy Act of Oklahoma, 82 O.S. 1961 ยง 531[ 82-531] et seq. is constitutional. Owens, supra; In re Conservancy District No. 37, Okla., 398 P.2d 525 (1964); Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy District No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17 (1965). Protestants challenge the order establishing the Conservancy District, on asserted constitutional grounds, based on the appraisal of benefits and assessment provisions of the Act, ยงยง 601-649.

  8. Leveridge v. Notaras

    1967 OK 193 (Okla. 1967)   Cited 9 times

    This is consistent with the rules we have applied to pleadings. In this connection, notice the cases cited in Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 11, Okla., 405 P.2d 17, 29, cert. den. 382 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 400, 15 L.Ed.2d 352. If anyone was liable to plaintiff for breach of any express, or implied, covenant of warranty constituting a part of its contract for the sale of the subject auto, it was the Leveridge Motor Company; and any obligation arising out of that contract was a joint one of both co-partners in said Company. That being true, the trial court's rendering of judgment against the co-partnership was the correct way to establish that liability of record.

  9. In re Cottonwood Creek Cons. Dist. No 11

    465 P.2d 782 (Okla. Civ. App. 1969)

    IRWIN, Presiding Judge. In Bridal v. Cottonwood Creek Conservancy District No. 11, 405 P.2d 17, this Court affirmed the judgment of the district court which approved the establishment of the conservancy district; and also affirmed that court's approval of the "Plans For Works Improvements" submitted by the District's Board of Directors, herein referred to as District. Since certain issues presented here involve matters in "Bridal", such case must be considered in conjunction with this appeal. The proposed construction by District of Dam Site No. 33, in Canadian County, form the basis for this action.

  10. Opinion No. 73-196

    Opinion No. 73-196 (1973) AG (Ops.Okla.Atty.Gen. Oct. 26, 1973)

    The Arbuckle Master ConServancy District must fall within these classes in order for the State Treasurer to be authorized to accept the proposed pledge of securities. It was the opinion of the Attorney General in Opinion No. 71-121, that the Arbuckle Master Conservancy District was not a political subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, based upon a construction of 82 O.S. 541 [ 82-541] and 82 O.S. 545 [ 82-545]. Also, in Bridal v. Cotton Creek Conservancy District No. 11, 405 P.2d 17 (1965), the Court held, in considering whether Oklahoma Constitution, Article X, Section 26 applied to a conservancy district as follows: "Article X, Section 26, supra, applies, by its own terms, to, a '. . . county, city, town, township, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of the State, . . . A water conservancy district is none of these." The Court later stated in considering the character of conservancy districts: ". . .