Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-CV-0376
07-31-2023
BRIANNA M,[1] Plaintiff v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI Acting Social Security Commissioner, Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Brianna M., an adult who lives in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3).
This matter is before me upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Commissioner's final decision, and the relevant portions of the certified administrative transcript, the court finds the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly the Commissioner's final decision will be AFFIRMED.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 7, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 15; Doc. 13-2, p. 16). In these applications, Plaintiff alleged she became disabled on August 31, 2014, when she was 23 years old, due to the following conditions: depression, rheumatoid arthritis-seronegative, and learning disabled. (Admin. Tr. 282; Doc. 13-6, p. 23). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs, complete tasks, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, use her hands and get along with others. (Admin. Tr. 296, 342; Doc. 13-6, pp. 37, 83). Plaintiff has at least a high school education. (Admin. Tr. 27; Doc. 13-2, p. 28). Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (Admin. Tr. 27; Doc. 13-2, p. 28).
On October 29, 2019, Plaintiff's applications were denied at the initial level of administrative review and On September 2, 2020 upon reconsideration. (Admin. Tr. 139-147, 153-160; Doc. 13-4, pp. 2-10, 16-23). On September 18, 2020, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Admin. Tr. 161; Doc. 13-4, p. 24).
On December 16, 2020, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Gwendolyn M. Hoover (the “ALJ”). (Admin. Tr. 14-15; Doc. 13-2, pp. 15-16). On April 12, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's applications for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 12-35; Doc. 13-2, pp. 13-36). On April 23, 2021, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”) review the ALJ's decision. (Admin. Tr. 215-217; Doc. 13-4, pp. 78-80).
On February 16, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1-6; Doc. 13-2, pp.2-7).
On March 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision denying the applications is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the law. (Doc. 1). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the court reverse the decision of the Appeals Council as it relates to their denial of the request for review of the decision of the ALJ and award Plaintiff benefits effective August 31, 2014, the alleged onset date for her claims. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
On May 19, 2022, the Commissioner filed an answer. (Doc. 12). In the answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision denying Plaintiff's application was made in accordance with the law and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 12). Along with her answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 13).
Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 17), and the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 23) have been filed. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. This matter is now ready to decide.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Before looking at the merits of this case, it is helpful to restate the familiar legal principles governing Social Security Appeals.
A. Substantial Evidence Review - the Role of This Court
A district court's review of ALJ decisions in social security cases is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court may consider any evidence in the administrative record. However, the claimant and Commissioner are obligated to support each contention in the argument section of their briefs with specific reference to the page of the record relied upon.
The Supreme Court has underscored the limited scope of district court review in this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015).
Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means-and means only-“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).
To determine whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must decide not only whether “more than a scintilla” of evidence supports the ALJ's findings, but also whether those findings were made based on a correct application of the law. In doing so, however, the court is enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh evidence and “must not substitute [its] own judgment for that of the fact finder.”
Furthermore, meaningful review cannot occur unless the final decision is adequately explained. As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
B. Standards Governing the ALJ's Application of The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process