Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-40003-GAO.
October 16, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
Anthony D. Bressi was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; attempt to manufacture with intent to distribute in excess of 100 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a listed chemical with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 235 months. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on March 18, 1998, and a subsequent petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 9, 1998.
On January 5, 2006, Bressi, then an inmate at FMC Devens within this District, filed in this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the relief sought was not available under § 2241, but rather should be sought by a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Section 2255 provides in relevant part as follows:
A prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
At some point Bressi was transferred to United States Penitentiary Canaan ("USP Canaan"), located within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The United States waived any objection to this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the petitioner's new custodian and consented to the substitution of the Warden of USP Canaan for the Warden of FMC Devens as respondent. See Status Report (dkt. no. 14).
The matter of personal jurisdiction over Bressi's custodian is, of course, entirely separate from the question whether the relief Bressi seeks may be obtained by a petition under § 2241. A petition under § 2241 is a proper vehicle to challenge the execution of a sentence, but not its validity. United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that § 2241 "confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence"). Bressi's claims challenge the validity of his conviction and his consequent sentence, rather than the manner in which the sentence is being carried out. Accordingly, they must be presented by a motion under § 2255.
The difference between a § 2241 petition and a § 2255 motion is not just technical fussiness. Section 2255 requires a collateral attack on the sentence to be presented to the sentencing court.Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 357 n. 15 (1st Cir. 1999). The corollary is that the collateral attack on the sentence may not be presented to a court that is not the sentencing court. In this case, that means that Bressi's claims that the conviction and sentence are invalid or unlawful may not be presented here, even where personal jurisdiction over an out-of-this-District respondent is conceded.
Bressi has not addressed a motion under § 2255 to the sentencing court. If he attempts to do so now, he will likely face the objection that the time for bringing such a motion is past. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (imposing a one-year limitation running from the date on which judgment of conviction becomes final). He argues that in this circumstance the so-called "savings clause" of § 2255 opens another avenue of relief, viz. a petition under § 2241. The argument is without merit.
A § 2255 petition does not become "inadequate or ineffective" within the meaning of the savings clause merely because the petitioner has not brought the motion within the prescribed limitations period. See Barrett, 178 F.3d at 50. Such an understanding of the savings clause would "make Congress's AEDPA amendment of § 2255 meaningless." Id. Rather, the "savings clause is most often been used as a vehicle to present an argument that, under a Supreme Court decision overruling the circuit courts as to the meaning of a statute, a prisoner is not guilty within the new meaning attributed to the statute." Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). Bressi does not present a claim that falls within this narrow understanding of the savings clause.
Because his claims are not properly raised under § 2241, this Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction over his petition, and it is therefore DISMISSED.
It is SO ORDERED.