However, § 24(1)( c) serves to prohibit the registrar from restoring the driving privileges of the offender before a specified date. See Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 134 (2007). That date is determined by the number of previous convictions that the offender has had for OUI or "a like offense" (regardless of whether such convictions are in "a court of the commonwealth or any other jurisdiction").
Instead, G.L.c. 90, § 24(1)(c), sets forth certain time periods during which the Registrar is prohibited from restoring a person's license. See Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies and Bonds, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 131, 134 (2007). These time periods are determined by the number of previous convictions a person has for an OUI or a "like offense."
General Laws c. 90, § 24, establishes a set of escalating sanctions for repeat OUI offenders, including progressively longer periods of license revocation. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c ) (2), (3), (3½), (3¾) ; Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 429, 658 N.E.2d 664 (1995) ; Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 134, 872 N.E.2d 1182 (2007). With respect to license revocations based on a driver's conviction of crimes involving operating under the influence, the sanction applicable to a given offender depends upon whether and how many times the offender has been "previously convicted" of OUI.
The statute thus mandated the lifetime revocation of his license. See Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 134 (2007) ("There is nothing in the statute indicating that the registrar is to do anything more than make a simple numerical count of the convictions on record"). Nonetheless, the plaintiff argues that the board's decision should be overturned because it punishes him twice for the same crimes in violation of double jeopardy principles.
Second, the RMV, which was statutorily mandated to impose a one-year loss of license absent successful completion of the § 24D disposition, did not overstep its bounds or interfere with the power of the judiciary when it revoked Dalton's right to operate for one year. See Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 134 (2007) (when revoking a license, the RMV can do no "more than make a simple numerical count of the convictions on record"). Finally, Dalton waived his due process argument by only raising it in a footnote in his brief.
See St. 2002, c. 302, §§ 1-4. "Accordingly, all prior convictions, without limitation in time, may be counted as prior offenses." Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 133 (2007). The defendant takes issue with the lack of records available from his 1992 guilty pleas; however, his bare assertion that his pleas were constitutionally infirm "does not automatically thrust upon the Commonwealth the burden of proving the existence of a contemporaneous record establishing that the plea[s] [were] entered knowingly and voluntarily."