"Where cooperation has been shown, compliance with the Act has already come about, and the imposition of a civil penalty would in no way aid the enforcement of the Act, it has been held that a fine is improper." High Lake Poultry, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 956, 960, 323 N.E.2d 612, 615; see Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 563, 315 N.E.2d 619, 622; Chicago Magnesium Casting Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 489, 495, 317 N.E.2d 689, 694; CPC International, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 203, 208, 321 N.E.2d 58, 61. On review, we give deference to administrative determinations and will not intervene unless the order is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the Board abused its discretion by acting "arbitrarily or capriciously."

General constraints have been established concerning the power of the Board under section 42(a) to levy monetary penalties. Penalties are imposed primarily to aid in enforcement of the Act rather than to impose punishment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1033(c); City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 482, 313 N.E.2d 161.) A monetary fine must be supported by some reasonable ground appearing in the record ( Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619) and must be commensurate with the seriousness of the infraction for which it is imposed. ( City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 517, 373 N.E.2d 512.) Monetary penalties must not be imposed solely to set an example. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. App.3d 517, 373 N.E.2d 512.

And while the Board is vested with broad discretionary powers in imposing penalties ( Monmouth), the assessment may not be arbitrary ( CPC International, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 203, 321 N.E.2d 58; Metropolitan Sanitary District v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 62 Ill.2d 38, 338 N.E.2d 392), and the imposition of a fine must be supported by some reasonable factor appearing in the record. ( Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution ControlBoard (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619; CPC International, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 203, 321 N.E.2d 56.) The Board itself has stated that it is not its policy to penalize those who were honestly trying.

This does not mean that cessation of the violation before the enforcement proceeding commences should bar the assessment of a penalty if such penalty is related to compliance with the Act. Where previous conduct constituting environmental violations has been discontinued, penalties assessed by the Board have been reversed in such cases as Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406, Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619, Chicago Magnesium Casting Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 489, 317 N.E.2d 689, and CPC International, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 203, 321 N.E.2d 58. A review of the aforementioned cases reveals a pattern indicating the relationship of the enforcement proceeding and the discontinuance of the violation. The longer the time period, the lapse between cessation of the violation and commencement of the enforcement proceeding, the more likely such enforcement proceeding is apt to be considered punitive only, having no relation to securing compliance with the Act.

n City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the provision of the Environmental Protection Act which authorizes the Board to impose upon any person who violates its provisions or any regulation adopted by the Board pursuant to the Act, a civil penalty of not to exceed $10,000 for said violation and an additional civil penalty of not to exceed $1000 for each day which such violation continues. • 1 It has also been held that the severity of the penalty should bear some relationship to the seriousness of the infraction, that the imposition of a penalty is not required in every case and when a civil penalty is imposed, the primary purpose must be to aid enforcement of the Act and punitive considerations must be secondary. ( Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406.) Two other considerations are the polluter's sincere desire to eliminate or reduce the pollution ( Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619) and the technical and economic reasonableness of curbing said pollution. • 2 Under the facts presented in the instant case, we consider the imposition of the $10,000 penalty not proper. First, petitioner demonstrated a sincere desire to eliminate, or at least reduce, stack emissions.

" ( 60 Ill.2d 204, 208-10, 326 N.E.2d 406, 408, 409.) To the same effect, see Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619, and Chicago Magnesium Casting Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 489, 317 N.E.2d 689, holding that the mere fact that the respondent firms in those cases had been in violation of provisions of the Act was not alone sufficient to permit imposition of penalties. Furthermore, good faith is a mitigating factor as evidenced by the PCB's own decision in Employees of Holmes Bros. v. Merlan, Inc. (1971), 2 Ill. P.C.B. Op. 405, 409, where it stated:

However, our determination that the Board could have considered evidence that (1) on October 14, Fry was in the process of complying with an agreed order to install pollution devices and (2) that those devices were working by February 1972 and the Board has found those devises to be satisfactory does not mean that the Board could not properly assess a penalty against the petitioner. Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619; Chicago Magnesium Casting Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 489, 317 N.E.2d 689; CPC International, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 203, 321 N.E.2d 58, and High Lake Poultry, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 956, 323 N.E.2d 612, upon which the petitioner relies for the proposition that no penalties may be awarded once he is in compliance, are not in point. In Bresler the company had made efforts to eliminate the emissions even before it appeared any complaint had been made and had stopped the use of the offending incinerator three months before the Board hearing.

The pertinent portion of the Board's opinion stating the basis for the imposition of the penalty has been quoted above. ACA's argument on this issue is that it should have been given an opportunity to comply with the Board's order prior to the imposition of a penalty, citing the appellate court decision in Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board; that there is no evidence in the record that it had received any complaints from anyone about odors or any other emissions from its plant; and the violation herein was minimal in nature and that, therefore, there is no rational basis in the record for the fine, citing Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619. Section 2(b) of the Act states that the purpose of the Act is "* * * to establish a unified, state-wide program * * * to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are fully considered and borne by those who cause them."

The record fails to show recalcitrance, and the abatement of the asserted violations imposes the only sanctions reasonably necessary. Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619. In Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., the court noted that section 33(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1033(b)) provided for procuring compliance through civil penalties in addition to, or in lieu of, a cease-and-desist order.

While the authority to impose variable monetary penalties has been upheld in City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (1974), "[s]uch impositions are, necessarily, subject to judicial review and to appropriate tests to determine whether the imposition is reasonable and proper under its circumstances in each particular case." Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Ill. App.3d 711, 718, 292 N.E.2d 540, 545; Bresler Ice Cream Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 21 Ill. App.3d 560, 315 N.E.2d 619 (1974); City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill.2d 482, 313 N.E.2d 161 (1974). Section 33(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1033(c)(i)) directs the Board to take into account in enforcement proceedings, "the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the protection of the health, general welfare and physical property of the people."