Opinion
CIVIL 1:21-CV-1610
03-14-2022
RAHEEM BRENNERMAN, Petitioner, v. RACHEL THOMPSON, WARDEN, Respondent.
Mariani, Judge
This case has a somewhat protracted and tangled procedural history. Brennerman initially sought, and obtained, and extension of time until December 6, 2021 to file a traverse in this case, but failed to do so. Therefore, we deemed this matter ripe for resolution and filed a Report and Recommendation which recommended the dismissal of the petition as unexhausted. When Brennerman filed a belated second motion for extension of time in which to file a traverse we withdrew this Report and Recommendation in order to give Brennerman every opportunity to respond to this administrative exhaustion defense. Brennerman then filed several requests for extension of time in which to respond to this exhaustion defense, (Docs. 10, 13, 16), before moving to stay these proceedings. (Doc. 18). In this motion to stay, sought Brennerman to stay consideration of this petitions while he exhausted his administrative remedies, thus apparently acknowledging that he had not completed this administrative exhaustion. Because exhaustion is a prerequisite to seeking relief in federal court we denied this stay request, and now file this Report and Recommendation recommending that Brennerman's unexhausted petition be dismissed.
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case is one of two federal habeas corpus petitions recently filed by Raheem Brennerman, a federal inmate housed at the Low Security Correctional Institution (LSCI) Allenwood. In this petition, Brennerman challenges an August 2021 disciplinary proceeding which found that the petitioner had engaged in mail abuse. However, it appears that Brennerman has brought this federal habeas corpus petition without first exhausting his administrative remedies within the federal prison system, as he is required to do. Specifically, a review of the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) computerized records reveals that Brennerman filed only one grievance between August 22, 2021, the date of the charged incident, and September 17, 2021, the date he filed this habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 9 Ex. 1, Lavelle Decl., ¶ 3; Attach. B (Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval) at 7). This grievance did not pertain to the incident report or disciplinary hearing at issue. (Id. ¶ 4). Instead, on September 23, 2021, some six days after he filed this federal case, Brennerman filed an administrative appeal with the Bureau of Prisons' Regional Office challenging this disciplinary citation. (Id.) Thus, this case presents the paradigm of an unexhausted habeas corpus petition.
As discussed below, this procedural default now has substantive significance for Brennerman, since his failure to exhaust these administrative remedies now bars consideration of this petition.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition is Unexhausted.
This petition suffers from a fundamental procedural flaw, since the petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies within the federal prison system. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no express exhaustion requirement, “[o]rdinarily, federal prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981). These exhaustion rules serve an important and salutary purpose. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit requires administrative exhaustion of a claim raised under § 2241 for three reasons: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Gambino, 134 F.3d at 171; Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988).
In this case, it is undisputed that Brennerman has not fully exhausted his administrative remedies, since he neglected to appeal the DHO's decision through the proper channels and ultimately to the Central Office. With respect to unexhausted habeas claims like those presented by here, “[c]ourts in the Middle District of Pennsylvania have consistently held that ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies is not rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative appeals.” Ross v. Martinez, No. 09-1770, 2009 WL 4573686, 3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009). Quite the contrary, rigorously applying these exhaustion requirements, courts have consistently rejected habeas petitions challenging prison disciplinary decisions where the inmate-petitioners have failed to fully exhaust their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williamson, 350 Fed.Appx. 786 (3d Cir. 2009); Pinet v. Holt, 316 Fed.Appx. 169 (3d Cir. 2009); Moscato, 98 F.3d. 757.
As this Court has previously explained when dismissing a federal prisoner's habeas petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies:
In order for a federal prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies, he must comply with 28 C.F.R. § 542. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq. Lindsay v. Williamson, No. 1:CV-07-0808, 2007 WL 2155544, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2007). An inmate first must informally present his complaint to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally resolve any issue before an inmate files a request for administrative relief. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If unsuccessful at informal resolution, the inmate may raise his complaint with the warden of the institution where he is confined. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If dissatisfied with the response, he may then appeal an adverse decision to the Regional Office and the Central Office of the BOP. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.15(a), 542.18. No. administrative appeal is considered finally exhausted until a decision is reached on the merits by the BOP's Central Office. See Sharpe v. Costello, No. 08-1811, 2008 WL 2736782, at *3 (3d Cir. July 15, 2008).Miceli v. Martinez, No. 08-1380, 2008 WL 4279887, 2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2008)
This exhaustion rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings is also subject to a procedural default requirement:
[A] procedural default in the administrative process bars judicial review because ‘the reasons for requiring that prisoners challenging disciplinary actions exhaust their administrative remedies are analogous to the reasons for requiring that they exhaust their judicial remedies before challenging their convictions; thus, the effect of a failure to exhaust in either context should be similar.' Sanchez, 792 F.2d at 698. We require exhaustion for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy. Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at 1052; see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-57, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1312, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975) (exhaustion avoids duplicative proceedings and insures that judicial review will be informed and narrowed); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (circumvention of administrative process diminishes effectiveness of an agency by encouraging prisoners to ignore its procedures). Requiring petitioners to satisfy the procedural requirements of the administrative remedy process promotes each of these goals.Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1996). For these reasons, “a federal prisoner who . . . fails to exhaust his administrative remedies because of a procedural default, and subsequently finds closed all additional avenues of administrative remedy, cannot secure judicial review of his habeas claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice.” Id.
Brennerman's efforts to avoid or negate this exhaustion requirement are unpersuasive. While this exhaustion requirement is a prudential limit on the exercise of judicial power that a court may forego in limited circumstances where no purpose would be served by exhaustion, this case is not one of those narrow instances. The exceptions to this rule favoring full exhaustion are typically restricted to situations where an inmate is attacking the constitutionality of a prison policy, see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005), or the facts reveal that administrative procedures could not have provided the prisoner any meaningful relief. Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Neither of these narrow exceptions to the general rule favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies has any application here. This habeas petition does not challenge the constitutionality of any prison regulation. Instead, it raises a fact-bound question concerning the fairness of certain disciplinary hearings. This is a matter where timely administrative review could have provided Brennerman with meaningful relief. Further, the other goals fostered by full exhaustion would have been promoted in this case. A timely and thorough administrative review of these decisions would have allowed the Bureau of Prisons to develop a factual record and apply its expertise to these facts in a way that would have facilitated judicial review. Proper administrative exhaustion would have also permitted the Bureau of Prisons to grant the relief requested, thereby conserving judicial resources, and would have fostered administrative autonomy by providing the Bureau of Prisons the opportunity to correct any potential errors. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62. Therefore, the prudential factors favoring exhaustion were fully satisfied here and exhaustion was required in this case.
Nor can Brennerman avoid this exhaustion requirement by making a showing of cause and prejudice which would justify excusing him from exhausting these administrative remedies. In fact, it is clear that Brennerman can fully avail himself of these administrative procedures, since he is currently challenging this incident report through this process and has filed the first appeal that is necessary to satisfy this exhaustion requirement.
Thus, the basic legal requirement of administrative exhaustion applies here, and is fatal to this habeas corpus petition. With respect to his complaints in this petition regarding this particular disciplinary citation, Brennerman is an inmate who has failed to exhaust his remedies, and now fails to provide cause and prejudice which excuses this earlier procedural default. Therefore, these unexhausted claims should be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 1) IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DISMISSED without prejudice to renewal when and if Brennerman exhausts his administrative remedies. Further, since the petitioner has not demonstrated “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C § 2253(c)(2); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 773-75 (2017); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) IT IS RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.