“Consideration can be found in benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee.” Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd., 59 N.C.App. 68, 70, 295 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1982); see alsoSessler, 144 N.C.App. at 634, 551 S.E.2d at 167 (“Consideration ‘consists of any benefit, right, or interest bestowed upon the promisor, or any forbearance, detriment, or loss undertaken by the promisee.’ ” (quoting Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78 N.C.App. 334, 338, 337 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1985))).
However, not every comment from the bench creates reversible error. The trial court may admonish counsel not to pursue a specific line of questioning, Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd., 59 N.C. App. 68, 295 S.E.2d 607 (1982), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983), and it may stop examination of a witness if such examination is futile. Greer v. Whittington, supra.
Second, many of the remarks were justified admonishments to keep the trial moving. Brenner v. Little Red Schoolhouse, Ltd., 59 N.C. App. 68, 295 S.E.2d 607 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983). Third, His Honor also admonished plaintiff's counsel and directed several remarks at him, thereby indicating that no favoritism was felt for either side.
Moreover, where a contract has been partially performed, as is the case here, a modification of its terms is treated as any other contract and must also be supported by consideration. Brenner v. School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 274 S.E.2d 206 (1981), appeal after remand, 59 N.C. App. 68, 295 S.E.2d 607 (1982), review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983). It is well established that consideration sufficient to support a contract or a modification of its terms consists of "any benefit, right, or interest bestowed upon the promisor, or any forbearance, detriment, or loss undertaken by the promisee."
The South Carolina Reporter's Comments state "a legitimate contractual allocation of risk which may be one-sided through superior bargaining power, should not be affected by this Commercial Code section." Unconscionability has generally been recognized as including the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them. Brenner v. Little Red School House, Limited, 302 N.C. 207, 274 S.E.2d 206, appeal after remand, 59 N.C. App. 68, 295 S.E.2d 607, review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1981), citing Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 10 S.Ct. 134, 33 L.Ed. 393 (1889). In support of his argument for unconscionability, Phillips cites the cases of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (1948), Bank ofIndiana, National Association v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104 (1979), and Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1181 (1970).
) (under contract with school, plaintiff not entitled to refund of tuition because she became sick and unable to undertake scheduled course of study); Missouri Military Academy v. McCollum, 344 S.W.2d 636 (Mo.App. 1961) (entire contract payable despite student's withdrawal from school); Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc.2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749, affirmed, 33 A.D.2d 1106, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1969) (enrollment contract entire and indivisible and therefore, student not entitled to recover tuition paid since he breached contract without cause); Van Brink v. Lehman, 199 A.D. 784, 192 N.Y.S. 342 (1922) (endorsing entire contract principle); William v. Stein, 100 Misc. 677, 166 N.Y.S. 836 (1917) (school's complaint to recover balance due on contract for tuition and board, which expressly provided no reduction for absence or withdrawal except in case of protracted illness, improperly dismissed); Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 274 S.E.2d 206 (1981), appeal after remand, 59 N.C. App. 68, 295 S.E.2d 607 (1982), review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983) (contract providing for nonrefundable payment of tuition is enforceable as written); Vidor v. Peacock, 145 S.W. 672 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912) (parent's obligation for tuition not discharged by son's illness which rendered son incapable of attending school). In Tabor Academy v. Schwartz, 129 N.J.L. at 390, 30 A.2d 22, defendant enrolled his two sons in plaintiff boarding school in the Fall of 1938.