Opinion
1D22-1253 1D22-1286
08-02-2023
Thomas Bartholomew Brennan, Appellant, v. Dillon Syfrett, Stephanie Walker Syfrett, obo S.W.S., a minor and J.W.S., a minor, Appellees. Justine K. Chase, Appellant, v. Dillon Syfrett, Stephanie Walker Syfrett, obo S.W.S., a minor and J.W.S., a minor, Appellees.
John W. Roberts, Stephen F. Barber, Daniel S. Rosenheim, and Tristan A. LaNasa, Law Offices of John W. Roberts PLLC, Santa Rosa Beach, for Appellant. Robert J. Powell, Moorhead Law Group, Pensacola; Amelia H. Beard and Nicholas J. Youtz, Moorhead Law Group, Santa Rosa Beach, for Appellees.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.
John W. Roberts, Stephen F. Barber, Daniel S. Rosenheim, and Tristan A. LaNasa, Law Offices of John W. Roberts PLLC, Santa Rosa Beach, for Appellant.
Robert J. Powell, Moorhead Law Group, Pensacola; Amelia H. Beard and Nicholas J. Youtz, Moorhead Law Group, Santa Rosa Beach, for Appellees.
B.L. THOMAS, J.
Appellants in these consolidated cases are husband and wife and respondents to petitions for protection against stalking and injunctive relief under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes. The trial court granted the injunctions against Appellants. We reverse the injunctions.
As in some cases involving such petitions, the heart of the matter here is unneighborly conduct by Appellants. The complained of behavior included Appellants riding four-wheelers on their own property at night and shining four-wheeler lights in the direction of Appellees, installing lights to illuminate the fence line in the direction of Appellee, spreading manure and horse stall cleanout near the fence line and around the property, feeding horses near the fence line, staring at Appellees from Appellants' property, and calls to state agencies about Appellees. While there was not evidence of Appellants firing a gun on their property, there was testimony about Appellee Dillon Syfrett firing a gun and running towards Appellant Chase. Finally, there was no evidence of Appellants installing cameras on their property, but Appellees submitted video evidence of their constant recording of Appellants.
Unneighborly conduct may reach a point when one party decides to seek injunctive relief under section 784.0485, which, among other grounds, provides relief when the respondent has "committed stalking" or "previously threatened, harassed, stalked, cyberstalked, or physically abused the petitioner." § 784.0485 (1), (3). Stalking injunctions deprive citizens of important rights, including the constitutional right to possess a firearm under section 784.0485(6)(e), Florida Statutes. They carry serious restrictions of freedoms that can also result in criminal liability when violated, with punishment up to one year in the county jail. See § 784.0847(4)(a)(4), Fla. Stat.
Before a court may impose an injunction against stalking, the court must find that the alleged conduct would inflict substantial emotional distress on a reasonable person. Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In addition, under sections 784.048(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, the trial court must find that no legitimate purpose existed to justify the conduct. The question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support these two legal conclusions is reviewed de novo. Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So.3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
It is imperative to recognize that the act of "stalking," upon which a petition for injunction may be based, is abhorrent and criminal conduct, a first-degree misdemeanor under section 784.084(2), Florida Statutes. "A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). "'Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). "'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). But "[t]he term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized protests." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
As this court has noted, the stalking statutes authorizing protective injunctions are not designed to "keep the peace" between neighbors "who for whatever reason, are unable to get along and behave civilly toward each other." Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So.3d 986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Power v. Boyle, 60 So.3d 496, 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Courts must be careful not to apply the stalking statute to infringe on another person's constitutionally protected freedom of association or free speech or apply in an overbroad manner to reach non-malicious conduct. See generally, Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla. 1995). In Bouters, the supreme court noted that Bouters' constitutional claims of free speech were meritless where he repeatedly called his ex-girlfriend, entered her home, threatened to harm her, and violated a domestic-violence injunction. Id. The court emphasized that the definitions in the stalking statute proscribed criminal conduct: "The statute proscribes a particular type of criminal conduct defined at length in the statute." Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
The stalker's common purpose is often to strike fear in and demoralize and dehumanize the victim, whereby the stalker hopes to accomplish a deviant, perverse, or other evil act. See, e.g., Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So.3d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Lukas, this Court held that a single act of stalking could support an injunction for repeat violence, as the act of stalking itself required repeated acts of harassment and following. Id. at 1217. The perpetrator in Lukas told the victim she "needed to talk to him," that he "would not harm her" but he "might rape her," he "knew where she lived," he knew the roads she used to drive home, he knew what she was wearing at home last night, and other repulsive comments that would clearly cause a reasonable person to suffer fear and had no legitimate purpose. Id. at 1218.
As the court in Bouters held, the statute requires that the alleged conduct must cause "substantial emotional distress" in a reasonable person, not a subjective assertion of such distress:
In the present case, Bouters claims that the statutory definition of "harasses" is impermissibly vague. Under the statute, "[h]arasses" means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992). Bouters contends that this creates a subjective standard for "substantial emotional distress," and that an unduly sensitive victim may suffer such distress from entirely innocent contact.
The court in Pallas v. State, 636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), correctly addressed this issue:
In our view the statute creates no such subjective standard, but in fact creates a "reasonable person" standard. The stalking statute bears a family resemblance to the assault statutes. Under the assault statutes, it is settled that a "well-founded fear" is measured by a reasonable person standard, not a
subjective standard. Indeed, "where the circumstances were such as to ordinarily induce fear in the mind of a reasonable man, then the victim may be found to be in fear, and actual fear need not be strictly and precisely shown." The same principle applies to the definition of "harasses" under the stalking statute; the legislature has proscribed willful, malicious, and repeated acts of harassment which are directed at a specific person, which serve no legitimate purpose, and which would cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted). We agree with this analysis and find that the statute is not impermissibly vague.Bouters, 659 So.2d at 238 (footnote omitted).
This does not mean that courts must ignore dangerous behaviors, as noted above for example in Lukas, that often involve implied threats by persons attempting to coerce another person to comply with the stalker's demands. As we have noted:
Stalking only requires "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. As such, it is not a direct act of violence.... The stalking statute was designed to protect women from being harassed by exhusbands or former boyfriends, by ensuring that victims did not have to be injured or threatened with death before stopping a stalker's harassment.Khan v. Deutschman, 282 So.3d 965, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (affirming an injunction against dating violence, which includes a necessary element of stalking).
But the courts have repeatedly reversed injunctions where a reasonable person would not have suffered emotional distress from the asserted conduct. See Mitchell v. Brogden, 249 So.3d 781, 782- 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (extensively citing authority supporting reversal).
We do not discount the discomfort caused to Appellees. But the trial court reversibly erred by granting the injunction under section 748.0485, Florida Statutes, because the conduct at issue would not have caused serious emotional distress in a reasonable person, and in addition, there was no evidence that the conduct lacked any legitimate purpose.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to vacate the injunction.
RAY and MK THOMAS, JJ, concur