With regard to constructive knowledge, a property owner is under a duty “to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not know and to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement and use of the premises.” Brennan v. Freight Room, Inc., 226 Ga.App. 531, 533 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted)

See Best v. Dublin Eye Assoc., P.C., 188 Ga. App. 225 ( 372 S.E.2d 495) (1988) (landlord liable for placement and maintenance of defective mat). Poor lighting along a path intended for use by invitees can make it difficult for an invitee to discern a hazard. Sykes, supra (nonworking light fixture prevented plaintiff from seeing sidewalk construction); Brennan v. The Freight Room, 226 Ga. App. 531 ( 487 S.E.2d 109) (1997) (poorly illuminated walkway prevented plaintiff from seeing curb and drop in elevation); Sacker v. Perry Realty Svcs., 217 Ga. App. 300 ( 457 S.E.2d 208) (1995) (poor lighting in parking lot prevented plaintiff from seeing out-of-place railroad tie). "`The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property.

For example, in Hull v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 269 (235 SE2d 601 ) (1997), we held that a tenant who came home for lunch during the work day and then slipped on ice outside of her apartment when returning to work was entitled to a jury trial in her case against her landlord, despite her awareness of the ice before she fell, because she had to leave to get back to work and it would be unreasonable to require her to stay home. Also, in Brennan v. Freight Room, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 531 (487 SE2d 109 ) (1997), we held that a restaurant patron who was injured in a fall while walking on a walkway as she was leaving the facility was entitled to a trial on her personal injury claim despite that she, obviously, knew that it was dark when she left and that the path was poorly lighted. In doing so, we found that it was a disputed fact as to whether an alternate safe means of egress was readily accessible to her.

Under Georgia law prior to the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 343, superior knowledge of the owner was necessary for the duty to warn and to guard against unreasonable dangers known to the owner, but the invitee had a duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. See Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170, 173 (2) ( 138 S.E.2d 77) (1964) (citing 20 RCL 56, § 52 for this proposition); See also Whatley v. Nat. Svcs. Indus., 228 Ga. App. 602, 604 (1) ( 492 S.E.2d 343) (1997); Jet Food Stores v. Kicklighter, 226 Ga. App. 552, 553 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 120) (1997); Brennan v. The Freight Room, 226 Ga. App. 531, 533 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 109) (1997); Newell v. Great A P Tea Co., 222 Ga. App. 884, 885 (2) ( 476 S.E.2d 631) (1996).Whatley v. Nat. Svcs. Indus., supra; Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509, 529-530 ( 317 S.E.2d 853) (1984) (storm drain behind housing project clogged up causing ponding where children drowned).

Under the rule set forth in Gaydos, she assumed the risk of her injuries by deviating from the relatively safe path. 226 Ga. App. 531, 534(2) ( 487 S.E.2d 109) (1997) This is not a situation in which the plaintiff contends that she was a virtual prisoner in her own apartment.

This case is distinguishable from Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 ( 493 S.E.2d 403) (1997), where the plaintiff was an invitee walking down a lighted and publicly-traveled supermarket aisle. In determining that the issue of Dudukovich's exercise of ordinary care was a jury question, the trial court cited Brennan v. Freight Room, 226 Ga. App. 531, 534 (2) ( 487 S.E.2d 109) (1997). However, in Brennan, there was "a disputed issue of fact as to whether an alternative safe means of egress was readily accessible to appellant."

A " ‘plaintiff must exercise ordinary care for [his] own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the defendant's negligence after it becomes apparent to [him] or in the exercise of ordinary care [he] should have learned of it.’ " Brennan v. Freight Room, Inc. , 226 Ga.App. 531, 487 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1997) (quoting Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon , 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1980) ). The plaintiff is required to make " ‘use of all [his] senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to [him].’ "

With respect to the second prong, a "'[plaintiff] must exercise ordinary care for [her] own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the [defendant's] negligence after it becomes apparent to [her] or in the exercise of ordinary care [she] should have learned of it." Brennan v. Freight Room, Inc., 487 S.E.2d 109, 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (alteration in original). The plaintiff is required to make "use of all [her] senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to [her].'"