Brennan v. Brennan Assocs.

11 Citing cases

  1. Doll v. Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC

    417 Mont. 493 (Mont. 2024)

    ¶48 Brennan v. Brennan Assocs. does not support LBWR’s proffered April 21, 2023 dissociation date. 316 Conn. 677, 113 A.3d 957 (2015). On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, a business partner contested the valuation method for a buy-out distribution after he had been involuntarily dissociated from the business.

  2. In re Johnson

    565 B.R. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2017)   Cited 4 times

    This is especially true here when the Partnership has not come into bankruptcy court seeking relief and the winding up of the Partnership has already begun in State court. The Court will not allow the Debtor to use the bankruptcy court and the automatic stay provisions as a sword to thwart what otherwise will be an orderly liquidation of the Partnership's only asset under Ohio Rev. Code § 1776. See e.g. , Brennan v. Brennan Associates , 316 Conn. 677, 113 A.3d 957, 964 (2015) (wherein the Connecticut Supreme Court determined the proper date of dissociation for purposes of valuing the partner's economic interests under an analogous version of the Uniform Partnership Act.); see also Allan G. Donn, Donald J. Weidner and Robert W. Hillman, Rev. Uniform Partnership Act Section § 701 (2016–2017 ed.) (describing the extensive and complicated process undertaken by state courts to determine the effects of a partner's disassociation before the partnership business is wound up.).For the reasons provided, the Court directs the following:

  3. State v. Jodi D.

    340 Conn. 463 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    In light of this specificity, it would appear that the defendant's hypothetical is inapt. See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan Associates , 316 Conn. 677, 696, 113 A.3d 957 (2015) ("specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same ... statute which might otherwise prove controlling" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We further note that our sister courts have previously rejected claims that the terms "handicap" and "impaired" are unconstitutionally vague.

  4. Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C.

    321 Conn. 244 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 13 times
    In Costello v. Goldstein &Peck, P.C., 321 Conn. 244, 137 A.3d 748 (2016), we stated: ''[I]t is our expressed policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court....

    The requirements under our statutes and rules of practice raise a question of law, to which we apply plenary review and settled rules of construction. See General Statutes § 1–2z (plain meaning rule); Brennan v. Brennan Associates, 316 Conn. 677, 684, 113 A.3d 957 (2015) (statute); Wexler v. DeMaio, 280 Conn. 168, 181–82, 905 A.2d 1196 (2006) (rule of practice); cf. State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (distinguishing trial court's interpretation of Code of Evidence, subject to plenary review, from court's application of correct view of law, subject to review for abuse of discretion).Remedies for a failure to comply with the recognizance or certification requirements under § 52–185(a) and Practice Book §§ 8–3 and 8–4 ; see footnotes 2 through 4 of this opinion; are respectively provided in § 52–185(d) and Practice Book § 8–5.

  5. McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc.

    320 Conn. 299 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 10 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brennan v. Brennan Associates, 316 Conn. 677, 685, 113 A.3d 957 (2015).Section 31–306b (c) provides in relevant part that “[t]he failure of an employer or insurer to comply with the notice requirements ... shall not excuse a dependent of a deceased employee from making a claim for compensation within the time limits prescribed by subsection (a) of section 31–294c....” As we have explained previously in this opinion, the plain language of § 31–294c does not include any provision applicable to claims by a dependent for survivor's benefits if a timely claim has already been filed by the employee during his or her lifetime.

  6. D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. For Urban Home Ownership of New Haven

    212 Conn. App. 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 7 times

    (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brennan v. Brennan Associates , 316 Conn. 677, 705, 113 A.3d 957 (2015). In Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc ., 265 Conn. 210, 231–32, 828 A.2d 64 (2003), the plaintiffs argued on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined the date on which certain actions accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations.

  7. Town of Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC

    187 Conn. App. 604 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 15 times

    Furthermore, no articulation of the court's decision was sought by the defendant with respect to that issue. See Practice Book § 66-5 ; see also Brennan v. Brennan Associates , 316 Conn. 677, 705, 113 A.3d 957 (2015) (responsibility of appellant to ask trial judge to rule on overlooked matter). The defendant alternatively argues that the daily fine imposed by the court should not begin to accrue until the date of the trial court's decision in this case.

  8. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Horsey

    182 Conn. App. 417 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that court "implicitly rejected" defendant’s claim at hearing, where defendant never sought articulation of subsequent ruling

    An articulation is the proper vehicle to test whether a court has failed to consider or overlooked an argument properly raised. See Brennan v. Brennan Associates , 316 Conn. 677, 705, 113 A.3d 957 (2015) (responsibility of appellant to ask trial judge to rule on overlooked matter). Because the defendant has provided no support for his assertion that the trial court failed to consider his standing arguments, we reject that aspect of his claim.

  9. Nutmeg Financial Holdings, LLC v. 249 River Street, LLC

    UWYCV186039241 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 11, 2018)

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brennan v. Brennan Associates, 316 Conn. 677, 684-85, 830 A.2d 711 (2015). Similarly, "[w]ith respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ..." Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 571 (2006).

  10. Derby v. Town of Plainfield Board of Selectmen

    CV175007162S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017)

    The opinion hews to the long-standing rule that " specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling . . . Where there are two provisions in a statute, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one case or subject within the scope of a general provision, then the particular provision must prevail; and if both cannot apply, the particular provision will be treated as an exception to the general provision." This directive is not unique to family cases, and has since been applied in a variety of non-family cases; see, Brennan v. Brennan Associates, 316 Conn. 677, 113 A.3d 957 (2015), and State v. Victor O., 320 Conn. 239, 128 A.3d 940 (2016). Chapter 2 of the Plainfield charter deals generally with town meetings.